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ABSTRACT 
Cloud Computing is the real-world depiction of a long held dream called 
“Computing as Utility”, it emerged in the market with a huge potential to fulfil this 
dream. It promises on-demand service for customers’ software, platform and 
infrastructure needs. Under the scenario, companies do not even need to plan for 
their IT growth in advance in this new “pay as you go” system.  Already, there is 
palpable excitement about its great potential as utility and its scalability and 
instant access features, but there are also nervousness and caution about the 
security gaps, for instance, trust, threats and risks.  Cloud computing could be the 
most significant shift in IT infrastructure of the recent times but yet a great deal of 
work is needed in the area of security to minimise the gaps.  
In our literature review, we discover cloud providers’ unwillingness to 
provide different security related data to its customers. This is a repeated pattern 
and does not seem to have an easy solution as nobody wants to reveal their 
company secrets including policy for hiring employees. Therefore, this research 
also aims to enlighten cloud customers with some basic ideas on how they can 
detect different types of cyber-attacks with the limited resources and access they 
have. 
The study is divided into six major sections. Firstly, an extensive survey on 
cloud computing with the main focus on gaps has done for the specific problem 
definition. Secondly, some thoughts are constructed on novel approaches to 
address some of the widely discussed cyber-attack types using machine learning 
techniques. Thirdly, some of the real life insiders’ activities are detected from the 
performance data in a hypervisor and its guest operating systems. Rule-based 
 ix 
 
learning successfully used for identification of these activities in this section. We 
present the performances of several of the most popular machine learning 
techniques on our activity modelling in a Cloud environment and a comparison on 
performances has been made in identifying a particular activity. Fourthly, the 
study address some of the widely discussed Denial of Service (DoS) attack types 
by using machine learning techniques. We evaluate the techniques’ 
performances by using statistical ranking-based methods, and find the rule-based 
learning technique C4.5, from a set of popular learning algorithms, as an efficient 
tool to classify various DoS attacks in the Cloud platform. Fifthly, we offer an 
alternative view of “Big Data Cloud” with the main aim to make this complex 
technology easy to understand for new researchers and identify gaps efficiently. 
In our lab experiment, we have successfully implemented cyber-attacks on 
Apache Hadoop’s management interface “Ambari”. On our thought about 
“attackers only need one way in”, we have ran cyber-attack on the Apache 
Hadoop’s management interface, successfully turned down all communication 
between Ambari and Hadoop’s ecosystem and collected performance data from 
Ambari Virtual Machine (VM) and Big Data Cloud hypervisor. We have also 
detected these cyber-attacks with 96.3687% accurateness using modern 
machine learning algorithms. Lastly, the study explores a vision on integrating 
Internet-of-Things (IoT) with the power of Cloud Computing and the intelligence 
of Big Data analytics.This part is written with a three layered approach 
understanding the technology, gap and security. The complexity of Big Data 
Cloud has made traditional way of attack detection difficult, this study has applied 
this same difficulty to an advantage by gathering hypervisor’s performance data. 
With a series of lab experiments on different hardware, we have collected 
 x 
 
performance data from all these three layers, then combined these data together 
and finally applied modern machine learning techniques to distinguish 18 different 
activities and cyber-attacks. Our experiments find classification algorithm 
RandomForest can identify 93.9008%, once filtering option discretization is 
selected, we got an accuracy of 93.9918%. We than apply another filtering option 
called instance resampling, to the set of data and we got perfect accuracy of 
97.6787%, this mean that RandomForest can identify 97.6787% of attacks and 
activities in this complex environment. From the existing literature, no one has 
ever attempted similar experiment for cyber-attack detection for IoT neither with 
performance data nor with a three layered approach. 
Over the duration of this study, wide-ranging data has been collected and 
extensive testing has been conducted using real time hypervisor and its guest 
operating systems performance data, and appropriate documentation and 
recommendations is provided through peer reviewed book chapters, journal 
articles and conference papers. In summary, the research on “Combating Cyber 
Attacks in Cloud Computing Using Machine Learning Techniques” is firstly an 
investigative extensive survey on Cloud Computing with the main focus on gaps 
that is slowing down Cloud adoption as well as reviewing the threat remediation 
challenges.  Secondly, some thoughts are constructed on novel approaches to 
address some of the widely discussed cyber-attack types using machine learning 
techniques. Such thoughts captured through a series of experiments are 
expected to give researchers, Cloud service providers and their customers’ 
additional insight and tools to proactively protect themselves from known or 
perhaps even unknown security issues that follow the same patterns. 
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1.1 Background and Significance 
The long-term potential benefits including cost of services by improving 
business outcomes make Cloud Computing an attractive proposition these days. 
To make it more marketable in the wider IT user community one needs to address 
a variety of information security risks. Cloud Computing can be viewed as the 
transformation into reality of a Long-held dream called “Computing as Utility”, it 
emerged into the market with a huge potential to fulfil this dream. It promises on-
demand services for customer’s software, platform and infrastructure needs. In 
its fold, companies do not even need to plan for their IT growth in advance with 
this new “pay as you go” system. Already, there has been upbeat assessment 
about its great potential for utility, scalability and instant access features; but on 
the flip side some are also apprehensive of security gaps, involving for instance, 
trust, threats and risks.  
While Cloud Computing has received mixed reviews from its customers, 
some experts describe it as the reinvention of distributed main frame model [1]. It 
could be the most significant shift in IT infrastructure area in recent times as it 
appears promising but still a great deal of work is warranted in the area of security 
to minimise the gaps. At the time of writing this chapter, we discover a propensity 
in many small or midsized organizations to adopt Cloud Computing mainly to 
reduce upfront investment costs, minimise maintenance work in IT infrastructure 
and to enhance on-demand capabilities. However, there is a risk of depredation 
for not doing an assessment on security and privacy.  
As with any change in IT infrastructure where there are accompanying 
novel risks and opportunities, Cloud Computing is no exception. Shared, on-
demand nature of Cloud Computing expose it to some unique risks that have not 
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been experienced before. In this study, a survey of Cloud Computing with the 
main focus on gaps and their proposed solutions are presented. The presentation 
of the report is in two discourses. The first discourse is on the survey for an easy 
but comprehensive definition of Cloud Computing and understanding its main 
aspects and gaps. The second discourse is on series of experiments for some 
novel approaches to identify attack types using modern machine learning 
techniques including rule-based learning and statistical learning theory. We 
believe our findings with a series of experiments will give researchers, Cloud 
providers and their customers the initiative to proactively protect themselves from 
known or even unknown security issues.  
 
1.2 Scope of the Study 
Cloud providers’ unwillingness to provide different security related data to 
its customers, this is a repeated pattern and does not seem to have an easy 
solution as nobody wants to reveal their company secrets including policy for 
hiring employees. Therefore, this study explores some basic ideas on how Cloud 
customers can detect different types of cyber-attacks in Cloud Computing with 
the limited resources and access they have. To fulfil the requirements of this 
study, some thoughts are constructed on novel approaches together with a series 
of experiments to address some of the widely discussed cyber-attack types using 
machine learning techniques. Such findings captured through a series of 
experiments are expected to give researchers, Cloud providers and their 
customers’ additional insight and tools to proactively protect themselves from 
known or perhaps even unknown security issues that follow the same patterns.  
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The study presents the performance of different machine learning 
techniques using different kernels on attack dataset and does compare with other 
conventional machine learning techniques. Through the process, the study did 
not only establish that a particular algorithm is the best choice but also try to find 
that what other algorithms are most suitable for the purpose.  
 
1.3 Aims of the Study 
The ultimate design goal of this study is to give Cloud customers some 
insights and novel ideas on how they can identify insider’s activity and different 
cyber-attacks without considerable help from the Cloud service providers. 
Therefore this study aims to use the complexity of Cloud architecture to Cloud 
customers advantage by using hypervisor generated performance data and 
present the performances of several popular machine learning techniques on 
attack modelling for the Cloud environment and a comparison has made in 
identifying a particular attack. Therefore the proposed scheme would be able to 
identify the attacks in an intelligent way in the Cloud Computing environment and 
Cloud customers will be also able to do this with the limited access and resources 
they typically have. 
In cyber-attack detection systems, researchers’ put most of their efforts on 
gaining high accuracy whereas other very important aspects such as false alarm 
reduction remain untouched [2]. A very good thing about our series of 
experiments on Cloud Computing [3], detecting insiders attack [4] ,distinguishing 
DDoS attacks from normal activities on Cloud Computing [5] and recent 
experiments of Big Data Cloud and Internet of Things, this study is capable of 
providing training dataset to machine that gives us high accuracy not only in 
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attack detection but also in reduction of false alarm. At the end when all required 
data are collected, this study also implements filtering approach to gain higher 
accuracy.  
 
The key research questions of the study are: 
x How Cloud customers can proactively detect cyber-attacks on Cloud 
Computing without any help from Cloud service providers?  
x In cyber-attack detection process, what is the way for Cloud 
customers to use the complexity of Cloud architecture to their 
advantage? 
x In cyber-attack detection model in Cloud Computing, what can be 
done to reduce false alarm?  
 
With a view of getting answer to above questions, the following major 
objectives are set: 
 
x Conduct an extensive investigative survey on Cloud Computing with the 
main focus on gaps that is slowing down Cloud adoption as well as 
reviewing the threat remediation challenges. 
x Construct some thoughts on novel approaches to address some of the 
widely discussed cyber-attack types using machine learning techniques. 
The thoughts construction have to be in such a way so that Cloud 
customers can detect the cyber-attacks in the Cloud without much help 
from Cloud service providers. 
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x Identify real life insiders’ activities from the performance data in a 
hypervisor and its guest operating systems, this data will be used later to 
reduce false alarm in cyber-attack detection systems.  
x Classify different Denial of Service attacks in Cloud Computing using rule-
based learning. 
x Offer an alternative view of “Big Data Cloud” with the main aim to make 
this complex technology easy to understand for new researchers and 
identify gaps efficiently. Through lab experiment, implement cyber-attacks 
on Apache Hadoop’s management interface “Ambari”, turn down all 
communication between Ambari and Hadoop’s ecosystem and collect 
performance data from Ambari Virtual Machine (VM) and Big Data Cloud 
hypervisor. 
x Explore a vision on integrating Internet-of-Things (IoT) with the power of 
Cloud Computing and the intelligence of Big Data analytics. Use layered 
approach in cyber-attack detection and collect performance data from all 
these layers, then combine these data together and apply modern machine 
learning techniques to distinguish 18 different activities and cyber-attacks. 
x Present the performances of several popular machine learning techniques 
on proposed attack modelling for the Cloud environment and make 
comparison in identifying a particular attack. 
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1.4 Contributions 
The major contributions of this study can be divided into six main 
categories: an extensive review on Cloud Computing security; capture some 
thoughts for proactive attack detection; Monitoring Insiders Activity in Cloud 
Computing; classifying different Denial of Services (DoS) attacks in Cloud 
Computing; evading cyber-attack on Big Data Cloud and a security centric view 
on integrating Internet of Things (IoT) with Cloud Computing and Big Data. Fig. 
1.1 depicts the proposed contributions of this study.  
 
 
Fig. 1.1. Proposed contributions of the study 
1.4.1   Contribution 1: An Extensive Review on Cloud Computing 
Security 
This part of study is an extensive survey on Cloud Computing with the 
main focus on gaps that is slowing down Cloud adoption has been undertaken 
and, at the same time, a review on threat remediation challenges has been 
investigated. The study identifies the top security threats and their existing 
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solutions. Later on investigate the challenges/obstacles in implementing threat 
remediation. 
 
1.4.2 Contribution 2: Some Thoughts for Proactive Cyber-
Attack Detection on Cloud Computing 
This part of thesis constructs some thoughts on novel approaches to 
address some of the widely discussed attack types using machine learning 
techniques. Such thoughts captured through a series of experiments are 
expected to give researchers, Cloud providers and their customers’ additional 
insight and tools to proactively protect themselves from known or perhaps even 
unknown security issues that follow the same patterns. While constructing 
these thoughts, main focus was given to Cloud customers and how they can 
detect these cyber-attacks without any help from Cloud Service providers. In 
order to achieve this goal this study proposed novel way of detecting cyber-
attacks from hypervisors performance data.  
 
1.4.3 Contribution 3: Monitoring Insiders Activities in Cloud 
Computing  
One of the essential but formidable tasks in Cloud Computing is to 
detect malicious attacks and their types. A Cloud provider’s constraints or 
inability in monitoring its employees, and lack of transparency, may make the 
detection process even harder. The study found these insiders’ activities form 
similar pattern in the monitoring systems as some other cyber-attacks because 
these also uses huge computer resources. In this part of study we observe 
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some of the real life insiders’ activities that can be detected from the 
performance data in a hypervisor and its guest operating systems. Rule-based 
learning is successfully used for identification of these activities in this 
research. We further observe that some of these insiders’ activities can on 
occasions turn into a malicious insider’s attack, and thus, need constant 
monitoring in the Cloud environment.  
 
1.4.4 Contribution 4: Classifying Different Denial of Services 
Attacks in Cloud Computing 
The common business practice of existing Cloud providers is that they 
are not transparent when it comes to share security related logs and data with 
its consumers, which adds to the difficulty of cyber-attack detection by a Cloud 
customer. The issue is addressed in this chapter in two parts. First, we 
demonstrate an easy technique on how Cloud customers can collect 
performance data from their Virtual Machine (VM). Second, some thoughts are 
constructed on novel approaches to classify some of the widely discussed DoS 
using machine learning techniques. We evaluate the techniques’ performances 
using accuracy measure. In this part of study we experimented with several 
types of DoS attacks and attack tools which are worth testing in an 
experimental Cloud environment. McDowell [6] listed few symptoms of DoS 
and DDoS attacks such as unusually slow network performance, unavailability 
of a particular website, inability to access any website, dramatic increase in the 
amount of spam. The novelty of our rather rigorous analysis is in its ability to 
identify insider’s activities and other DoS attacks by using performance data. 
The reason for using performance data rather than traditional logs and security-
10 
 
related data is that the performance data can be collected by the customers 
themselves without any help from Cloud providers. To the best of our 
knowledge, no one has made such attempts before. 
 
1.4.5 Contribution 5: A Security Centric View of Big Data 
Cloud With A Novel Way for Evading Cyber Attack on Hadoop 
Ecosystem  
This research proposes a novel idea to present complex Big Data Cloud 
technologies and architecture from a security centric view to an easy way for 
future data scientist and researchers. While we redefined or tried to make 
complex technical terms easy to understand, we make sure nothing has 
changed from its original intended meaning. In this chapter we first offer an 
alternative view of “Big Data Cloud” with the foremost aim to make this complex 
technology easy to understand for new researchers and identify security gaps 
efficiently. The complexity of Big Data Cloud has made traditional way of attack 
detection difficult, we have applied this same difficulty to our advantage by 
gathering data such as Hypervisor’s performance data for Hadoop Virtual 
Machine (VM) and detecting cyber-attacks from that because no one as of now 
actually highlighted what will happen if Hadoop itself is under attack. In our lab 
experiment, we have successfully implemented cyber-attacks on Apache 
Hadoop’s management interface “Ambari”. We also successfully distinguish 
the attacks and activities in an attempt to reduce false positive alerts. On our 
thought about “attackers only need one way in”, we have attacked the Apache 
Hadoop’s management interface, successfully turn down all communication 
between Ambari and Hadoop’s ecosystem and collected performance data 
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from Ambari VM and Big Data Cloud hypervisor. We have also detected these 
cyber-attacks with 96.3687% accurateness using modern machine learning 
algorithms. Apart from detecting attacks we also present the comparative 
benchmark with existing works which are on reducing false alarm in cyber-
attack detection. From the existing researches, no one has ever attempted 
similar experimentation in detection of cyber-attacks on Hadoop using 
performance data. 
1.4.6 Contribution 6: Development of a Security Centric View 
on Integrating Internet-of-Things with the Power of Cloud Computing 
and the Intelligence of Big Data Analytics 
This part of thesis is written through the vision on integrating Internet-
of-Things (IoT) with the power of Cloud Computing and the intelligence of Big 
Data analytics. Putting a sensor on everything around us will create 
opportunities for us to generate more data, power of Cloud will provide better 
storage and management facilities and with the integration of Big Data 
technologies are not only going to make everything intelligent but also will bring 
big economic prospects. But integration of all these three cutting edge 
technologies is complex to understand. This chapter is written with a three 
layered approach understanding the technology, gaps and security. The 
complexity of Big Data Cloud has made traditional way of attack detection 
difficult, we have applied this same difficulty to our advantage by gathering data 
such as Hypervisor’s performance data. With a series of lab experiments on 
different hardware, we have collected performance data from all these three 
layers, then combined these data together and lastly applied modern machine 
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learning techniques to distinguish 18 different activities and cyber-attacks. 
From our experiments we found classification algorithm RandomForest can 
identify 93.9008%, after selecting the filtering option discretization we got an 
accuracy of 93.9918%. We than applied another filtering option called instance 
resampling, to the set of data and we got perfect accuracy of 97.6787%, this 
mean that RandomForest can identify 97.6787% of attacks and activities in this 
complex environment. From the existing literature, no one has ever attempted 
similar experiment for cyber-attack detection for IoT neither with performance 
data nor with a three layered approach. 
1.5  Outline of the Thesis 
Following a comprehensive literature review on Cloud Computing, threats 
and risks, this report presents the findings and potential challenges found in the 
existing literature. Then it investigates the problems identified in the existing 
research and proposes an appropriate research direction and goals to solve those 
problems. Finally, a methodological approach has been presented to meet the 
research goals with the research milestones.  
Chapter 1 describes the general background and motivation of the study. 
Key technology and research contributions are discussed in this chapter. The 
scope and contributions of the study are also presented in this chapter. 
Chapter 2 reviews the literature associated with Cloud Computing with the 
main focus on gaps that is slowing down Cloud adoption as well as reviewing the 
threat remediation challenges.  
Chapter 3 describes the problems discussed in the existing literature and 
identifies objectives of the study in consideration of these problems. This chapter 
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also constructed some thoughts on novel approaches to address some of the 
widely discussed cyber-attack types using machine learning techniques. Such 
thoughts captured through a series of experiments are expected to give 
researchers, Cloud providers and their customers’ additional insight and tools to 
proactively protect themselves from known or perhaps even unknown security 
issues that follow the same patterns. 
Chapter 4 explains a method of identifying insiders’ activity in Cloud 
Computing using machine learning, this data also helped on distinguishing attack 
and activities and later chapters.  
Chapter 5 address some of the widely discussed Denial of Service attack 
types by using machine learning techniques and evaluates the techniques’ 
performances by using statistical ranking-based methods. 
Chapter 6 first offers an alternative view of “Big Data Cloud” and later 
demonstrate a successful method of cyber-attack detection when Hadoop’s 
management interface Ambari is under attack. 
Chapter 7 explores a vision on integrating Internet-of-Things (IoT) with the 
power of Cloud Computing and the intelligence of Big Data analytics. This chapter 
is written with a three layered approach understanding the technology, gaps and 
security. The complexity of Big Data Cloud has made traditional way of attack 
detection difficult, this study has applied this same difficulty to an advantage by 
gathering data such as Hypervisor’s performance data. With a series of lab 
experiments on different hardware, we have collected performance data from all 
these three layers, then combined these data together and lastly applied modern 
machine learning techniques to distinguish 18 different activities and cyber-
attacks. 
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Chapter 8 draws conclusion on findings, recommendations are made and 
proposes future research directions related to this study. 
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2.1  Introduction 
Cloud Computing can be viewed as the transformation into reality of a 
Long-held dream called “Computing as Utility”, it emerged into the market with a 
huge potential to fulfil this dream. It promises on-demand services for customer’s 
software, platform and infrastructure needs. In its fold, companies do not even 
need to plan for their IT growth in advance with this new “pay as you go” system. 
Already, there has been upbeat assessment about its great potential for utility, 
scalability and instant access features; but on the flip side some are also 
apprehensive of security gaps, involving for instance, trust, threats and risks.  
While Cloud Computing has received mixed reviews from its customers, 
some experts describe it as the reinvention of distributed main frame model [1]. It 
could be the most significant shift in IT infrastructure area in recent times as it 
appears promising but still a great deal of work is warranted in the area of security 
to minimise the gaps. At the time of writing this paper, we discover a propensity 
in many small or midsized organizations to adopt Cloud Computing mainly to 
reduce upfront investment costs, minimise maintenance work in IT infrastructure 
and to enhance on-demand capabilities. However, there is a risk of depredation 
for not doing an assessment on security and privacy.  
This chapter outlines detailed survey on Cloud Computing with the main 
focus on gaps that is slowing down Cloud adoption and, at the same time, a 
review on threat remediation challenges has been undertaken. The content of this 
chapter published in the Journal of Future Generation Computer Systems, 
ELSEVIER and the Journal of Security and Communication Networks, John Wiley 
& Sons Ltd. 
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2.2  Cloud Computing Definition 
Before we explore the security and privacy issues in Cloud Computing, it 
is worthwhile to revisit the definition of Cloud Computing. 
In our quest for the definition of Cloud Computing, we perused books and 
articles [7-12] and came up with our own definition that is easy to comprehend 
and yet broad in its scope, which can be visualized in graphical form as described 
in Fig. 2.1. Put in words: 
Cloud Computing is a system, where the resources of a data centre is 
shared using virtualization technology, which also provides elastic, on 
demand and instant services to its customers and charges customer usage 
as utility bill. 
 
Fig. 2.1. Schematic definition of Cloud Computing 
 
Virtualization, elasticity, on-demand, instant service and pay as you go are 
the main characteristics that convert a data centre into Cloud Computing. In a 
typical depiction the word ‘data centre’ may be restrictive because it could be any 
IT resource that can be shared using virtualization technology. But if we walk 
through any of today’s Cloud provider’s office we will witness a large data centre 
full of computer systems in the racks which are used to share resources. So, we 
may as well include the word “data centre” to make our definition more relevant 
to the real world. We have noticed that some existing data centre providers are 
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already rebranding themselves as Cloud providers taking advantage of their 
existing infrastructure as they do not wish to miss out on the “next big thing” in IT 
industry. 
 In some definitions, we found that experts have  added the phrase “using 
internet technology” [13, 14] as a must for Cloud Computing. But our interpretation 
does not make that feature imperative because on premise single organization’s 
private Cloud would not need internet to access Cloud services. Thus, we exclude 
internet from our definition. Furthermore, in Cloud Computing, virtualization is 
used to create multi-tenant architecture, but we did not use the word ‘multi-tenant’ 
in our definition to keep it simple as the encompassing word ‘virtualization’ is 
already there. 
 
2.3  Review of Cloud Computing Standards 
Cloud Computing standards are currently the topic of research of several 
groups and organizations. ‘Cloud Standard Coordination’ was formed in July 
2009, their main “goal is to create a landscape of Cloud standards work, including 
common terminology” [15].  In that vein they have created a Wiki page where 
different Cloud oriented Standard Developing Organizations (SDOs) can update 
their part of research [16]. We have visited each of these SDOs websites and 
attempt here to capture the essence of their areas of research.  The intent is to 
give aspiring researchers a lead as to where to start in the sky of Clouds.  
Cloud Security Alliance (CSA) is a non-profit organization promoting the 
use of best practices, common level of understanding, awareness and guidelines 
for Cloud related security threats [17-19]. The goal of CloudAudit working group, 
which has been working under the guidance of CSA from October 2010, is to 
19 
 
provide a common interface and namespace for Cloud providers to automate the 
audit, assertion, assessment, and assurance of their service environments so that 
their authorized clients can access the services using a similar secured interface 
[20].  
Distributed Management Taskforce’s (DMTF’s) Cloud efforts are focused 
on standardizing management protocols for interactions and development of 
Cloud environments. To reach this goal, they have formed two working groups –  
Cloud Management Work Group (CMWG) and Cloud Audit Data Federation 
(CADF) work group [21]. To address convergence issues between Cloud 
Computing and telecommunications the European Telecommunications 
Standards Institute (ETSI) established the Cloud project.  Their particular interest 
is on the Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) delivery model [22]. The National 
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) is a United States government 
agency; their long term goal is to provide specific guidance to the industry and 
government, they aim to shorten adoption cycle and identify gaps in Cloud 
standards [23].  
Open Grid Forum’s (OGF) Open Cloud Computing Interface (OCCI) 
working group  was originally formed to create remote management API for 
Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS), but their current release of open computing 
interface is even suitable for other service delivery models such as Platform as a 
Service (PaaS) and Software as a Service (SaaS) [24]. Open Cloud Consortium 
(OCC) works with development of standards for interoperability, benchmarks and 
open source reference implementations. They have several working groups 
working at the moment, such as The Open Science Data Cloud (OSDC) working 
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group, The Open Cloud Testbed working group and InterCloud Testbed working 
group [25].  
The Storage Networking Industry Association (SNIA) has created the 
Cloud Storage Technical work group with the aim of developing SNIA architecture 
related to Cloud storage technology [26]. In May 2010 “the open group” merged 
“SOA and Security” and “Security in Cloud” projects to form “Security for Clouds 
and SOA”. Their main objective is to develop best practices, describe and 
understand security and Cloud security architecture [27]. The Open Cloud 
Manifesto group is working on a set of principles for the Cloud community “in the 
belief that Cloud Computing should be as open as all other IT technologies”. In 
their document, they pointed out choice, flexibility, skills and speed, and agility as 
goals for open Cloud with six principles [28].   
Before we discuss the gaps and unique security concerns of Cloud 
Computing, it is imperative that we portray the main aspects of Cloud Computing 
as many of those are actually generated because of its unique features.  
 
2.4  Main Aspects of Cloud Computing 
Cloud Computing actually inherits all the security issues from existing 
systems plus the security issues that has been created due to its unique 
architecture and features. To understand these unique features, we first need to 
put into context the main aspects that form a Cloud system. Jeffery et al. [29] have 
drawn a picture which makes it easy to understand the Cloud system and its main 
aspects. There are other researchers [9, 10, 12, 19, 30-32] who also tried to 
organize and capture different aspects of Cloud Computing.  After doing an 
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extensive review of all these works we have constructed a new framework to 
visualize every piece of detail of a Cloud system as shown in Fig. 2.2.  
 
Fig. 2.2. Understanding Cloud Computing 
In Fig. 2.2 we have categorized a Cloud system into eight main aspects. 
These are features, comparison, service delivery models, deployment models, 
roles, layers, locality and gaps, which is a new addition. Each of these main 
aspects has at least three sub aspects. We linked all sub aspects with the relevant 
main aspects. The new contribution of this section is the introduction of gaps as 
one of the main aspects because we believe it is too important to ignore. 
Furthermore, our assertion is that trust issues, security threats, security risk and 
some other specific Cloud Computing related issues are the main gaps of Cloud 
Computing.  
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2.5  Cloud Computing Gaps 
Despite the huge potential that Cloud Computing has, so far, it has not 
been adopted by the consumers with the enthusiasm and pace that it deserves. 
This can be attributed to the gaps. The National Institute of Standards and 
Technology [23] contends that security, interoperability, and portability are the 
major barriers to a broader Cloud adoption. A group of researchers from the 
University of California at Berkeley [30] identified 10 obstacles to Cloud 
Computing. These are: availability of service, data lock-in, data confidentiality and 
auditability, data transfer bottlenecks, performance unpredictability, scalable 
storage, bugs in large distributed systems, scaling quickly, reputation fate sharing, 
and software licensing. Ness [33]  associates three major barriers to Cloud 
Computing, first, Cloud depends on new approaches to security, second, Cloud 
can break static networks, and third, network automation is critical. By contrast, 
Leavitt [34] describes six challenges which are: control; performance, latency and 
reliability; security and privacy; related bandwidth costs; vendor lock-in and 
standards; and transparency.  
There may be so many ways to define gaps, compounded further by the 
fact that many parties are involved other than Cloud providers and customers. 
However, more importantly, it is the perception of the customers that dictates 
whether they or their organizations are willing to join Cloud Computing that 
matters. What their organizations’ expectations are and what services they are 
going to receive from a particular provider are likely to be the key deciding factors 
in choosing a Cloud provider. From a rather extensive review [23, 30, 33, 34] we 
can define the Cloud Computing gaps succinctly as follows:  
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The factors that are slowing down migration to Cloud Computing from 
existing systems are Cloud Computing gaps.  
In Fig. 2.3 we have drawn a diagram showing the gaps between Cloud 
customers’ expectations and deliverable services based on our understanding 
[12, 17-19, 23, 30, 33-35].  
 
 
Fig. 2.3. Understanding Cloud Computing gaps 
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Cloud customers may form their expectations based on their past 
experiences and organizations’ needs. They are likely to conduct some sort of 
survey before choosing a Cloud service provider similar to what people do before 
choosing an Internet Service Provider (ISP). Customers are expected also to do 
security checks that are centered on three security concepts: confidentiality, 
integrity and availability. On the other hand, Cloud service providers may promise 
a lot to lure a customer to sign a deal, but some gaps may manifest later as 
insurmountable barriers to keep their promises. As we can well appreciate, there 
is a gap between a customer’s expectations and deliverable services. Many 
potential Cloud customers are well aware of this, and consequentially, still sitting 
on the sidelines. They will not venture into Cloud Computing unless they get a 
clear indication that all gaps are within acceptable limits.  
Notwithstanding the fact that Cloud Computing is still nascent in the 
information technology landscape and so many of the future threats may still be 
unknown, we can always analyze the gamut of lessons learned in the past and 
incorporate that in the new architecture. Mikkilineni and Sarathy [36] draw a 
parallel between the state of the data centers today and the evolution of the 
Intelligent Network (IN) infrastructure in telecommunications. They believe that 
the next generation Cloud evolution would be a fundamental transformation. 
Chonka et al.  [37] note that as security experts their experiences premonish the 
same mistakes that occurred during the development of Internet being repeated 
with Cloud Computing. They pointed out that functionality and performance are 
receiving unduly higher priority than security. Unfortunately, customers are less 
aware of the risks.  
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Tim Watson, Head of the computer forensics and security group at De 
Montfort University notes, “although one provider may offer a wonderfully secure 
service and another may not, if the latter charges half the price, the majority of 
organisations will opt for it as they have no real way of telling the difference” [38]. 
While referring to the seriousness about the security threats, George Wrenn, 
Security Solutions Director at Unisys suggested, “Customers must evaluate 
Cloud infrastructure vendors on more than price and top feature sets before 
deciding to move critical systems and applications” [39]. 
 
2.6  Review of Cloud Computing Security 
Choubey et al. [40] have done a short but very specific review of Cloud 
Computing security and identified the key advantages, disadvantages and 
tradeoffs between cost and security. Subashini and Kavitha [14] have done a 
recent survey on the security risks that have been created by the sheer nature of  
different service delivery models. Rad et al. [41]  have done a survey of Cloud 
platforms that mainly focused on foundation, storage system, infrastructure 
service and integration. Chang et al. [42] have done a review on Cloud business 
models where they classify these business models into eight types. They also 
discuss how the Cloud cube model fits into each of these eight models. 
Srinivasamurthy and Liu [43] have done another survey on secure Cloud 
architecture advantages and different security threats with some existing ways to 
minimise these threats. Rimal et al. [32] have attempted to classify the Cloud 
architecture followed by the addition of their own  survey findings on existing 
Cloud services using their classifications.  
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From our observation of these and other analyses [12, 14, 17-19, 32, 35, 
40-44], we tried to integrate all the information and visualize Cloud Computing 
security in a snapshot which is presented in Fig. 2.4. We organized Cloud 
Computing security into three sections: security categories, security in service 
delivery models and security dimensions. 
 
 
Fig. 2.4. Graphical view of Cloud Computing security 
The existing surveys in published literature are mainly on categories and 
service delivery models. Though there are some very good research works on 
security dimensions, they are rather limited in scope and incomplete. Essentially, 
this has motivated us to write a review on Cloud security dimensions. In this effort, 
we found two research works as most cited in literature, which are Cloud Security 
Alliance’s research on top threats [18] and security farm Gartner’s research [35, 
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44].  Coincidently, both of these organizations picked the top seven threats and 
risks respectively. 
 
2.6.1  Major Security Concerns in Cloud Computing 
Some organizations and security farms have released their research 
findings on major security concerns to assist companies interested in joining 
Cloud Computing to make wise decisions being fully cognizant of the associated 
risks. It behoves new customers to ask tough questions and consider getting a 
security assessment from a neutral third party before committing to a Cloud 
vendor.  In June 2008 the security farm Gartner published a report  entitled  
"Assessing the Security Risks of Cloud Computing” [44]. In it, they identify seven 
specific security issues that customers should raise with vendors before selecting 
a Cloud vendor. The specific issues are “Privileged user access, Regulatory 
compliance, Data location, Data segregation, Recovery, Investigative support and 
Long-term viability” [35, 44].  
In November 2009, the European Network and Information Security 
Agency (ENISA) published another research document entitled “Cloud 
Computing: Benefits, Risks and Recommendations for Information Security”. The 
document lists eight important Cloud-specific risks which are: loss of governance, 
lock-in, isolation failure, compliance risks, management interface compromise, 
data protection, insecure or incomplete data deletion and malicious insiders. They 
have also discussed about risk management and provided recommendations 
[12].  
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Cloud Security Alliance (CSA) released version 2.1 of their document 
“Security Guidance for Critical Areas of Focus in Cloud Computing” in December 
2009, where they identified thirteen areas of concerns in three major sections. 
Those are “Section I. Cloud Architecture, Domain 1: Cloud Computing 
Architectural Framework; Section II. Governing in the Cloud, Domain 2: 
Governance and Enterprise Risk Management, Domain 3: Legal and Electronic 
Discovery, Domain 4: Compliance and Audit, Domain 5: Information Lifecycle 
Management, Domain 6: Portability and Interoperability; Section III. Operating in 
the Cloud, Domain 7: Traditional Security, Business Continuity, and Disaster 
Recovery, Domain 8: Data Center Operations, Domain 9: Incident Response, 
Notification, and Remediation, Domain 10: Application Security, Domain 11: 
Encryption and Key Management, Domain 12: Identity and Access Management, 
Domain 13: Virtualization” [19]. 
CSA have published their research findings on the top threats to Cloud 
Computing in March 2010. The purpose of the research was to assist Cloud 
providers as well as their potential customers in identifying the major risks and to 
help them decide whether or not to join in Cloud infrastructure, and also, how to 
proactively protect them from these risks. The top seven threats they mentioned 
are “Abuse and nefarious use of Cloud Computing, Insecure application 
programming interfaces, Malicious insiders, Shared technology vulnerabilities, 
Data loss/leakage, Account, service and traffic hijacking, and Unknown risk 
profile” [18]. However, it has also drawn criticism from some experts. Lacey [45] 
wrote in his blog about CSA research that it contains information on many general 
IT security problem areas but little on specific threats to Cloud Computing. He 
also stated that ‘Unknown risk profile' (the absence of a risk assessment), 
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‘Malicious insiders', 'Data loss or leakage' and 'Abuse and nefarious use of Cloud 
Computing’ are too general to any network security issues. 
It is our contention that the four research works mentioned above [12, 18, 
19, 44] on Cloud Computing security could be regarded as pioneering work to 
guide aspiring future researchers in this area. This however is not intended to 
downplay the importance of other security issues. For instance, Choo [46], a 
Senior Research Analyst from the Australian Institute of Criminology, has pointed 
out that attacks targeting shared-tenancy environment, Virtual Machine (VM)-
based malware, Botnet hosting, launch pad for brute force and other attacks, data 
availability,  and rogue Clouds are key risks. He also identifies espionage and 
regulation and governance as other potential risks. Moreover, some experts 
compare Cloud Computing with the old mainframe model and fear that data could 
be held captive by the providers [1]. Additionally, some professionals have voiced 
their concerns on the current privacy laws strangling the process of addressing 
some of the Cloud Computing specific risks [47].  
As we have found CSA’s research on top threats [18] the most recent 
among the notable research works in Cloud Computing security area, and not 
many reviews are available on it, we have decided to expand on the top seven 
threats in the following section. 
 
2.7   Survey on Top Threats to Cloud Computing 
Securing computer networks and data centres has never been an easy 
task. Shared on-demand nature of Cloud Computing makes it an even more 
challenging job. Selecting an appropriate security procedure requires correct 
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judgement of the threat environment [18].  In this section our main intention is to 
address the gaps in implementing threat remediation.  
 
2.7.1  Abuse and Nefarious Use of Cloud Computing 
CSA mention as some Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS) providers do not 
maintain enough control, hackers, spammers and other kinds of people engaged 
in criminal activities can take advantage of the opportunities such as free limited 
trials. CSA propose strict registration and identity check procedures, enhanced 
monitoring for possible credit card frauds, comprehensive introspection of 
network traffic, and monitoring of public blacklists [18]. 
In a round table meeting, Microsoft representative John Howie once 
complained, because of the privacy laws they are not allowed to look at what 
customers are doing. So, if a malicious individual or organization is performing 
something nefarious (malware, phishing attacks etc.) using their service, they 
cannot immediately know, and have to rely on other mechanisms such as 
notifications and abuse reports [48]. Monfared [49] echoed John’s sentiments in 
his research by saying, “Cloud customers may abuse services which they are 
paying for, hosting a phishing website is an example of it”. He pointed out 
“Communication between different stakeholders play a vital role in mitigating the 
threat, interest of stakeholders are not necessarily in the same direction. 
Therefore conflict may happen” [45].  
Findings of a few researchers [18, 48, 49] corroborate the fact that even 
though CSA propose enhanced monitoring, comprehensive introspection of 
network traffic, and other actions, present privacy laws are restricting Cloud 
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providers to become the first to know if some abuse and nefarious activities are 
in progress in their Cloud.  
 
2.7.2 Insecure Application Programming Interfaces 
As Cloud providers provide some kind of software interfaces to a customer 
to manage and interact with their services, a relatively weak or too much user 
friendly interfaces may expose different kinds of security issues. Suggested 
solutions to address the problem are to analyze the security model of API, strong 
authentication and access control with encrypted transmission, and 
understanding of the dependency chain [18].   
Wrenn [39], Security Solutions Director at Unisys pointed to the fact that 
the security control mechanism (authentication and authorization mechanism) 
may not be adequate to counter bypass attacks and API hacks. This may lead to 
unauthorized access to even privileged user functions. Attackers can steal 
session cookies for access to customer systems and data. He also identified two 
barriers to securing API, which are the inability to audit events associated with 
API use and incomplete log data to enable reconstruction of management activity. 
The worst case scenario could be the complete loss of control over the customer 
Cloud infrastructure [39].  
Andrei and Jain [50] praised the API use in Cloud Computing for its 
centralized model. They said Cloud Computing helps software developers in 
creating multiple evaluation environments for their applications, software 
monitoring can be done by monitoring API calls for server requests. If there is a 
centralized architecture for data storing, all efforts can be focussed in one 
direction resulting in better monitoring. While discussing vulnerabilities in web 
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application layer in their paper, Grobauer et al. [51] said that API functions share 
many vulnerabilities with web application layer. As most Cloud services are likely 
to be web services, to access web URL customers need to use web applications 
through web browsers which share more vulnerabilities than other avenues of 
sharing vulnerabilities.  
From the works of [18, 39, 50, 51] we can summarize that there are some 
advantages of monitoring API in Cloud Computing based centralized system, but 
web application based API mostly share more vulnerabilities.  Though CSA 
suggested a few remediation measures, there are still some gaps. These gaps 
are the inability to audit events associated with API use and incomplete log data 
to enable reconstruction of management activities. 
 
2.7.3  Malicious Insiders 
It is usual for a provider to hide its own company policy on recruiting 
employees and what level of access it provides to them, but with higher level of 
access an employee can gain access to confidential data and services. CSA 
suggest enforcing strict supply chain management, specifying human resource 
requirements as part of Service Level Agreement (SLA), transparency in overall 
information security and management practices’ compliance, reporting, and 
determining security breach notification processes [18]. Wrenn [39]  mentioned if 
someone gets a job with a Cloud service provider with ill intent, it may be much 
easier for him/her to engage in malicious activities than what people might think. 
Things can get even worse if this intent conjoins with the Cloud provider’s inability 
in monitoring its employees, especially the ones with privileged access. If a Cloud 
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provider lacks a breach notification policy and practice, a time may come when a 
customer may not even be informed of a serious security incident.  
Spring [52] suggested ten best practices for Cloud providers to handle 
malicious insiders. These are:  separation of privileges, least privilege, access 
control systems, alarm systems, administrator logging, two-factor authentication, 
codes of conduct, confidentiality agreements, background checks, and visitor 
access. Rocha and Correia [53] discussed three solutions, which are: not to allow 
any physical access to the servers, zero tolerance policy, and logging all 
accesses to the server. However, they demonstrated in their paper that an 
incident can happen remotely (without physical access) and the last two solutions 
come into effect after the incident occurs, which is too late.  They also discussed 
how recent research mechanisms fail to protect the confidentiality of previous 
attacks on users’ data. 
From the research works discussed so far [18, 39, 52, 53] we can infer that 
most suggestions are mainly on monitoring employee activities and formulation 
of Cloud providers’ policy such as zero tolerance. Customers can only make sure 
that they sign up an agreement that contains all of the proposed solutions 
including transparency of the Cloud provider. But some of these solutions will only 
come into effect after a serious security breach occurs. Unfortunately, in the 
foreseeable future it is likely to continue to be a natural tendency of a Cloud 
provider to hide its company policy regarding hiring of employees and put in place 
insufficient measures to monitor them because of economic reasons. 
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2.7.4  Shared Technology Vulnerabilities 
Shared on-demand nature of Cloud Computing need virtualization and this 
virtualization technology uses hypervisors to create virtual machines and 
operating systems. But flaws in a hypervisor sometimes allow someone to gain 
inappropriate access and control to the platform that impacts other customers as 
well. CSA suggest implementing security best practices for installation and 
configuration, monitoring for unauthorized changes, promote strong 
authentication, SLA for patching and vulnerability remediation, and vulnerability 
scanning and configuration audits [18].  
Wrenn [39] pointed out that Cloud Computing was designed for 
infrastructure sharing in a cost effective model, which inherently lacks basic 
protection and customer compartmentalization.  This class of vulnerability is 
evident at all levels of the infrastructure stack. Shielding customers’ network 
traffic, data and applications is very difficult because of the hardware limitation. 
Attackers can hijack privileged user accounts, run other customers VM, and 
intercept network communication. Yildiz et al. [54] cited the example of 
mainframes where secure separation is possible but the cost is always 
unacceptable to the SaaS providers.  This is the reason for the introduction of 
lower cost equipment with emerging virtualization capabilities that can offer 
business competitors separate virtual machines on the same physical hardware. 
They also think coexistence of manufacturing and retail sector clients is a 
problem, as the former’s quiet time does not match with retail demand, resulting 
in issues on applying security patches to shared equipment.  
Chow et al. [55] think many adoption problems of Cloud Computing are 
essentially old problems in new settings. They also claim that virtual machine 
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attacks and web service vulnerabilities existed long before Cloud Computing 
became fashionable. Grobauer et al. [51] expect future virtualization to develop 
into virtualized servers from computational resources. They are concerned about 
VMs image handling. As a common practice, Cloud providers create a template 
image of Operating System (OS) and clone it to multiple machines. This is a 
vulnerable VM template image that may spread over many systems. An attacker 
can rent one of these VMs and can analyse all the important configurations 
including administrative rights. Another important issue they raised is that an 
image can even be taken from an untrustworthy source, which may provide back-
door access to an attacker. 
From the works of the aforementioned researchers [18, 39, 51, 54, 55], we 
can summarize that there is a hardware limitation of compartmentalization. 
However, there is expectation for future virtualization technology, virtual servers 
to be developed from computational resources. 
 
2.7.5  Data Loss/Leakage 
Cloud customers need to make sure that cost saving methods never 
compromises their valuable data as there are multifarious ways to compromise 
data. Such ways specially increase in a Cloud environment because of the 
number of interactions between risks and challenges. An example can be deletion 
or alteration of records without backup or another can be not able to restore large 
context after a disaster. Loss of the encoding key can be very painful too. Some 
of these may be unique to a Cloud system as well as too complex to restore 
because of its architecture [18]. Proposed solutions by CSA include 
implementation of strong API access control, encryption and protection of integrity 
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of data in transit, analyses of data protection at both design and run time, 
implementation of strong key generation, storage and management, and 
destruction practices – contractually demand providers wiping persistent media 
before it is released into the pool. Contractually here specifies provider backup 
and retention strategies [18].  
Wrenn [39] sees protection of Cloud based data from unauthorized access 
as top priority in Cloud security. He identified two types of risks that Cloud 
providers must adequately address in their Cloud implementations. These are 
data theft and data loss. Reasons behind data loss can be corrupted storage, 
failure of drives, accidental deletion of partition, providers’ lack of adequate 
backup capability, untested procedures, poor policy, and inadequate data 
retention practices. Dahbur et al. [56] raised the issue that if users and Cloud 
employees are not educated enough on processes and procedures, they can 
make intentional or unintentional mistakes that can cause data loss inflicting a 
devastating impact on a business. Wang et al. [57] mentioned two different 
sources of data loss and leakage. First, a Cloud provider can be self-interested, 
untrustworthy and possibly malicious and store data in a lower tier of storage than 
agreed, the provider can also hide a data loss incident due to management errors. 
Second, there could be someone with capability to alter (modify or delete) Cloud 
data in different time intervals and still remain undetected by a Cloud provider for 
a while.  
In making an inference from the already cited research [18, 39, 56, 57] we 
need to be aware about Lacey’s [45] criticism that this type of threat is too general 
to any network security issues. Surely, data protection is the top priority in network 
(not just in Cloud) security, but it reaches a much higher level of challenge in 
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Cloud Computing due to the number of interactions between risks and challenges. 
While untested procedures, poor policy and inadequate data retention practices 
are too general, they may be critical in Cloud Computing because of policy issues, 
complex infrastructure and customers demand. A Cloud employee’s lack of 
knowledge or understanding on Cloud related processes and procedures can 
prove to be very costly. There is also a trust issue with the Cloud providers who 
may become too commercial and store customers’ data in a lower tier of storage 
than agreed. 
 
2.7.6 Account, Service and Traffic Hijacking 
These kinds of attack are usually perpetuated with stolen credentials. 
There are different attack methods for stealing someone’s credentials such as 
phishing, fraud, Denial of Services (DoS), finding vulnerabilities, and account 
hijacking. In a Cloud, if an attacker can gain access to someone’s credentials, he 
or she can eavesdrop on a customer’s activities, transactions, and alter data. 
Remediation proposed by CSA include prohibition on sharing of account 
credentials between users and services, leveraging strong two-factor 
authentication techniques where possible, employing proactive monitoring to 
detect unauthorized activity, and understanding Cloud provider security policies 
and SLAs [18].  
Srinivasamurthy and Liu [43] found four attack types that match these 
kinds of threat. Those are: man-in-the-middle attacks, phishing, spam campaigns, 
and DoS attack. Wrenn [39] raised the concern that a company’s Cloud 
infrastructure can be targeted as a staging ground for these kinds of attacks, and 
all these can happen under the identity of the company. He proposed three 
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defensive actions to deal with these types of attack, which are providing strong 
cryptographic authentication of systems and users in the Cloud, user and system 
level strong defence against account hijacking, and only authorized systems 
belonging to a company’s interest can access and manage Cloud resources for 
a given customer. Shin and Kobara [58]  raised another issue, if Cloud provider 
also provide Single Sign-On or ID management services, then this type of attack 
can cause more significant damage. While referring to ID management, Yan et 
al. [59] emphasized that quick development of Cloud Computing brought some 
security problems. Currently, the majority of Cloud Computing systems use digital 
identity for their users to access Cloud services, this could be a disadvantage for 
a hybrid Cloud. In their research they proposed the use of federated identity 
management together with hierarchical identity-based cryptography. 
From [18, 39, 43, 58, 59] we can see that on one hand, there is nothing 
new, all these types of attacks mentioned above has been encountered before, 
but on the other hand, rapid development of Cloud Computing brought in some 
new problems, such as, the prevalent ways of identity management are not 
adequate for hybrid Clouds.  
 
2.7.7  Unknown Risk Profile 
One of the major benefits of Cloud Computing is the reduction of hardware 
and software needs, which lead to financial savings for a Cloud customer as well 
as relieve them of some complexity to focus more on their actual business. 
However, the transition into Cloud Computing may not ensure the efficacy of the 
security procedures that the company used to maintain by itself, and can entail 
unknown risks. CSA suggested having disclosure of applicable logs and data; full 
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or partial disclosure of Cloud infrastructure; and monitoring and alerting on 
necessary information [18]. CSA actually raised in this context their concern about 
customers’ questions that are not clearly answered by Cloud providers. In another 
report they mentioned "Unless Cloud providers can readily disclose their security 
controls and the extent to which they are implemented to the consumer, and the 
consumer knows which controls are needed to maintain the security of their 
information, there is tremendous potential for misguided decisions and 
detrimental outcomes” [19].  
Wrenn [39] delved into well-known and less known features of Cloud 
Computing. While well-known features are deciding factors for choosing a Cloud 
provider, there are always some less known features such as the details on 
auditing, logging, security policies, vulnerability and incident response. Without 
these details, it is essentially an incomplete picture of Cloud providers’ security 
practices. He further pointed out that for the unknown risk profile, traditional risk 
managements are ineffective because it happens without customer awareness. 
He proposed transparency into the Cloud provider’s infrastructure management 
practices and audit data as a solution, an aspect highlighted in recent press 
reports and technology publications that many Cloud providers do not disclose 
those details to their customers.  
We therefore see that an unknown risk profile is somewhat creation of the 
Cloud providers’ unwillingness in providing details about security logs, audit 
report, security practices etc [18, 19, 39]. Without these details customers cannot 
grasp the full extent of the security procedure and may be exposed to unknown 
risks. There is no easy solution because of the aversion of Cloud providers to be 
transparent in this matter.  
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2.8  Problem Definition 
From our survey on Cloud Computing threats and remediation we have 
identified some challenges in this chapter. We note that some remediation only 
comes into effect after a successful attack happens. We also found Cloud 
providers unwillingness to provide different security related data to its customers. 
This is a repeated pattern and does not seem to have an easy solution as nobody 
wants to reveal their company secrets including policy for hiring employees. 
Our observations and reviews on the top threats to Cloud Computing are 
surmised in Table 2.1. We have enlisted the challenges, which is the first step in 
contemplating solution strategies.  
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Table 2.1. Gaps in threat remediation 
Threats Challenges in implementing threat remediation or gaps 
Abuse and Nefarious 
Use of Cloud 
Computing  
x Privacy laws are restricting Cloud providers from instant 
monitoring  
x Interest of different stakeholders are not necessarily in the same 
direction 
Insecure Application 
Programming 
Interfaces 
x The inability to audit events associated with API use 
x Incomplete log data to enable reconstruction of management 
activity 
Malicious Insiders x Providers may always try to hide their own company policies for 
recruiting employees. 
x Solutions come into effect after the incident occurs, which is too 
late. 
x Cloud providers’ inability of monitoring its employees 
Shared Technology 
Vulnerabilities 
x Shared elements were never designed for strong 
compartmentalization  
x business competitors using separate virtual machines on the 
same physical hardware 
x Coexistence of manufacturing sector and retail sector 
Data Loss/Leakage x Trust issue with the Cloud providers that they may become self 
interested and store in low security area than agreed 
x Untested procedures, poor policy and inadequate data retention 
practices 
x Lack of knowledge 
Account, Service and 
Traffic Hijacking 
x Rapid development of Cloud Computing also opens some new 
loopholes 
x present way of digital  identity management is not good enough 
for hybrid Clouds 
Unknown Risk Profile x Cloud providers’ unwillingness to provide log and audit data; 
and security practices. 
x Lack of transparency 
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2.9 Conclusions 
 
This chapter presented an extensive literature review on Cloud Computing 
security. The chapter mainly focused on widespread search on gaps, identify 
prevalent types of cyber-attacks, and seek solutions for the Cloud environment. 
Despite the great potential that Cloud Computing holds, we are witnessing a lack 
of enthusiasm among the consumers; a phenomenon we believe is largely 
attributable to data security concerns. Organizations desire assurances that their 
valuable data are not compromised. Because of many benefits that Cloud 
Computing can offer, it is of critical importance that the gaps in security measures 
be identified and addressed. Unfortunately, Cloud services do pose as an 
attractive target to any cyber-criminal because it is a one-stop shop to do all kinds 
criminal activities as these sites contain many user and organizational data. To 
address the problem lessons learned from the past on internet are always 
beneficial. 
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Chapter 3 
Some Thoughts for Proactive 
Cyber-Attack Detection in Cloud 
Computing  
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3.1  Introduction 
Given the inherent deficiencies of Cloud Computing such as remediation 
only comes into effect after a successful attack happens and Cloud providers are 
unwilling to provide security related data to its customers, we propose a 
“Proactive Attack Detection” model with three goals. Firstly, it will be able to detect 
an attack when it starts or at least during the time of its perpetuation. Secondly, 
it can alert system/security administrators and data owner about the attack type 
with possible action needed. Thirdly, if Cloud providers try to hide attack 
information from customers, this model will be able to tell customers on the kind 
of attack that happened by looking at the pattern of attack. Our experience on 
machine learning techniques suggest that modern machine learning techniques 
including rule-based learning and statistical learning theory are capable of 
achieving these goals. The content of this chapter was published in the Journal 
of Future Generation Computer Systems, ELSEVIER, and presented at the 2011 
IEEE 17th International Conference on Parallel and Distributed Systems 
(ICPADS 2011). 
 
3.2    Background  
Despite our awareness on threats and our efforts to tackle them, cyber-
attacks are not vanquished, and we believe this is due mainly to the gaps.  In 
their research Rimal et al. [32] presented eight examples of outages in different 
Cloud services with date and duration. Dahbur et al. [56] presented three other 
scenarios of Cloud Computing outage and data loss with the number of 
customers affected. It is not clear whether these outages were caused by attacks, 
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but nevertheless, outages and data losses are surely basic security concerns and 
can be put into CSA’a data loss/leakage threat category.  
Researchers at the University of California, San Diego and the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge Ristenpart et al., [60] showed 
in experiments with Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud [61] that it is possible to map 
the internal Cloud infrastructure and find out the location of a particular virtual 
machine. They also showed how such findings can be used to mount cross-virtual 
machine side-channel attacks to collect information from a target virtual machine 
residing on the same physical machine. In a recent research Rocha and Correia 
[53] showed how malicious insiders can steal confidential data. They 
demonstrated a set of attacks with attack videos, showing how easily an insider 
can obtain passwords, cryptographic keys and files etc. Chonka et al. [37] 
recreate some of the recent real world attack scenarios and demonstrate how 
HTTP-DoS and XML-DoS attack can take place in Cloud Computing. 
We discovered some commonalities among these [37, 53, 60] attack 
models in that all of them used attack tools and followed organized attack 
procedures. We have attempted to design our experimental setup in the same 
pattern. 
 
 3.3  Experiment Design  
In our experiment, the first step has been to collect attack tools such as 
Hping, Socket Programming, Httping, Unix shell scripts, side channel attack tools 
etc. The next step has been on generating attack scripts from the information 
described in documented attack scenarios in different internet security related 
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websites and blogs such as Dancho Danchev’s blog [62] or Jeremiah Grossman’s 
blog [63] and their research works  [64-67]. We may not know if some of these 
attacks happened in Cloud Computing because of lack of transparency from the 
Cloud providers but it would surely help us from our novelty detection graph. One 
of the benefits of generating attack scripts is less human effort and these can be 
programmed to run according to the actual attack timing and duration over 
multiple virtual machines simultaneously. We have designed our experiment as 
given in Fig. 3.1 for a single Cloud. 
 
 
 
Fig. 3.1. Attack detection and Proactive resolution in Single Cloud environment 
 
The next step was data collection, the type of data would determine which 
data collection tools are to be used. The most common type of data collection in 
an attack scenario could be the number of packets sent and received, processing 
time, round trip time, CPU usages etc. Machine learning techniques can then be 
used to investigate if there was an attack. If there is a known type of attack, 
machine learning can take proactive action to address the issue, and at the same 
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time, notify systems/security administrators. If an unknown type of attack 
happens, machine learning will still be able to detect it as an attack from the data 
variations from usual usage, and can notify the designated person with the 
closest type attack known to its database. It would make the security 
administrator’s job easier to fight against unknown types of attacks. 
For data communication between multiple Clouds, also known as 
InterCloud communication, our proposed experimental design is given in Fig. 3.2. 
In this scenario, an attacker may attack data sent from one Cloud to another. 
Here machine learning needs to undertake proactive action on both Clouds. To 
achieve this there must be some kind of trust relationship between both Cloud 
providers. The proactive action on both Clouds is called for because if one is 
infected, it would become an attacker’s target for his/her next mission. 
 
 
Fig. 3.2. Attack Detection and Proactive resolution for InterCloud 
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To create a virtual Cloud environment, our intention has been to conduct 
our experiment on several hypervisors such as Xen, VMWare, Hyper-V etc. Our 
purpose would be better served if we choose different physical machines with 
different hardware architecture though the first preference is 64 bit architecture 
with sufficient memory and Hard drive space to create at least one host OS with 
four guest VM (two VMs  with Server OS and two VMs with client OS). The guest 
virtual machines could be the combination of both 32 bit and 64 bit OS to make it 
more conforming to the real world scenario. 
 
3.4  Data Preparation 
To identify the nature of attack in a Cloud environment we searched for 
some data in the web. But unfortunately no data is available for Cloud attack 
modelling. Therefore, we generated a synthetic attack dataset for experimental 
demonstration, and chose an appropriate technique for attack classification. To 
start with, we considered five types of most discussed attacks in Cloud 
Computing [18, 37, 53, 60, 68]. These are as follows: 
 
3.4.1  Denial of Service (DoS) Attack   
According to the United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team 
(US-CERT) DoS attack is a type of attack where an attacker attempts to prevent 
legitimate users from accessing network or computer resources. Distributed 
Denial of Services (DDoS)  means, the attacker is using multiple computers to 
launch the Denial of Service attack [6]. CSA raised their concern about this type 
of attack in their first of seven top threats [18]. Chonka et al. [37] demonstrated 
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how the two types of DoS attacks can take place in Cloud Computing. However, 
there are several other types of DoS attacks and attack tools which are worth 
testing in an experimental Cloud environment. McDowell [6] listed few symptoms 
of DoS and DDoS attacks such as unusually slow network performance, 
unavailability of a particular website, inability to access any website, dramatic 
increase in the amount of spam. 
 
3.4.2  Cross VM Side Channel (CVMSC) Attack  
Ristenpart et al. [60] showed how to run this kind of attack in Amazon EC2 
to collect information from a target VM where an attacker can reside on a different 
VM on the same physical hardware. One of the authors of their paper, Professor 
Stefan Savage from the University of California, mentioned in an interview, “A 
virtual machine is not proof against all of the kinds of side-channel attacks that 
we've been hearing about for years" [69]. Some security experts commented 
about this experiment that, though these attacks developed by the researchers 
are minor, the techniques could lead to more significant concerns in Cloud 
Computing [69]. 
 
3.4.3  Malicious Insiders (MI) attack 
This is one of the most widely discussed and most difficult to detect attack 
types in any network, where an attacker is an insider and therefore bestowed with 
trust and access. We have discussed about this type of threat in Cloud Computing 
in Section 5.3 and mentioned that a Cloud provider’s lack of transparency makes 
this threat detection even more complex. Rocha and Correia [53] recently 
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demonstrated execution of this type of attacks using XEN hypervisor. However, 
we found in our survey that the UNIX commands and procedures they used in 
their experiments to obtain passwords, cryptographic keys and other confidential 
data are not generally used by an insider with administrative privileges once a 
physical machine with customers VMs is in production environment.  So, we can 
definitely monitor those kinds of attempts in order to detect insiders attack. 
 
3.4.4  Attacks Targeting Shared Memory (ATSM)  
In this type of attack, an attacker takes the advantage of shared memory 
(physical and cache memory) of a physical/virtual machine. This is an initial level 
of attack in Cloud Computing and can lead up to several other types of attacks.  
For example, while performing CVMSC attack on Amazon EC2, Ristenpart et al. 
[60] measured cache activity of other users [69]. Rocha and Correia [53] also 
used information from memory dump while doing MI attack. 
 
   3.4.5  Phishing Attack (PA)  
According to US-CERT [70] “Phishing is an attempt by an individual or 
group to solicit personal information from unsuspecting users by employing social 
engineering techniques”. This kind of attack is mainly done by sending links of a 
website in emails or instant messengers. Such a link looks the same as the 
original website of a bank or a credit card verification site for example. Resorting 
to this deception, an attacker can obtain passwords, credit card information etc 
[70]. In Cloud Computing phishing attacks can be classified into two threat 
categories. First, as an abusive behaviour where an attacker can use the Cloud 
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service to host a phishing attack site, and we discussed in literature review 
chapter how present privacy laws are preventing Cloud providers to detect that 
instantly. Perpetrators can take advantage of the free trial and instant access. 
Second, phishing attacks can also be performed to hijack account and services 
of Cloud Computing [18]. 
Sometimes there could be a combination of attacks. Also, for each attack 
type different set of parameters of the computer/network system may change, 
which requires collection of data on what parameters are changing compared to 
usual/average usage. Based on the attack symptoms described in above five 
widely discussed attack types in Cloud Computing, we consider eight attributes to 
construct the dataset. These are: number of packets sent; number of packets 
received; number of packets lost; number of open ports; difference in VM file size; 
network usage; CPU usage; and number of failed administrative log-on attempt. 
In practice, all the data points are considered as real values. A graphical 
explanation of all the attributes and five classes (types of attack) are presented in 
Fig. 3.3. The total number of instances in our dataset is 5000. The types of attack 
or class distributions are summarised in the last box of Fig. 3.3. The highest 
numbers of attacks is 1762 which belongs to class 3 MI attack and the lowest 
number of attacks is 217 which belongs to class 5 PA. 
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Fig. 3.3. The statistical description of the attributes and classes 
 
 
3.5  Attack Classification 
Classification of any attack based on predefined classes of attacks can be 
solved successfully using machine learning techniques. These techniques are 
widely available from the data mining community. From the available list we have 
chosen Naive Bayes [71],  Multilayer Perceptron [72], Support Vector Machine 
[73], Decision Tree [74], and PART [75] to classify into attack type. Naive Bayes 
is a probability based technique, Multilayer Perceptron and Support Vector 
Machine (SVM) are function estimation based techniques, Decision Tree and 
PART are basically rules based data mining techniques.  
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All these techniques have been implemented in WEKA, which is a Java 
based popular data mining tool. WEKA uses C4.5 [76] algorithm for decision tree 
implementation.  Initially, we carried out some experimental tests to identify the 
best suited technique for attack classification. The details of performances are 
provided in Table 3.1. Performance indicators considered are classification 
accuracy, number of unclassified instances, and the Area Under Receiver 
Operating Characteristic (AUROC).   
The classification accuracy gives the percentage of attacks which are 
classified correctly by the data mining techniques. The number of unclassified 
instances measures the technique’s limitations, which means failures in 
classifying some attacks. AUROC is a two dimensional popular method of a 
classification technique’s performance measure. In its simplest form, it is a 
parametric plot of the true attack versus the false attack rate, as a decision 
threshold is varied across the full range of a continuous classification quantity. It 
is often taken as a scalar measure [77]. An AUROC of 0.5 reflects random 
classification, while AUROC=1 implies perfect classification. We also need to 
consider the computational efficiency of the algorithms and how well they learn 
since we are dealing with comparatively large data sets. Therefore, we measured 
the model building and testing times, which are listed in Table 3.1 along with the 
number of unclassified instances and AUROC. The attack classification 
accuracies in percent are shown in Fig. 3.4. 
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Fig. 3.4.  Attack classification accuracy 
 
Based on the classification accuracy, number of unclassified instances 
and AUROC we found multilayer perceptron and support vector machine are 
better choices for attack classification in the Cloud Computing area. Further 
comparison among these two techniques demonstrated that SVM is the best 
choice for attack classification. However, in terms of computational complexity 
we found both techniques have spent more time to build their models compared 
with other techniques. Multilayer perceptron is an extremely slow technique for 
our task. But the computational complexity of SVM is relatively close to other 
techniques. Therefore, we choose SVM as the final selection for our task. 
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Table 3.1. Classification performances of attack data 
 Naive 
Bayes 
Multilayer 
Perceptron 
Support 
Vector 
Machine 
Decision 
Tree 
PART 
No. of 
Unclassified 
Instances  
0 0 0 0 0 
Area Under 
ROC 0.97 1 1 0.90 0.89 
Model Building 
Time in 
Seconds 
0.02 10.90 0.65 0.26 2.76 
Model Testing 
Time in 
Seconds 
0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02 
 
The classification accuracy, number of unclassified instances and AUROC 
basically captured the average performances of the techniques for our problem.  
But we made further attempts to take a closer look at the performances on attack 
classification. In that vein, we employed Confusion Matrix [78] analysis to study 
the details of the techniques’ performance measures. This matrix offers a detailed 
picture on the actual and predicted classification task done by any classification 
technique classwise. The confusion matrix based performances are provided in 
Tables 3.2 to 3.6. 
We found naive Bayes classified 56.80% of DoS, 73.00%  of CVMSC, 
73.60%  of MI, 67.80% of ATSM and 35.50%  of PA attacks successfully.  CVMSC 
and MI were comfortable tasks for naive Bayes. However, PA attacks appear to 
be a difficult task for this technique. Moreover, DoS attack performance is not high 
enough. 
 
 
56 
 
Table 3.2. Confusion matrix based performance for naive Bayes algorithm 
 DoS CVMSC MI ATSM PA Classified 
DoS 104 75 4 0 0 DoS 
CVMSC 6 325 114 0 0 CVMSC 
MI 0 81 377 54 0 MI 
ATSM 0 3 90 198 1 ATSM 
PA 0 0 4 40 24 PA 
 
Table 3.3. Confusion matrix based performance of multilayer perceptron 
 DoS CVMSC MI ATSM PA Classified 
DoS 180 3 0 0 0 DoS 
CVMSC 1 442 2 0 0 CVMSC 
MI 0 2 508 2 0 MI 
ATSM 0 0 7 285 0 ATSM 
PA 0 0 0 68 0 PA 
 
Table 3.4: Confusion matrix based performance of support vector 
machine 
 DoS CVMSC MI ATSM PA Classified 
DoS 171 12 0 0 0 DoS 
CVMSC 0 435 10 0 0 CVMSC 
MI 0 5 506 1 0 MI 
ATSM 0 0 13 277 2 ATSM 
PA 0 0 0 13 55 PA 
 
By contrast, multilayer perceptron has classified 98.40% of DoS, 99.30% 
of CVMSC, 99.20% of MI, 97.60% of ATSM and 0% of PA attacks successfully.  
DoS, CVMSC, MI, ATSM were very comfortable tasks for multilayer perceptron. 
But, it failed miserably  to classify any attack of PA.  All PA attacks were classified 
as ATSM attacks. 
Support vector machine appeared to have high level of performance 
across all classes. It classified 93.40% of DoS, 97.80% of CVMSC, 98.80% of MI, 
94.90% of ATSM and 80.9% of PA attacks successfully. SVM classification 
57 
 
performance for all categories – DoS, CVMSC, MI, and ATSM – is very similar 
and acceptable.  Only the classification rate of ATSM was relatively lower than 
others. 
Table 3.5: Confusion matrix based performance of decision tree C4.5 
 DoS CVMSC MI ATSM PA classified 
DoS 137 46 0 0 0 DoS 
CVMSC 32 339 73 1 0 CVMSC 
MI 0 66 400 46 0 MI 
ATSM 0 0 52 221 19 ATSM 
PA 0 0 0 21 47 PA 
 
Decision tree classified 74.90% of DoS, 76.20% of CVMSC, 78.10% of MI, 
75.70% of ATSM, and 69.10% of PA attacks correctly.  DoS, CVMSC, MI, ATSM 
classification performances were all at a similar level for the decision tree. PA 
attack performance is slightly lower for this technique, but still it is better than 
naive Bayes or multilayer perceptron. 
Table 3.6: Confusion matrix based performance of PART 
 DoS CVMSC MI ATSM PA classified 
DoS 130 52 1 0 0 DoS 
CVMSC 38 333 72 2 0 CVMSC 
MI 1 75 382 54 0 MI 
ATSM 0 0 64 218 10 ATSM 
PA 0 0 0 21 47 PA 
 
PART classified 71.00% of DoS, 74.80% of CVMSC, 74.60% of MI, 
74.70% of ATSM, and 69.10% of PA attacks successfully.  DoS, CVMSC, MI, 
ATSM, and PA classification performances were all at similar level for PART, 
which we have seen earlier with the decision tree C4.5.  DoS, CVMSC, MI, ATSM 
attacks classification performances of PART are slightly lower than the decision 
tree but the PA attack classification performance is similar to the decision tree. 
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These results of the confusion matrices corroborate the fact that SVM is an 
efficient classifier to classify the attack types in the Cloud environment. 
SVM is a statistical learning theory based data mining technique, which 
was first introduced for data classification only. With time it has been expanded 
with full functionality in the areas of regression analysis and clustering tasks. 
Even though it is considered that multilayer perceptron (artificial neural network) 
is easier to use than this, experimentally it has been found that SVM is more 
efficient in many cases than neural networks  in terms of accuracy and even 
computational complexity [79, 80] .  
Because we have finally adopted SVM, we provide here a brief description 
of SVM. Let us consider a training sample: ܦ݈ = {ݔ݅, ݕ݅}݈݅ = ݈,
  where xi is the ith 
input vector, ∈ ܴ݊,  ݕ݅ ∈ [+1, −1], ݈ is the total number of input vectors and ݊ is 
the dimension of the input space. The relation between ݔ and ݕ is given by y =
 ݏ݃݊(݂(ݔ)  + ߝ), where sgn(x)= 1, if ݔ ≥ 0 and sgn(x) = -1, if x<0, and the task 
uncovering function f is called classification. 
 SVM basically minimizes a tradeoff between empirical error and 
complexity of hypothesis space in the training phase. Formally this is done by 
solving the following minimization problem: 
 ¦
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i 1
ii
2
Kf
|)f(y1|Cf min x  (1) 
Where C is a so called "regularization parameter" that controls the tradeoff 
between empirical error and complexity of the hypothesis space used.  
We present the quadratic programming formulation for SVM 
classification, and we refer the interested reader to  [81]. 
Equation (1) can be rewritten as follows: 
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SV classification: 
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 subject to: yif(xi) t 1 - [i, for all i 
 [i t 0 
Variables [i are called slack variables and they measure the error made at 
point (xi,yi).   
A sequential optimization method was proposed by Platt initially to 
solve the above problem [73].  
SVM classification, dual formulation: 
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While ),K( ji xx is called the kernel function. This is the most important 
ingredient of SVM, which basically transforms the data from a nonlinear space 
into a linear or near linear space. As a result the learning space becomes more 
tractable. Some common kernels are shown in Table 3.7.  In our studies we have 
experimented with polynomial and radial basis function (rbf) kernels. 
 
In Table 3.7 we can observe that d and J are the polynomial and rbf kernel 
parameters, respectively. Both kernels’ performances are highly reliant on the 
tuning of these parameters.  
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Table 3.7. Common kernel functions for SVM 
Kernels Functions 
Linear yx   
Polynomial  > @dixx 1  
RBF ^ `2exp ixx J  
 
 
In WEKA the default kernel for SVM is the 1st degree polynomial.  We 
tested the polynomial kernel (in a normalized form) and rbf kernel for our attack 
classification problem. The performances are reported in Table 3.8. We found 
polynomial kernel is the best choice for our problem. 
Table 3.8. SVM kernel performances 
 
 
 
% accuracy | Time in 
seconds 
Types of SVM Kernels 
Polynomial Normalized 
Polynomial 
rbf 
96.27|1.45 84.46| 55.95 66.6 |96.67 
 
For the final selection of SVM with polynomial kernel for the attack 
classification, the value of d was changed from 1 to 5. This is the normal practice 
in SVM applications to keep the polynomial degree range within these limits [80]. 
From our experimental observations we found the value of 2 for d is best suited 
for our problem. The polynomial kernel with different degrees on performances 
are summarised in Table 3.9. 
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Table 3.9. Best polynomial degree performance 
 
Degree 
Polynomial Kernel 
1 2 3 4 5 
% accuracy | Time 
in seconds 
96.27|1.45  97.13| 
10.03   
97.06 | 11.01   96.87 |10.65  96.8 
|10.03   
 
A screen shot of WEKA during the calibration process is given in Fig. 3.5. 
The series of the experiments in the screen shot demonstrated that the 
performance of the polynomial kernel deteriorates with increasing the d values. 
Therefore, we deduced that SVM with polynomial degree 2 performs the best for 
attack classification in a Cloud. 
 
Fig. 3.5.  A screen shot of SVM with polynomial kernel performance 
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3.6  Conclusions 
This chapter focused on an extensive search for suitable solution of the 
problem found in literature review, identify prevalent types of attacks, and 
recommended resolutions for the Cloud customers in a way that, they can detect 
cyber-attacks with the limited resources they have and without considerable help 
from Cloud service provider. The study identified five common types of attacks, 
which are Denial of service attack, Cross virtual machine side-channel attack, 
Malicious insiders attack, Attacks targeting shared memory, and Phishing attack. 
These are the top threats for the real world Cloud implementation. To develop a 
procedure for the automatic identification of these attacks we generate a 
database from our experience by including number of packets sent; number of 
packets received; number of packets lost; number of open ports; difference in VM 
file size; network usage; CPU usage; and number of failed administrative log-on 
attempts. We set up an actual Cloud environment and performed cyber-attacks 
on it to simulate the real world attack scenarios. With the data generated machine 
learning techniques were employed for detecting top and known attack types as 
well as some unknown attacks that follow the same pattern.  
We have presented the performance of SVM technique using different 
kernels on our attack dataset and compared with other conventional machine 
learning techniques. Through the process, we not only established that SVM is 
the best choice but also found that polynomial and rbf kernels are most suitable 
for the purpose. We evaluated polynomial kernel for different values of degree 
and discovered that the second degree is most appropriate.  
However, our experimental outcomes are by no means conclusive 
because of the limitations on the depth and volume of trials.  As a future task 
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when more data become available we intend to focus on optimizing the naive 
Bayes, multilayer perceptron, decision tree C4.5, and PART techniques by 
adopting their parameters for our attack classification problem. We also hope to 
be able to collect real world Cloud environment data and test how many attack 
traffic we can identify within a short period of time. It may so happen that we would 
discover different methods are best suited for different platforms. Indeed, it would 
be an exciting experience to be able to travel through the real world experimental 
environment. 
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Chapter 4 
Monitoring Insiders Activities in 
Cloud Computing 
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4.1 Introduction 
One of the essential but formidable tasks in Cloud Computing is to detect 
malicious attacks and their types. A Cloud provider’s constraints or inability in 
monitoring its employees, and lack of transparency, may make the detection 
process even harder.  We found these insiders’ activities form similar pattern in 
the monitoring systems as some other cyber-attacks because these also uses 
huge computer resources. In this chapter we observe some of the real life 
insiders’ activities that can be detected from the performance data in a hypervisor 
and its guest operating systems. Rule-based learning is successfully used for 
identification of these activities in this research.  We further observe that some of 
these insiders’ activities can on occasions turn into a malicious insider’s attack, 
and thus, need constant monitoring in the Cloud environment. The content of this 
chapter was presented at the 2011 IEEE 10th International Conference on Trust, 
Security and Privacy in Computing and Communications (TrustCom 2011). 
 
4.2  Experiment Design 
For this experiment we have chosen a HP ProLiant DL380 G4 Server [82], 
with following specifications : dual Intel Pentium IV Xeon 3.2GHz Processors, 6 
GB RAM, 2x 72.8GB Hot Plug SCSI Hard Drives, Integrated Smart Array 6i Plus 
RAID Controller, Dual network interface cards. The main reason for choosing 
server hardware is for not making hardware limitation a bottleneck which may 
provide incorrect data. We also choose VMWare ESXi 3.5 [83] Hypervisor as 
Virtual Machine Manager (VMM) and Windows 7 as guest Operating System 
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(OS). Fig. 4.1 and 4.2 shows a logical and Physical diagram of our experiment 
design respectively. 
 
Fig. 4.1. A logical diagram of the experiment design 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.2. A real life Cloud environment to generate attack data 
We designed this process from the belief that customers need to know all 
attacks happening on their VM and the physical machine they are co-residing 
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with others. If their business competitors get co-residence on the same physical 
hardware, or their machine being cloned without prior notice, there is always a 
threat.  
 
Fig. 4.3.  Taking snapshot of guest VM 
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Fig. 4.4. Performance chart of hypervisor at the time of taking Guest VM 
snapshot 
 
Our main goal for this experiment is to enlighten Cloud customers with 
some basic ideas about how they will be able to detect different attack types with 
the limited resources and access they have. Fig. 4.3 shows a screenshot of taking 
guest VM snapshot and in Fig. 4.4 we put Hypervisor performance plots at the 
time of taking this snapshot. 
 
4.3  Data Preparation 
We generate an attack dataset for the experimental demonstration by 
simply gathering performance data of CPU, memory, disk and network usage 
from hypervisor and guest OS, and choose an appropriate technique for activity 
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classification. The aim is to detect activity pattern and alert on the type of insider 
activity that happened by looking at the change of parameters in the computer 
and network systems. To start with, we consider seven types of most common 
activities (including no activity to distinguish from original activities) of Cloud 
insiders. These are: No activity (short name is activity A), Reboot physical 
machine (B), Malicious insider cloning VM (C), Malicious insider copying 
everything from a VM (D), Malicious insiders taking snapshot of the VM (E), 
Installing new guest VM on the same physical hardware (F), and Turn on any 
guest VM on the same physical hardware (G). 
     Sometimes there could be a combination of attacks. It is important to 
note that for each attack type different set of parameters of the 
computer/network system may change - we collect the data on what parameters 
are changing compared with the usual/average usage. We consider 14 
attributes to construct the dataset. These are different parameters of CPU, disk, 
network and memory performances. In practice, all the data points are 
considered as real values. The total number of instances in our dataset is 591. 
 
4.4  Activity Classification 
Classification of any activity based on predefined class of the activity could 
be solved successfully using the machine learning techniques. These techniques 
are widely available from the computational intelligence community. From the 
available list we have chosen Naive Bayes [71],  Multilayer Perceptron [72], 
Support Vector Machine [73], Decision Tree [74], and PART [75] to classify our 
activity type data. Naive Bayes is a probability based technique, Multilayer 
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Perceptron and Support Vector Machine are function estimation based 
techniques, Decision Tree and PART are basically rules based machine learning 
techniques. All these techniques have been implemented in WEKA [76], which is 
a Java based popular machine learning tool. WEKA uses C4.5 [76] algorithm for 
decision tree implementation. At the beginning, we carried out some experimental 
tests to identify the best suited technique for activity classification. The details of 
performances are available in Table 4.1. We primarily consider classification 
accuracy, number of unclassified instances and computational complexity. The 
classification accuracy calculates the percentage of activities, which were 
classified correctly by the machine learning techniques. The number of 
unclassified instances basically measured the technique’s limitations, which 
means failed to classify any activity. We are also aware of the computational 
efficiency of the techniques and how well they learn since we are dealing with 
comparatively large data sets. Therefore we observe the model building and 
testing time, which are listed in Table 4.1. Based on the classification accuracy, 
number of unclassified instances and computational complexity, we found 
Decision Tree C4.5 or Multilayer Perceptron could be a better choice for activity 
classification in Cloud Computing.  
     The classification accuracy and number of unclassified instances 
basically summarise the average performances of the techniques for our activity 
classification task. So, we tried to observe the details of performance about the 
activity classification scenario. As a result, we employed confusion matrix [78] 
analysis to see the details of the techniques performance measures. This matrix 
offers a detailed picture about the quality of the actual and predicted classification 
task done by any classification technique classwise.
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  Table 4.1. Classification performances of activity data 
 Naive 
Bayes 
Multilayer 
Perceptron 
Support 
Vector 
Machine 
Decision 
Tree 
PART 
Classification 
Accuracy in % 87.48 89.34 65.82 89.51 88.49 
No. of Unclassified 
instances  0 0 0 0 0 
Model Building Time in 
Seconds 0.03 5.08 0.39 0.08 0.11 
Model Testing Time in 
Seconds 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 
 
Since the Multilayer Perceptron and Decision tree C4.5 performances are 
in the top two ranks, it is useful to find out the best one. For the purpose we 
employed the confusion matrix to capture the performances of both the techniques 
which are summarised in Tables 4.2 and 4.3. 
Multilayer Perceptron has classified 98.20% of type A, 41.90% of type B, 
73.30% of type C, 98.00% of type D, 50.00% of type E, 83.60% of type F, and 
36.80% of type G activities correctly. Types A, D, E and G were handled 
convincingly by the Multilayer Perceptron technique. However, it struggled to 
classify types B, C and F.  
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Table 4.2.  Confusion Matrix based Performance of Multilayer Perceptron 
 A B C D E F G Classified 
A 382 0 0 0 2 1 4 A 
B 17 13 0 0 0 1 1 B 
C 4 0 22 3 0 1 0 C 
D 0 0 1 50 0 0 0 D 
E 7 0 0 0 8 1 0 E 
F 6 3 0 0 0 46 0 F 
G 8 4 0 0 0 0 7 G 
 
Table 4.3.  Confusion Matrix based Performance of Support Vector Machine 
 A B C D E F G Classified 
A 377 2 1 0 2 4 3 A 
B 16 15 0 0 0 0 0 B 
C 4 0 25 0 0 1 0 C 
D 0 0 3 48 0 0 0 D 
E 6 0 3 0 7 0 0 E 
F 6 0 1 0 0 47 1 F 
G 6 0 0 0 0 3 10 G 
 
We found the decision tree algorithm C4.5 classified 96.90% of type A, 
48.40% of type B, 83.30% of type C, 94.10% of type D, 43.80% of type E, 85.5% 
of type F and 52.60% of type G activities correctly. C4.5 classification performance 
for activities of types B, C and F was better than the Multilayer Perceptron.  
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However, the classification rates of types A, D, E and G are comparably 
lower than the Multilayer Perceptron. To summarise, we infer from the confusion 
matrix that C4.5 is an efficient classifier to classify activity types in a Cloud 
environment.  
Decision trees are one of the most common data mining techniques and 
are by far the most popular tools used by the research community. C4.5 is one of 
the most popular decision tree algorithms. C4.5 was developed by Ross Quinlan. 
It was derived from the ID3 algorithm. It has additional features for missing values, 
continuous attributes, pruning of decision trees, and rule derivation among others. 
C4.5 constructs a large tree by considering all attribute values and finalises the 
decision rule through pruning. It uses a heuristic approach for pruning based on 
the statistical significance of splits [84]. A basic decision tree construction process 
is shown in Fig. 4.5. In the performance data example, there are 5 instances of 
which the decision of attack happening is "yes" and there are 9 instances of which 
the decision of attack happening "no'. Based on the data pattern and threshold 
value of an attack, decision tree can determine if an attack is happening or not. 
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Fig. 4.5. A simple decision tree to determine cyber attack or malicious activities 
happening from performance data 
 
The information gain measure is used to select the test attribute at each 
node in the decision tree. Such a measure is referred to as an (ASM) or a measure 
of the goodness of split. The attribute with the highest information gain is chosen 
as the test attribute for the current node. 
The entropy or expected information based on the partitioning into subsets 
by A is given by equation (5): 
 
ܧ(ܵ) =  − ෍ ݂ݏ (݆)݈݋݃2 ݂ݏ (݆)
௡
௝ୀଵ
 (4) 
 
Where : 
x E(S) is the information entropy of the subset S ; 
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x n is the number of different values of the attribute in S (entropy is 
computed for one chosen attribute) 
x fS(j) is the frequency (proportion) of the value j in the subset S 
x log2 is the binary logarithm 
An entropy of 0 identifies a perfectly classified subset while 1 shows a 
totally random composition. Entropy is used to determine which node to split next 
in the algorithm, the higher the entropy, the higher the potential to improve the 
classification here. 
The encoding information that would be gained by branching on A is given 
by: 
 
ܩ(ܵ, ܣ) = ܧ(ܵ) − ෍ ݂ݏ (ܣ݅)ܧ(ܵܣ݅)
௠
௜ୀଵ
 (5) 
Where : 
x G(S,A) is the gain of the subset S after a split over the A attribute 
x E(S) is the information entropy of the subset S 
x m is the number of different values of the attribute A in S 
x fS(Ai) is the frequency (proportion) of the items possessing Ai as value for 
A in S 
x Ai is ith possible value of A 
x ܵܣ݅ is a subset of S containing all items where the value of A is Ai 
Gain quantifies the entropy improvement by splitting over an attribute : 
higher is better. The algorithm computes the information gain of each attribute 
[85]. 
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We attempted here to investigate the best choice among machine learning 
techniques for activity classification in the Cloud environment. Our results support 
the claim that C4.5 is the best choice for the activity classification in the Cloud 
environment. 
 
4.5 Conclusions 
 
In this chapter, we presented the performances of several of the most 
popular machine learning techniques on our activity modelling in a Cloud 
Computing environment and a comparison on performances has been made in 
identifying a particular malicious activity. We found rule based technique C4.5 is 
an efficient technique to solve our problem at hand.  
We evaluated a technique’s performance through different performance 
evaluation matrices with the rigorous testing of 10-fold cross validation. Our 
experimental outcome demonstrated that C4.5 provided not only a better 
performance than other techniques, but also the level of performance is of 
acceptable standard. The other algorithms tested were Naive Bayes, Multilayer 
Perceptron, SVM and PART techniques, which as a future task, would be 
subjected to further tests by adopting their best parameters for more real-world 
activity classification problems. 
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Chapter 5 
Classifying Different Denial of 
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5.1 Introduction 
A Cloud provider’s unwillingness to share security related data with its 
customers make cyber-attack detection a difficult task by a Cloud customer. 
Keeping this into perspective, the ultimate design goal of this chapter is to build 
a “Proactive Attack Detection” model for Cloud Computing users with three 
goals. Firstly, the model will be able to detect an attack when it starts or at least 
during the time of its perpetuation. Secondly, it can alert system/security 
administrators and data owner about the attack type with possible action needed. 
Thirdly, if Cloud providers try to hide attack information from customers, this 
model will be able to tell customers about the kind of attack that happened by 
looking at the pattern of attack.  
In previous chapters, we have discovered Cloud providers’ reluctance to 
supply different security related data to its consumers. This is a recurring pattern 
and does not appear to have an easy resolution as no one wishes to disclose 
their company secrets together with policy for hiring recruits [86-89]. We also note 
that some remediation measures are only initiated after a successful attack 
happens. Therefore, we intend to inform Cloud customers of some necessary 
ideas on how they can sense diverse types of cyber-attacks with limited resources 
and access they have. To achieve this goal, we started with an extensive survey 
on Cloud Computing with the main focus on gaps that is slowing down Cloud 
adoption as well as reviewing the threat remediation challenges [86]. Next, some 
of the real life insiders’ activities were detected from the performance data in a 
hypervisor and its guest operating systems [88]. We also propose supported by 
experimentation that it is possible to detect Denial of Service (DoS) and 
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Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) based attacks [6] on Cloud Computing using 
performance data which is generated in the hypervisor and it’s guest operating 
systems [89]. 
 Through the above research works, we presented the performances of 
several of the most popular machine learning techniques on our modelling in a 
Cloud environment for identification of these attacks and activities. A comparison 
on performances has also been made in identifying a particular attack or activity. 
We evaluated a technique’s performance through different performance 
evaluation matrices with the rigorous testing of 10-fold cross validation. Our 
experimental outcome demonstrated that C4.5 [74] provided not only a better 
performance than other techniques, but also the level of performance is of 
acceptable standard. The other algorithms tested were Naive Bayes [71], 
Multilayer Perceptron [72], Support Vector Machine (SVM) [73] and PART [75] 
techniques.  
The uniqueness of our continuing research is that it is capable of 
recognizing insider's actions and further DoS/DDoS attacks with performance 
data. The motive for using performance data rather than conventional logs and 
security related data is that the performance data can be self-possessed by the 
customers without any help from Cloud providers. To the best of our knowledge, 
from existing literature, no one has made such attempts before to protect Cloud 
customer.  
In this chapter we use same dataset as our earlier publication “Classifying 
Different DoS Attacks in Cloud Computing using rule-based learning” [89]. 
However,  we add the details  of data collection procedure in this chapter and 
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adopt advance  algorithm AdaBoost  [90] with J48 and PART,  and note the 
improved performance compared with the previous results. 
The chapter is organized as follows: Section 5.2 discusses some 
background information about cyber-attacks in Cloud Computing. Section 5.3 
describes cyber-attack detection in Cloud Computing using machine learning 
techniques that includes experimental design and data collection. Section 5.4 
narrates different classification algorithms that can be used for attack detection in 
Cloud Computing. Section 5.5 shows our experimental results, and finally, in 
section 5.6 we summarise the limitations of our present work and put forward the 
scope for future work.  The content of this chapter was published in the Journal 
of Security and Communication Networks, John Wiley & Sons Ltd, and as book 
chapters in books Security, Privacy and Trust in Cloud Systems, Springer, 2013, 
and Smart Grids, Springer, 2013. 
. 
5.2 Background of this Study    
As with any change in IT infrastructure where there are accompanying 
novel risks and opportunities, Cloud Computing is no exception. Shared, on-
demand nature of Cloud Computing expose it to some unique risks that have not 
been experienced before. Cloud Computing inherits all the security issues from 
existing systems, for instance grid computing,  plus the security issues that has 
been created due to its unique architecture and features [86].  
Despite our awareness on threats and our efforts to tackle them, cyber 
attacks are not vanquished, and we believe this is due mainly to the gaps.  Rimal 
et al. [91] presented eight examples of outages in different Cloud services with 
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date and duration. Among those outages there are some providers of today’s 
leading Cloud services including Microsoft Azure and Google apps. Dahbur et al. 
[92] presented three other scenarios of Cloud Computing outage and data loss 
with the number of customers affected. It is not clear whether these outages were 
caused by attacks, but nevertheless, outages and data losses are surely basic 
security concerns and can be put into Cloud Security Association (CSA)’s data 
loss/leakage threat category [18]. Researchers at the University of California, San 
Diego and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, and Ristenpart 
et al., [93] showed experimentally  with Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud [61] that 
it is possible to map the internal Cloud infrastructure and find out the location of 
a particular VM. They also showed how such findings can be used to mount cross-
VM side-channel attacks to collect information from a target VM residing on the 
same physical machine. In a recent research Rocha and Correia [53] showed how 
malicious insiders can steal confidential data. They demonstrated a set of attacks 
with attack videos, showing how easily an insider can obtain passwords, 
cryptographic keys and files etc. Chonka et al. [37] recreate some of the recent 
real world attack scenarios and demonstrate how HTTP-DoS and XML-DoS 
attack can take place in Cloud Computing. 
In this chapter we only focus on one of the most hostile cyber-attack types 
known as DoS and sometimes DDoS. According to the United States Computer 
Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT) DoS attack is a type of attack where an 
attacker attempts to prevent legitimate users from accessing network or computer 
resources. Distributed Denial of Services (DDoS)  means, the attacker is using 
multiple computers to launch the Denial of Service attack [6]. However, there are 
several other types of DoS attacks and attack tools which are worth testing in an 
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experimental Cloud environment. US-CERT  [6] also listed few symptoms of DoS 
and DDoS attacks such as unusually slow network performance, unavailability of 
a particular website, inability to access any website, dramatic increase in the 
amount of spam, etc. We discovered some commonalities among these [37, 53, 
93] attack models in that all of them used attack tools and followed organized 
attack procedures. We have attempted to design our experimental setup in the 
same pattern. 
 
5.3 Cyber-Attack Detection for Cloud Computing Using 
Machine Learning Techniques  
 Machine learning techniques can be used to investigate if there was an 
attack. If there is a known type of attack, machine learning can take proactive 
action to address the issue, and at the same time, notify systems/security 
administrators as well as the data owner. If an unknown type of attack happens, 
machine learning will still be able to detect it as an attack from the performance 
variations from standard usage, and can notify the designated person with the 
closest type attack known to its database. That would make the security 
administrator’s job easier to fight against unknown types of attacks. In our 
previous research experiments we successfully identified Cloud insiders activities 
[88] and DoS/DDoS attacks [89] using machine learning techniques. We found 
rule-based technique C4.5  is an efficient technique to solve our problem at hand. 
We evaluated a technique’s performance through different performance 
evaluation matrices with the rigorous testing of 10-fold cross validation. Our 
experimental outcome demonstrated that C4.5 provided not only a better 
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performance than other techniques, but also the level of performance is of 
acceptable standard. The other algorithms tested were Naive Bayes, Multilayer 
Perceptron, SVM and PART [88, 89]. 
 
5.3.1 Experimental Design 
For this experiment we first chose some of the very common DoS/DDoS 
attack tools, our aim was to train the machine with necessary patterns of 
DoS/DDoS attack. We discuss about these basic tools in data collection section. 
We also studied some of the real world documented attack scenarios, such as 
[62-65] then planned and generated attack script accordingly. Fig. 5.1 shows our 
experiment designs. It should be noted that for complex environments, we 
recommend running step 1 and 2 first, train the machine and then run step 3 to 
get enhanced result. 
Once attack script ran on Cloud Computing environment, we have 
collected Virtual Machine Managers (VMM) data in step 4. At step 5 machine 
learning algorithms were used to detect a DoS/DDoS attack type. 
For this experiment we have chosen a HP ProLiant DL380 G4 Server [82] 
with Dual network interface cards. The main reason for selecting server hardware 
is not to make hardware limitation a bottleneck, which may provide inaccurate 
data. We also chose VMWare ESXi 3.5 [83] Hypervisor as VMM and Windows 7 
[94] as guest Operating System (OS). Fig. 5.2 shows a logical and physical 
diagram of our experiment design.  
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Fig. 5.1.  Experimental design for attack generation, data collection and 
proactive actions for a DoS attack that match attack pattern 
 
 
 
Fig. 5.2. Logical and physical diagram of our experiment design 
5.3.2 Data Collection 
In this section we present pictures of the performance charts that are taken 
from the hypervisor during the attack and also performance plot generated by our 
data collection spreadsheet during the attack, the similarity between these two 
indicates how precisely our data was collected. Accurate data collection is very 
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important to achieve correct results by machine learning, and also, to make a 
distinction between an attack and an activity. It is to be noted that we have 
collected performance data of 20 different parameters of System, CPU, Memory 
and network. In this chapter we only included performance charts or plots of those 
that shows significant changes during an attack, however, to refine data using 
machine learning we used all 20 parameters at the same time irrespective of 
whether they made any noteworthy dissimilarity or not. 
5.3.2.1 DoS Using Real-Time Disk Operating System (RDOS) 
RDOS by Rixer [95] is one of the most easily available DDoS attack tool 
for web attack. This tool together with a port scanner can be very useful DDoS 
attacking tools for web resources. In our experiment we only used RDOS and did 
not use any port scanner as we created our own website on a virtual Cloud 
environment and knew the port number already, which in this case was default 
HTTP port 80. Our HTTP servers Internet Protocol (IP) address is 10.1.1.1 and 
we ran RDOS tool from other VMs selecting victim’s IP address 10.1.1.1 and port 
80 from 4:30am to 4:40am.  
Fig. 5.3. Shows RDOS by Rixer tool running in our Cloud environment and 
also victim’s System performance chart showing important changes during the 
attack, there is a notable change in performance chart from 4:30 am onwards 
since we ran this tool. 
 
86 
 
 
Fig. 5.3. DoS attack using RDOS running, also victims system performance chart 
showing significant changes during the attack [89] 
Fig. 5.4 and Fig. 5.5 represent System and CPU performance charts, 
respectively, after the attack happened between 4:30am to 4:40am, significant 
changes in both System and CPU performances are noticeable during attack 
time. 
 
87 
 
 
Fig. 5.4. System performance chart during RDOS attack happened 
between 4:30 am  to 4:40 am 
 
Fig. 5.5. CPU performance chart generated in hypervisor during the 
attack 
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Next four pictures we have presented here are the plots taken from our 
data collection spreadsheet, these are exactly same as the hypervisor was 
showing in its performance charts during the time the attack happened, which 
indicates how accurately data can be collected in a Cloud environment.  Figures  
5.6, 5.7, 5.8 and 5.9 show the performance plots of CPU, Disk, Memory and 
System, respectively, generated by our data collection spreadsheet.  
 
Fig. 5.6. CPU performance plot generated by data collected for our 
experiment showing similarity with the one generated automatically by the 
hypervisor 
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Fig. 5.7.  Performance plot disk performance from the data collection 
spreadsheet 
 
Fig. 5.8. Memory performance plot shows significant changes in active 
memory and memory changes during attack time 
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Fig. 5.9.  System performance plot generated by data collected 
5.3.2.2  HTTP-DoS Attack Using Low Orbit Ion Cannon (LOIC) 
Low Orbit Ion Cannon (LOIC) is an open source network stress testing and 
DoS/DDoS attack application [96, 97]. An attacker can flood TCP/UDP packets 
with the intention of disrupting the service of a particular host. On December 2010, 
BBC report entitled “Anonymous Wikileaks supporters explain web attacks” 
quoted security experts that well-written firewall rules can filter out most traffic 
from harmful DDoS attacks by LOIC [98]. However, in our previous research we 
discovered that these corporate firewalls are not very effective if the attacker 
resides or shares the same physical hardware from same Cloud provider [86]. 
For that reason, here, we attack a particular VM from other VMs that is sharing 
the same physical resources. We started HTTP-DoS attack on victim (IP 10.1.1.1) 
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using LOIC at 6:08am and ended at 6:15am. Fig. 5.10 shows LOIC running from 
attacker VM with target IP 10.1.1.1.  
 
Fig. 5.10. HTTP-DoS attack using LOIC running, also showing CPU 
performance chart generated in hypervisor [89] 
Figures 5.11, 5.12 and 5.13 have shown the performance chart (taken from 
hypervisor) of CPU, system and network during the attack. Significant changes in 
charts are noticeable from 6:08am to 6:15am when the attack happened. 
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Fig. 5.11. CPU performance chart generated in hypervisor during attack 
showing significant changes during attack time 
 
Fig. 5.12. System performance chart generated in hypervisor during 
HTTP-DoS attack 
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Fig. 5.13. Network performance chart generated in hypervisor during 
HTTP-DoS attack 
In Figures 5.14, 5.15 and 5.16 we presented performance plots of CPU, 
network and system generated by our data collection spreadsheet that we 
collected from the VMM during the attack. Sudden increase in performance was 
noticed during the attack time (start 6:08am and ended at 6:15am). 
 
Fig. 5.14. CPU performance plot generated from the data collected [86] 
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Fig. 5.15. Network performance plot generated from the collected data 
[86] 
 
Fig. 5.16. System performance plot generated from the data collected 
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5.3.2.3 Ping Flood Attack 
Ping flood is another kind of DoS attack where the attacker crushes the 
victim with Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) Echo Request (ping) 
packets. This method could be very successful when sending packets quickly 
without waiting for a response from the victim. If ICMP service is not disabled by 
the target host, it will flood the target host with large data segments [99, 100]. 
However, in our study and from work experience, we found organizations usually 
disable ICMP requests at firewall or in the router so that it can stop ICMP requests 
from external networks, traditionally they keep ICMP open on hosts in their own 
internal networks so that they can do network diagnostics. Our concern for Cloud 
VMs is that an attacker could be residing on the same physical hardware or 
somehow can manage to hack into another low secured VM that is residing on 
same internal virtual network and, carry this kind of attack to a target VM. 
A certain kind of ping flood attack in the past was named “ping of death” 
where an attacker deliberately used to send packets larger than the 65,536 bytes, 
many computer systems were not able to handle a ping packet larger than this 
maximum IPv4 packet size [101]. So, in our experiment we send ICMP packets 
from each attacker VM slightly lower than that so that the attacker VM itself does 
not get overwhelmed. We ran “ping  10.1.1.1  –t  -l  65000” command from each 
attacker VM. Here –t  was used for repeated sending of echo messages and –l 
indicates the size of packet to be sent, in this case it was 65000 bytes from 
attacker VM1 (we named it win7_1 as shown in Fig. 5.17). 
Fig. 5.17 shows hypervisor console running ping flood attack from attacker 
VM to Victim VM. Whereas Fig. 5.18 represents network performance chart of 
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attack, Figures 5.19 and 5.20 are the performance plot of network and CPU 
generated during the data collection that we take out from the VMM during the 
attack. 
 
Fig. 5.17.  From hypervisor console running ping flood attack from 
attacker VM to Victim VM 
 
Fig. 5.18. Network performance chart generated from the hypervisor 
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Fig. 5.19. Network performance plot generated from collected data 
 
Fig. 5.20. CPU performance during attack time, and nothing significant 
noted 
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5.3.2.4 SYN Flood Attack Using Engage Packet Builder 
A SYN flood attack is also another kind of DoS attack where a network 
becomes overwhelmed by a series of SYN requests to a target's system [102].  
 
Fig. 5.21. Running SYN flood attack using engage packet builder and 
monitoring network performance from the hypervisor during the attack 
Engage Packet Builder [103] is a powerful and scriptable packet builder 
with capability of packet injection starting from link layer (MAC address spoofing), 
it can also generate SYN-Floods by building "strange" packets [103]. We used 
Engage Packet builder to run SYN flood attack twice, at 5:13am and 5.17am , 
Fig. 5.21 shows Engage Packet Builder running from attacker VM (IP 10.1.1.10) 
with target IP 10.1.1.1, Fig. 5.22 represents a performance chart (taken from 
hypervisor) of network during the attack. Figures 5.23, 5.24, 5.25 and 5.26 are 
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performance plot of CPU, memory, network and system generated by our data 
collection that we collected from the VMM during the attack.  
 
Fig. 5.22. Network performance chart collected from hypervisor after the 
SYN flood attack was over [86] 
 
Fig. 5.23.  CPU performance plot generated from the data collected 
during the SYN flood attacks 
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Fig. 5.24. Memory performance plot generated from the data collected 
during the SYN flood attacks 
 
 
Fig. 5.25.  Network performance plot generated from the data collected 
during the SYN flood attacks 
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Fig. 5.26. System performance plot generated from the data collected 
during the SYN flood attacks 
5.4. Classification Algorithms 
Now-a-days, there are a series of algorithms available to do any 
classification task by meeting the desired accuracy. Among these, Boosting is a 
general and popular method to improve the classification accuracies of any weak 
learning algorithms [104]. In our implementation we used decision tree C4.5 
(WEKA name is J48) [74] as a weak learner. One of the strong points of the 
Boosting algorithm is that one can identify an upper limit of the training error under 
the assumption of the weak hypothesis, i.e., "rules of thumb". The AdaBoost 
(adaptive boosting) algorithm was first proposed in 1995 by Yoav Freund and 
Robert Shapire as a general method for generating a strong classifier out of a set 
of weak classifiers [104, 105]. AdaBoost works even when the classifiers come 
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from a continuum of potential classifiers (such as decision tree, linear 
discriminants, etc.).  
Let us consider a DoS attacks dataset which contains N instances and M 
attributes (Steps 1 and 2 in Table 5.1). Basically the Mth attribute is holding the 
class variable of the Dos attack dataset. The independent attributes (N by M-1) is 
denoted by x in step 3 and dependent attribute Mth is indicated by y in step 4 
below. We have presented the dependent attribute with the two symbols (+1 
means attack and -1 means no attack). In step 5, we have assigned each instance 
with the same weight, ݓ௜ =
ଵ
୒. In our implementation, the decision tree classifier 
uses the weights associated with each instance. In step 7, the model is prediction, 
the class values either is +1 or -1. For an ideal model, we should have ܯଵ(ݔ௜) =
ݕ௜. Of course the model is expected to be only slightly better than random so ms 
in step 8 is unlikely to be empty. The model ܯଵ relative error ∈ଵis calculated as 
the relative sum of the weights of the misclassified instances in step 9. We use 
∝௜ to adjust the weights in step 11. To reach the expected level of classification 
accuracy, we adjust the weights by increasing or decreasing in the steps 11-13. 
We continue the model building and weight modification until the new model 
performs no better than random (i.e., the error is 50% or more: ∈ଵ≥ 0.5), or is 
perfect (i.e., the error rate is 0% and ݉ݏ  in step 8 is empty), or when model reach 
the maximum number of iterations. Finally, in step 14, the model ܯ combines the 
other models using a weighted sum of the outputs of these models. In the same 
step, ∝௝ reflects the accuracy of each of the constituent models. The pseudo code 
of the AdaBoost algorithm is presented in Table 5.1. 
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Table 5.1. Pseudocode of AdaBoost Algorithm [106] 
 
Algorithm: AdaBoost  
AdaBoost (data,learner) 
1:  ܰ ← ݊ݎ݋ݓ (݀ܽݐܽ) 
2:  ܯ ← ݊ܿ݋݈ (݀ܽݐܽ) 
3:  ݔ ← ݀ܽݐܽ[,1: ܯ − 1] 
4:  ݕ ← ݀ܽݐܽ[, ܯ] 
5:  for ݅ ← 1 to  N: ݓ݅ = 
ଵ
ே 
6:  Repeat ݅ ← 1, ݅ ← ݅ + 1: 
7:  ܯ݅ ← ݈݁ܽݎ݊݁ݎ(݀ܽݐܽ, ݓ) 
8:  ݉ݏ = {݌ Iܯ݅(ݔ݌) ≠ ݕ݌} 
9:  ∈ ݅ =
∑ ୧ ∈୫୬ ୵୨
∑ ୵୨೙ೕసభ
 
10: ܽ݅ = log ((1−∈ ݅)/∈ ݅) 
11: for  ݆ ∈ ݉ݏ: ݓ݆ = ݓ݆ × ݁ఈ௜ 
12:  for ݅ ← 1 ࢚࢕ ܰ: ݓ݅ =
୵୧
∑ ୵୨೙ೕసభ
 
13:     until ∈ ݅ >= 0.5 ݋ݎ ݉ݏ =  ∅ 
14:  Return [ܯ(ݔ) =  ܛܑ܏ܖ (∑ ߙ݆ ܯ݆  (ݔ))]்௝ୀଵ  
 
 
 
A decision tree essentially uses ‘divide and conquer’ technique to break 
down a complex decision making process into a collection of simpler decisions, 
thereby providing an easily interpretable solution [85, 107]. The interesting thing 
of decision tree modeling is that it is transparent and any one can see the tree 
structure easily to check how the decision is made [85]. It is a predictive modelling 
technique used widely in classification. In a decision tree, the root and each 
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internal node is labelled with a query. At the terminating nodes, we can see the 
desired classification outcome in the leaf. The pseudo code of the decision tree 
algorithm is presented in table 5.2. In this algorithm E and F indicate the training 
records and attribute set, respectively. In Step 7, the algorithm works by 
recursively selecting the best attribute to split the data and expanding the leaf 
nodes of the tree in Steps 11 and 12 until the stopping criterion is met in Step 1. 
 
 
Table 5.2. Pseudocode of the Decision Tree Algorithm [108] 
 
Algorithm:  Decision Tree  
 
TreeGrowth (E, F) 
1: if stopping_cond(E,F) = true then 
2:   leaf = createNode(). 
3:   leaf.label = Classify(E). 
4:   return leaf. 
5: else 
6:   root = createNode(). 
7:   root.test_cond = find_best_split(E, F). 
8:   let V = {v|v is a possible outcome of root.test_cond }. 
9:   for each v ∈ V do 
10:     Ev = {e | root.test_cond(e) = v and e ∈ E}. 
11:     child = TreeGrowth(Ev, F). 
12:     add child as descendent of root and label the edge (root → child) as v. 
13:   end for 
14: end if 
15: return root. 
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In Step 2, the creatNode() function basically extends the decision tree after 
creating a new node. The Classify() assigns the class level at the leaf of the tree 
in Step 3. The find_best_split function determines the attribute to fit in the root to 
generate a decision tree. In general, we use entropy/gain index to select the 
attribute for the root. 
 
The entropy or expected information based on the partitioning into subsets 
by A is given by the equation [2]: 
ܧ(ܵ)
=  − ෍ ݂ݏ (݆)݈݋݃2 ݂ݏ (݆)
௡
௝ୀଵ
 (1) 
Where : 
x E(S) is the information entropy of the subset S ; 
x n is the number of different values of the attribute in S (entropy is 
computed for one chosen attribute) 
x fS(j) is the frequency (proportion) of the value j in the subset S 
x log2 is the binary logarithm 
 
An entropy of 0 identifies a perfectly classified subset while 1 shows a 
totally random composition. 
Entropy is used to determine which node to split next in the algorithm, the 
higher the entropy, the higher the potential to improve the classification. 
The encoding information that would be gained by branching on A is given 
by: 
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ܩ(ܵ, ܣ)
= ܧ(ܵ) −  ෍ ݂ݏ (ܣ݅)ܧ(ܵܣ݅)
௠
௜ୀଵ
 (2) 
Where : 
x G(S,A) is the gain of the subset S after a split over the A 
attribute 
x E(S) is the information entropy of the subset S 
x m is the number of different values of the attribute A in S 
x fS(Ai) is the frequency (proportion) of the items possessing 
Ai as value for A in S 
x Ai is ith possible value of A 
x ܵܣ݅ is a subset of S containing all items where the value of 
A is Ai 
 
Gain quantifies the entropy improvement by splitting over an attribute: 
higher is better. The algorithm computes the information gain of each attribute to 
construct the final decision tree [85]. 
 
The stopping_cond() function is used to stop the profuse expansion of the 
decision tree. However, in the final stage we use tree pruning method to keep the 
tree size manageable. 
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5.5    Experimental Results 
It is important to note that for each attack type different set of parameters 
of the computer/network system may change, we have collected the data on what 
parameters are changing compared with the usual/average usage. We consider 
20 attributes to construct the dataset. These are different parameters of CPU, 
disk, network and memory performances. In practice, all the data points are 
considered as real values. The total number of instances in our dataset is 536. 
In our previous experiment with DoS attack data set, we had chosen Naive 
Bayes (NB) [71],  Multilayer Perceptron (MP) [72], Support Vector Machine (SVM) 
[73], Decision Tree (C4.5) [74], and PART [75] to classify our data. Naive Bayes 
is a probability based technique, Multilayer Perceptron and Support Vector 
Machine are function estimation based techniques, Decision Tree and PART are 
rules based machine learning techniques. All these techniques have been 
implemented in WEKA [109], which is a Java based popular machine learning 
tool. WEKA uses C4.5 [109] algorithm for decision tree implementation.  
We previously suggested C4.5 in Cloud system to identify DoS attacks [5]. 
However, in this chapter we noticed AdaBoost with J48 (which is WEKA 
implementation of C4.5) and AdaBoost with PART displayed significantly better 
accuracies, 95.5224 % and 95.1493 %, respectably as shown in Table 5.3. We 
also investigated the rest of the algorithms as a base algorithm of AdaBoost but 
the accuracies have not shown any improvement compared to J48. 
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Table 5.3: Classification performances of DoS attack data 
Naive 
Bayes 
Multilayer 
Perceptron 
Support 
Vector 
Machine 
Decision 
Tree 
J48 
AdaBoost 
with J48 
PART AdaBoost 
with 
PART 
Classification 
Accuracy 
in % 
75.00 92.53 82.08 93.47 95.5224 93.28 95.1493 
No. of 
Unclassified 
instances  
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Model 
Building 
Time in 
Seconds 
0.03 4.55 0.67 0.06 0.41 0.11 0.82 
Model 
Testing Time 
in Seconds 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 
 
 
5.6 Conclusions 
In this chapter, we attempted a resolution of one of the major trust issues 
between Cloud providers and their customers: “Cloud providers are not 
transparent and try to hide security related data from their customers”. We 
endeavoured to empower the customers with a novel approach on how Cloud 
customers can detect cyber-attack happening in their VM by collecting 
performance data and using machine learning techniques. The reason for using 
performance data here instead of traditional security logs and data is that, Cloud 
customers can easily generate performance data of their VM using built-in or third 
party software without assistance from the Cloud provider. We demonstrated 
through performance charts from hypervisor and performance plots from our data 
collection spreadsheet to show how accurately these kinds of data can be 
collected during an attack. We also presented the performances of several of the 
most popular machine learning techniques on attack identification in a Cloud 
environment and, a comparison on performances has been made. We used 
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accuracy measure for the final selection of a learning technique for the task. In 
this chapter we suggested the use of AdaBoost method with base classifier J48 
to protect the Cloud Computing environment from the cyber-attacks. The major 
advantage of AdaBoost is that it considers a weighted sample to focus learning 
on the most difficult attack rather than a random sample of the training data. 
Moreover, this method incorporates weighted vote instead of combining 
classifiers with equal vote, the latter is very common in the traditional learning 
theory. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
110 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 6 
Evading Cyber Attacks on  
Big Data Cloud 
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6.1  Introduction 
Big Data - the latest dominant IT domain which is a massive volume of 
diverse data, both structured and unstructured, that is so large and fast-moving 
that it’s difficult to near impossible to process using traditional databases and 
software tools. The common scenario is, the data is too enormous, streaming by 
too quickly at unpredictable and variable speeds, and exceeds current processing 
capacity. It is an often challenge for the researchers – how to analyse the Big 
Data to extract knowledge? Big data analysis is like discovering our world into a 
complete new dimension, the values are coming from these analysis can be 
compared to discover a parallel universe that over the years remained as a 
mystery to the mankind. In today’s world of data science, size and varieties of 
data are already cosmological and these are only getting larger. It is always a 
continuous demand from computer users to make our data communication 
technologies faster, now with the big velocity of the data - that expectation 
converted to a necessity. Almost every type of information driven business we 
can think of, is trying to get a competitive edge by extracting value from their data. 
While Cloud Computing is on the hot wheels for IT researchers at the moment, 
data scientists predicts that - Big Data will be the next “Big Thing” in the IT world. 
It will be so big that everyone will care or perhaps everyone has already started 
talking about it. Cisco predicted, from 2016 internet data traffic will touch 4.8 zeta-
bytes per annum [110]. The Big volume of data usage indicates new challenges 
and opportunities for future research. Existing IT security problems are even 
inflated by velocity, volume, and variety of Big Data, for example, huge Cloud 
infrastructures and migration of data and Virtual Machines (VMs) between 
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multiple Clouds. However, traditional security techniques are inadequate to 
address Big Data challenges [111]. Open source community that is contributing 
on Big Data technologies such as Hadoop [112], still need to address a variety of 
information security gaps which is a very big tempting target for cyber criminals. 
The content of this chapter presented at the IEEE International Conference 
on 2nd Asia-Pacific World Congress on Computer Science & Engineering (APWC 
on CSE 2015), and Submitted in Journal of Concurrency and Computation: 
Practice and Experience, John Wiley & Sons Ltd.  
 
6.2  Big Data Cloud Definition 
In our hunt for a suitable definition of Big Data Cloud, we scanned books 
and articles [112-121], we found researchers and the IT industries used phrases 
like “Big data and Cloud Computing”; “Big Data in Cloud Computing”; “Big Data 
in the Cloud”. Dai et al., came up with exact wording “Big Data Cloud” though they 
have not actually defined it [122]. We believe this term will be so widely used in 
near future and needs a definition of its own. We propose here our own definition 
with an aim to make it easy and understandable for new researchers nevertheless 
broad in its scope, which can be pictured in graphical form as described in Fig. 
6.1.  
 When Big Data technologies are used to store and analyse Data in the 
Cloud, this Cloud infrastructure can be considered as Big Data Cloud. 
Once we defined the Big Data Cloud we also tried to integrate in a picture 
all major components that build Big Data Cloud. In the left hand side of Fig. 6.1. 
we described Cloud Computing  as combination of resource sharing using 
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virtualization technologies, that can provide on demand and instant services and 
bills usage like utility [4, 5, 86]. Back in 2001, Doug Laney first explains Big Data 
with 3Vs [113], that is now part of everyone’s definition of Big Data.  
 
Fig. 6.1. Schematic definition of Big Data Cloud and understanding why 
security is a big discussion topic for Big Data Cloud 
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Those three V’s are Volume, Velocity and Variety. SAS considers two additional 
dimensions of Big Data namely Variability and Complexity [114]. In their book, 
IBM introduced “Veracity” as forth V to Big Data definition [115]. From our 
understanding of [113-115]  we have drawn middle section of Fig. 6.1. where we 
show traditional techniques are incapable of handling Big data and as a result we 
are hearing new technologies and techniques such as Hadoop and Map-Reduce. 
Big data also exceeds the IT capacities of many organizations and forcing them 
to join in Cloud, hence Big Data Cloud. Big Data also brings into table big 
opportunities together with big challenges. From our understanding on above 
research works [4, 5, 86, 113-115]  we draw right hand portion of Fig. 6.1. where  
we addressed the issue about security - concentrating on development of Big 
Data and its integration with Cloud Computing was mainly focused on those 
issues created by 3V’s and developers focus was mainly on performance and 
scalability with almost no security in mind [123]. We also consider the fact that 
Big Data Cloud inherited security issues from Cloud Computing, traditional 
systems plus some unique security gaps that Big Data technologies brought 
forward. 
In this chapter, an alternate view of Big Data Cloud has presented with 
main focus on security gaps and proposing a different way of cyber-attack 
detection in Big Data Cloud even when Hadoop is under attack. The presentation 
of the chapter is in two discourses. The first discourse is on the review for an easy 
but comprehensive definition of Big Data Cloud, understanding its main aspects, 
research scopes and some investigative survey also conducted focusing on the 
security challenges that need to be addressed as soon as possible by future 
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researchers. Some ideas are also generated to protect Big Data Cloud using 
layered approach. The second discourse is on thoughts for some novel 
approaches to identify cyber-attack types using modern machine learning 
techniques including rule-based learning and statistical learning theory. Views will 
be discussed on novel approaches to address some of the gaps in security of Big 
Data technologies.These views were thought of while doing series of experiments 
[3-5, 86, 124, 125] to basically inform the researchers, Data Scientists, Big Data 
Cloud providers and their customers about the tools to use to protect their 
valuable data and information from Big Data challenges and implement right 
security measures with Hadoop and other Big Data technologies. 
The chapter is organized as follows; Section 6.3 describes the main 
aspects of Big Data Cloud, Section 6.4 identifies research scope in this area 
focusing on the gaps that are impeding to extract value from Big Data with pace 
and accuracy it is promising, and Section 6.5 narrates experiment design to 
create Big Data Cloud and run cyber-attack on Ambari port. In Section 6.6, we 
describe performance data collection and preparation procedures. Section 6.7 
narrates PART algorithm that we used in this experiment to do data analysis, 
Section 6.8 discusses experiment result and Section 6.9 provides a comparative 
comparison with other related works. Finally in Section 6.10 we have summarized 
and capture future work that need to be done by future researchers. 
 
6.3  Main Aspects of Big Data Cloud 
In previous section we have seen Big Data Cloud inherits all the security 
issues from existing systems, for instance Cloud Computing, plus the security 
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issues that has been created due to its unique architecture and features. To 
understand these unique features, we first need to put into context the main 
aspects that form a Big Data Cloud system. In our prior research we have drawn 
main aspects that form Cloud system [86], now in order to construct a diagram 
for main aspects of Big Data Cloud we taken into consideration what additional 
components could create a Big Data Cloud sitting on top of Cloud layer. From our 
idea, reading research contributions [4, 5, 86, 113-115]  we have drawn Fig. 6.2. 
To construct the main aspects of Big Data Cloud, we have considered foremost 
Big Data technologies and key features to make it Big Data Cloud. 
 
Fig. 6.2. Understanding Big Data Cloud 
There are several papers that did survey on Big Data, Cloud Computing 
Security issues, but there is no specific paper that specifically discusses about 
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“Big data Cloud Security” when the technologies combine. We believe it is going 
to be a big discussion topic in coming days and that initially motivated us to write 
a paper on the topic and experiment to find the gaps. Another motive was that, 
we found researchers are trying solve Big Data security challenges using Big Data 
technologies itself [126, 127]. While we do agree with them to some extent, our 
concern is, what will happen if we can make some part of Hadoop ecosystem 
paralysed, especially the part used to manage Hadoop? For this reason we setup 
our research centre lab with Big Data Cloud. Run traditional Denial of Service 
(DoS) attacks on Hadoop’s management interface Ambari [128] and paralyse it 
with perfection. This process have blocked all communication between Ambari 
and rest of Hadoop ecosystem. We also aim to see our existing system that we 
have developed for Cloud Computing [3-5, 86, 124, 125], if that technique works 
in Big Data Cloud. We found, we can still successfully detect cyber-attacks on Big 
Data Cloud using our technique of detecting cyber-attack from Virtual Machine 
Manager (VMM) generated performance data.  
Hadoop is today’s leading Big Data technology, open source computer 
library for reliable and scalable distributed computing [112]. In one word, Hadoop 
is addressing the issues that Big Data is creating.  Hadoop is the framework of 
tools, ecosystem of software. Objective of Hadoop is to support applications 
running on Big Data. Hadoop is not just one project, it’s an ecosystem of projects. 
Hadoop is open source and distributed under Apache license. This guarantees 
that no particular company is guiding the direction of Hadoop and it is managed 
by apache [112]. 
118 
 
Hadoop achieves reliability by replicating the data across multiple hosts 
and hence theoretically does not require Redundant Array of Inexpensive Disks 
(RAID) technology for fault tolerance. According to the “Apache Hadoop” and 
“Yahoo Developers network” websites, Yahoo! is running today’s world’s biggest 
Hadoop cluster containing 4,500 nodes that is used to support research for Ad 
Systems and web search, also used to do scaling tests to support development 
of Apache Hadoop on larger clusters. Yahoo! has more than 1,000,000 CPUs in 
over 40,000 servers running Hadoop. [112, 119]. In Fig. 6.3. we have drawn all 
the bits and pieces that create a Hadoop ecosystem from our knowledge going 
through each and every links in Hadoop Wiki Page [112]. 
 
Fig. 6.3. Understanding Hadoop’s Ecosystem 
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Big Data technologies were not designed with security in mind, those were 
designed with scalability, performance and ease of integration in mind. Security 
is only tied with the traditional techniques. From attack perspective, it’s a big 
target. Reason is simple, data can be valuable by producing knowledge that 
money can’t buy or perhaps help to shape our future. If traditional computational 
measures are not enough for handling Big Data then how traditional security 
mechanism can protect very large data? Our fear is that, DoS attacks here can 
be ignored with other large volume, velocity and variety of data that will generate 
similar type of charts in all pattern detection and analysis systems. Traditional 
security mechanism that were designed for small-scale, static are inadequate. 
There can be huge array of motives, disclosure, alteration, destruction and denial. 
If we can’t implement right kind of security, hackers can turn Internet of Things 
(IoT) into a weapon. There are too many ways that our systems are vulnerable 
and as we allow “Bring your own device”, new kind of sensors make the attackers’ 
job easier. It is a difficult task for security perspective given the complexity of 
those environments. Attackers do not even need to attack from the front door, 
they generally need just one way to get into the complex Big Data Cloud system. 
 
6.4  Research Scope 
With big opportunities arise big challenges. It’s so true about all the recent 
times IT revolution and Big Data is no exception in its place, challenges this time 
turn into big challenges. We first tried to define Big Data gaps as: 
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Factors that are not allowing Big Data to deliver value to its potential are 
Big Data gaps. 
In Fig. 6.4. We have constructed diagram of gaps with hope to make it 
easy to envisage what is not allowing Big Data to deliver to its full potential. In our 
research we have identified Big Data challenges, privacy concerns, Big Data risks 
and Big Data threats are the four major gaps that are not allowing Big Data to 
achieve value to its potential. In our previous survey paper on Cloud Computing 
gaps [86], we identified Cloud providers reluctance to share security related logs 
and data [86], from that point of view we propose a method in this chapter, where 
a Big Data Cloud customer will be able detect cyber-attacks with the limited 
resources they have. Fig. 6.4. is showing us what Big Data is promising to deliver 
and  what we are actually getting. Big data is promising to deliver a platform, 
which consists of the following: workflow and scheduling, Non-Relational 
Database, scripting, query, Metadata Management, distributed processing, and 
finally it also comprises with Distributed storage [129]. So basically these are the 
things which Big Data promises to their end users but because of some gaps such 
as challenges, privacy concerns, risk, and threat, Big Data is not delivering to its 
potential. Looking at Big Data challenges, some of the challenges include access 
to data for example, moving, merging and managing. Other challenges include 
overkill, skill shortages, cost of clusters, and development gap. Looking into 
privacy concerns there are a lot of worries such as government monitoring, re-
identification, regulations, creepy factor, lack of transparency, where to find 
policies? What will be future use? And lastly, too many entities collecting large 
data sets. The third form of gap can be called Big Data Risk, some of the risks 
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include unreliability of commodity hardware, insecure computation, input 
validation and filtering, not having smooth access control, and finally, the security 
system is tied with the traditional system. The last form of gap is known as Big 
Data Threats. Some of the threats we found out include, there are so many ports 
open, more data in warehouse this will tempt the attackers to infiltrate, it is 
magnified by 3 V’s, undetectable malicious activities, false positives, large logs 
raises security concerns and lastly it is not clear. These four gaps was found out 
while carrying out our research, once again those four gaps include Big Data 
challenges, privacy concerns, Big Data risk and lastly, Big Data threats. 
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Fig. 6.4. Understanding Big Data Gaps 
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6.5  Experiment Design 
Our goal for this experiment was to attack Hadoop’s web management 
interface Ambari web [130]. We also wanted to create a Big Data Cloud in which 
Hadoop ecosystem will be resident in the Cloud.  To achieve this goal we have 
chosen A computer with dual core Intel Pentium processor g3220 [131] it has 8 
GB  RAM. G3220 processor has support for Intel® Virtualization Technology (VT-
x). Fig. 6.5. shows our experiment design containing five VM’s out of those four 
are attackers and one is the victim. In our experiment we attack using Windows 
Server 2008 which is a windows based operating system. We also attack using 
Windows 7 which is also a windows based operating system. The other two 
attacker VM’s are based on Linux operating system and those are Red Hat 
Enterprise Linux 7 (RHEL7) and CentOS. We run the Cyber-attacks remotely and 
collect performance data from the hypervisor and Guest OS which in this case is 
the victim VM.  
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Fig. 6.5.  Experiment design 
We have setup Type 1 Hypervisor : VMware ESXi 5.5 [132] directly on the 
hardware  and through vSphere Client[133] we setup 4 other VMs Windows 2008 
[134], Windows 7 [135], RHEL 7 [136] and CentOS 7 [137]. All our Hypervisor 
and VMs is 64 bit. After setting VM we have imported Hortonworks Data Platform 
(HDP) VM [129] to our VMware infrastructure. 
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6.6 Performance Data Collection and Preparation 
We put Hadoop VM in the Cloud and collected performance data of CPU, 
memory, disk and network usage from Virtual Machine Manager (VMM) and HDP, 
and choose an suitable method for attack classification for Hadoop ecosystem 
similar to what we have done in the past for Cloud Computing architecture [124, 
125]. Details of the attack methods and their real life implementation can be found 
on Cloud Computing book [3]. The aim is to test how cyber-attacks shapes on 
performance charts of CPU, network, datastore, memory and physical disk usase. 
We consider 5 different types of cyber attacks and activities on Hadoop VM ports. 
These are the following: (a) Normal activities running on Hadoop ecosystem, (b) 
Real-Time Disk Operating System (RDOS) [95] attack on Ambari port 8080, (c) 
Low Orbit Ion Cannon (LOIC) [96] attack on Ambari port 8080, (d) XOIC attack 
[138] on Ambari port 8080 and (e) LOIC attack on Hadoop’s port 80.  We designed 
this process to alert the users and to let them know the cyber-attacks that are 
happening on on their VM. For Data collection we first checked if all the services 
that should be running on HDP is running. To check it we logged onto Ambari 
Web on port 8080. Fig. 6.6. Showing we have logged onto Ambari Web and all 
the services we were expecting to run are running as they should be.  
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Fig. 6.6. Before running cyber-attacks on Ambari Web 
As soon as we successfully run attack tools on port 8080 we could 
successfully stop all communications between Ambari Web and rest of Hadoop. 
Fig. 6.7. shows Ambari web interface which is not talking with the rest of the 
Hadoop ecosystem. 
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Fig. 6.7. Ambari Web interface during attack 
To note here, Our HDP VM received IP 192.168.186.129 automatically 
from our internal network Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) server. 
We have not put any static IP address on Hadoop VM instead we reserved this 
IP address in DHCP so that Hortonworks Sandbox with HDP always receives the 
same IP address. Fig. 6.8. shows we are attacking VM with IP 192.168.186.129 
to specific port 8080 that is the port for Ambari Web. Here we are attacking using 
JavaLOIC [139, 140], it is A Java based network stress testing application. For 
this particular attack we kept only HDP VM on and all other VMs off as can be 
seen in Fig. 6.8. 
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Fig. 6.8. Attacking Ambari Web interface port 8080 on Hortonworks 
Sandbox and collecting hypervisor data while all other co-residents are turned 
off 
Fig. 6.9. Shows datastore performance chart of Hortonworks Sandbox VM 
during Java LOIC attack. The spicks reveals when the attacks happened, sudden 
increase in read latency is noticeable by the yellow spikes. The purple spike 
reveals the write latency. The read latency which was at the maximum was during 
the time of 8.49 PM to 9.02 PM basically states that our experiment was 
successful. Fig. 6.10. Shows we are attacking Hadoop VM on default http port 80 
using attack tool RDOS by Rixer [140]. 
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Fig. 6.9. Datastore performance graph of Hadoop VM during attack using 
Java LOIC, sudden increase in read latency is noticeable between 8.49 PM to 
9.02 PM 
 
Fig. 6.10. Runing RDOS by Rixer on default HTTP port 80 and collecting 
performance data 
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In Fig. 6.11. the graph shows the CPU performance of Hadoop VM during 
attack using RDOS by Rixer. Irregular CPU usage is noticeable between the times 
of 10.56 PM to 11.08 PM. This proves that our experiment went really well based 
on the data received and shown by the CPU performance chart. 
Fig. 6.11. CPU performance graph of Hadoop VM during attack using 
RDOS by Rixer  
6.7  Algorithm Descriptions 
In this research we focused on supervised learning algorithms to identify 
real time cyber attacks and to distinguish between cyber attacks and usual 
activities that runs on Big Data Cloud and Hadoop’s ecosystem. A supervised 
learning algorithm considers the training data to produce an inferred function, 
which can be used for mapping new examples. An optimal scenario is basically 
allow for the algorithm to correctly determine the class labels for unseen instances 
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which is also called test data. Several state-of-the-art   supervised learning 
algorithms are experimentally evaluated in the context to stop real time cyber 
attack. The predictive power of several Decision Tree C4.5 [74], Naive Bayes [71] 
and Support Vector Machine (SVM) [73] is contrasted in our experiment. All the 
algorithms descriptions are availabe in Frank and Witten’s  paper [75]. Among 
this group of algorithms we found decision tree group algorithm PART [141, 142]  
shown excellent overall predictive capabilities. PART stands for Projective 
Adaptive Resonance Theory. All these techniques have been implemented in 
WEKA [109], which is a Java based popular data mining tool. J48 is WEKA 
implementation of C4.5. 
PART Algorithm  [142] 
Algorithm initialization: we consider number m of nodes in F1 layer which is equal to 
number of dimensions in the input vector.  We also consider number m of nodes in F 
layer is equal to expected maximum number of clusters that can be formed at each 
classification level. 
We initialize the following parameters L, ρo, ρh, σ, α, θ, and e. 
 
“1.   Set ρ = ρo. 
 2.  Repeat steps 3–7 until the stopping condition is satisfied. 
 3.  Set all F2 nodes as being non-committed. 
 4.  For each input vector in dataset S, do steps 4.a-4.f. 
a. Compute hij for all F1 nodes vi and committed F2 nodes vj. If all F2 nodes are 
non-committed, go to step 4.c. 
b. Compute Tj for all committed F2 nodes Vj. 
c. Select the winning F2 node VJ. If no F2 node can be selected, put the input data 
into outlier 0   and then continue to do step 4. 
d. If the winner is a committed node, compute rJ, otherwise go to step 4.f. 
e. If rJ   >= ρ, go to step 4.f, otherwise reset the winner VJ and go back to step 4.c. 
f. Set the winner VJ   as the committed and update the bottom- up and top-down 
weights for winner node VJ. 
 5.  Repeat step 4 N times until stable clusters are formed (i.e. until the difference of 
output cluster say N-than d (N-1) th time becomes sufficiently small) 
 6.  For each   cluster Cj   in F2    layer, compute the associated dimension set Dj. 
Then, set S = Cj and set ρ=ρ+ρh (or ρ=|D|=ρh), go back to step 2. 
 7.  For the outlier O, set S=0, go back to step2.”  [142] 
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6.8  Experimental Results 
Experimental performance indicators considered are classification 
accuracy, the details of performances are provided in Table 6.1. The classification 
accuracy gives the percentage of attacks which are classified correctly by the 
machine learning techniques. The number of unclassified instances measures the 
technique’s limitations, which means failures in classifying some attacks. Based 
on the classification accuracy we found PART is a better choice for attack 
classification in the Hadoop ecosystem. 
Table 6.1. Algorithms performance for attack classification 
Algorithm names SMO J48 REPTree Naïve Bayes DecisionTable PART 
Attack 
Classification 
Accuracy 
86.8715 % 90.7821 % 90.7821 % 58.2868 % 90.3166 % 91.9926 % 
 
The classification accuracy basically captured the average performances 
of the techniques for our problem.  But we made further attempts to take a closer 
look at the performances on attack classification. In that vein, we employed 
Confusion Matrix [78] analysis to study the details of the techniques’ performance 
measures. This matrix offers a detailed picture on the actual and predicted 
classification task done by any classification technique class wise. The confusion 
matrix based performances are provided in Table 6.2. Over the experiment we 
used cross validation technique to report the classification accuracy. Cross-
validation is a technique to evaluate predictive models by partitioning the original 
sample into a training set to train the model, and a test set to evaluate it. Due to 
the data size we preferred 10 fold cross validation in this research. In 10-fold 
cross-validation, the original sample is randomly partitioned into 10 equal size 
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subsamples. Of the 10 subsamples, a single subsample is retained as the 
validation data for testing the model, and the remaining (10-1) subsamples are 
used as training data. The cross-validation process is then repeated 10 times (the 
folds), with each of the 10 subsamples used exactly once as the validation data. 
The 10 results from the folds can then be averaged (or otherwise combined) to 
produce a single estimation. The advantage of this method is that all observations 
are used for both training and validation, and each observation is used for 
validation exactly once. 
Table 6.2. PART performance analysis 
Attack or 
Activities 
Normal 
Activities 
RDOS 
Attack on 
Ambari 
port 8080 
LOIC 
Attack on 
Ambari 
port 8080 
XOIC 
Attack on 
Ambari 
port 8080 
LOIC java 
Attack on 
Ambari 
port 8080 
LOIC 
Attack on 
Hadoop's 
port 80 
10FCV 
Attack 
Classification 
Performance 
Normal 
Activities 
613 13 3 4 9 10 
 
 
91.9926 % 
RDOS Attack 
on Ambari port 
8080 
22 21 0 0 0 0 
LOIC Attack on 
Ambari port 
8080 
7 0 39 0 0 1 
XOIC Attack on 
Ambari port 
8080 
1 0 0 23 0 0 
JavaLOIC  
Attack on 
Ambari port 
8080 
2 0 0 0 147 1 
LOIC Attack on 
Hadoop's port 
80 
7 0 0 0 0 145  
 
Looking at the confusion matrix in Table 6.2, we take into account the first 
row of attack that is Normal Activities. There are a total 652 instances for Normal 
Activities out of which 613 instances are correctly classified, 13 are incorrectly 
classified as RDOS, 3 are incorrectly classified as LOIC, 4 are incorrectly 
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classified as XOIC, 9 are incorrectly classified as JavaLOIC, and 10 are 
incorrectly classified as LOIC for port 80. Looking at the second attack using 
RDOS Attack on Ambari port 8080 there were a total of 43 instances, 22 of those 
were incorrectly classified as Normal Activities and 21 instances were correctly 
classified. In the third attack using LOIC Attack on Ambari port 8080, there were 
a total of 47 instances and out of those 7 were incorrectly classified as Normal 
Activities, 1 was incorrectly classified as LOIC attack on Hadoop’s port 80 and 39 
instances were correctly classified. Looking at the fourth attack which was XOIC 
attack on Ambari port 8080 where the total number of instances was 24, out of 
that only one was incorrectly classified as Normal Activities and the rest of the 23 
instances were correctly classified. The fifth attack was based on JavaLOIC 
attack on Ambari port 8080, where the total number of instances was 150, out of 
that 2 was incorrectly classified as Normal Activities, 1 was incorrectly classified 
as LOIC Attack on Hadoop’s port 80, and 147 instances were correctly classified. 
The last attack was known as LOIC Attack on Hadoop’s port 80, it had a total of 
152 instances and out of that 7 were incorrectly classified as Normal Activities 
and 145 of the instances were correctly classified. By looking at these results we 
can understand why PART was the best algorithm chosen to work with. Together 
with PART algorithm we chose the test option as 10 folds cross validation. Fig. 
6.12. shows how the algorithm and the selected test option works in this 
experiment. 
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Fig. 6.12. Graphical representation of the Machine Learning work flow for 
this experiment 
In a number of cases the amount of noise measured in a data set in quiet 
less. For instance, sources say that field error rates for business are usually 
around 5% or less if the organization takes some actions to actually prevent data 
errors [143]. Although, in other scenarios the amount of field error rates can 
actually be more. Taking in account an example of protein interactions, Gavin et 
al. [144] suggests that there are a significant number of false-positive protein 
interactions present in the current experimental data. Gavin et al. [144] also 
estimates that 30% or more of protein interactions detected in that example may 
be spurious, as inferred from duplicate analyses of 13 purified protein complex 
[145]. 
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To remove the noise data we applied discretization filtering algorithm to 
improve the classification performance. According to Fisher [146] some old 
articles suggests that discretization was a small part of Statistics and that it has 
an exceptional case of one-dimentional clustering. From the nineties the research 
in the field of discretization grew rapidly and supervised methods were developed 
[147, 148]. There are alot of the fields discretization has affected and that an effect 
of discretization can actually enhance the performance of discrete methods such 
as Association Rule construction [149] or the Machine Learning of a Bayesian 
Network [150]. In our experiment we have used the method called “Global 
Discretization” [151]. 
Table 6.3. PART performance after adopting filtering approach 
Attack or 
Activities 
Normal 
Activities 
RDOS 
Attack 
on 
Ambari 
port 
8080 
LOIC 
Attack 
on 
Ambari 
port 
8080 
XOIC 
Attack 
on 
Ambari 
port 
8080 
LOIC 
Java 
Attack 
on 
Ambari 
port 
8080 
LOIC 
Attack on 
Hadoop’s 
port 80 
10FCV 
Attack 
Classification 
Performance 
Normal 
Activities 
633 7 1 0 7 9 
 
96.3687 % 
 
RDOS Attack 
on Ambari 
port 8080 
9 31 0 0 0 0 
LOIC Attack 
on Ambari 
port 8080 
0 0 41 0 0 0 
XOIC Attack 
on Ambari 
port 8080 
0 0 0 30 0 0 
LOIC Java 
Attack on 
Ambari port 
8080 
1 0 0 0 138 0 
LOIC Attack 
on Hadoop’s 
port 80 
2 0 0 0 0 162 
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After filtering task carried out, the most irrelevant instances have been 
removed from data. The second stage is to fed the same test data with more 
rigourously data mining processes by using earlier model. The improved results 
of the filtering performaces have illustrated in Table 6.3. 
The above performance table confirmed that the proposed PART machine 
learning method that combines filtering and data mining processes is able to filter 
out most irrelevant instances and reduce the chance of generating noisy patterns 
hence improve the computational accuracy and efficiency which basically safe 
the system more likely from the above types of cyber attacks. After comparing the 
results shown in Table 6.1 and Table 6.2 we can see the imporvement as the 
number of instances are not similar between the two tables due to filtering. 
6.9 Related Works 
In cyber-attack detection systems, researchers’ put most of their efforts on 
gaining high accuracy whereas other very important aspects such as false alarm 
reduction remain untouched [2]. A very good thing about our series of 
experiments on Cloud Computing [3], detecting insiders attack [4] and 
distinguishing DDoS attacks from normal activities on Cloud Computing [5], we 
are now capable of providing training dataset to machine that gives us high 
accuracy not only in attack detection but also in reduction of false alarm. In this 
section we have done a comparative benchmarks from related research works 
such as intrusion detection systems and false alarm reduction and compared the 
accuracy with our research. Though other methods are not exactly same as ours 
in terms of dataset and method used, but the goal of achieving accuracy in cyber-
attack detection was same. Based on the benchmark in Fig. 6.13.  it can be said 
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that our results are more accurate in Cloud based systems. As shown in Fig. 6.13. 
our performance accuracy is 96.3687%, that is the highest accuracy achieved 
while using machine learning algorithms for attack detection and distinguishing it 
from normal activities (false alarm reduction). We believed this high accuracy was 
achieved for two main reasons, firstly we used the complexity of Cloud 
architecture to our advantage by using hypervisor generated performance data. 
Secondly, the results were also filtered through PART algorithm to achieve this 
percentage. We compared our achievement with five other research contributions 
from last ten years who also claimed percentage of success in accuracy and false 
positive reduction, and there scores are as follows: Tjhai et al [152] used SOM 
neural network and K-means algorithm attained an accuracy of over 50% which 
is just above the 50% threshold. Spathoulas and Katsikas [153] also used 
machine learning to get the accuracy rating, and they got an accuracy up to 75%. 
Al-Mamory and Zhang [154] got accuracy of 82%, which was the highest accuracy 
so far before our experiment. Hoang et al [155] got an accuracy of just over 45% 
mark, which is the lowest in the comparison between six performance statistics. 
Pietraszek and Tanner [156] achieved an accuracy of 52% just above the 50% 
mark. So as stated and also shown in Table 6.4, it proves that our result in this 
research is 14.36877% more accurate than the previously suggested 
performance accuracy of 82%. 
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Fig. 6.13. Comparative benchmark 
Table 6.4. Detailed comparison 
Reference Year 
Does Cloud 
Customers 
has easy 
access to 
the data 
Set? 
Method 
Will it 
work in 
Cloud 
Systems? 
Will it work 
in Pre Cloud 
System 
Systems? 
Used 
Architectural 
Complexities 
to 
Experimental 
advantage? 
Can it 
detect 
attack on 
Hadoop? 
Tjhai et al 
[152] 
2010 No 
SOM Neural 
Network and 
K-means 
Algorithm 
Yes Yes No 
Not 
Tested 
Spathoulas 
and 
Katsikas 
[153] 
2010 No 
Filtering 
Algorithms 
Yes Yes No 
Not 
Tested 
Al-Mamory 
and Zhang 
[154] 
2010 No 
Filtering 
Algorithms 
Yes Yes No 
Not 
Tested 
Hoang et 
al. [155] 2009 No 
Hidden 
Markov Model 
(HMM) 
Yes Yes No 
Not 
Tested 
Pietrazek 
and Tanner 
[156] 
2005 No 
Data Mining 
Clustering & 
Machine 
Learning 
Yes Yes No 
Not 
Tested 
This 
Research 
2015 Yes 
PART 
Algorithm with 
Filtering 
Yes No Yes Yes 
51%
75%
82%
48%
52%
96.3687%
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
120%
Tjhai et al. (2010) Spathoulas and
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Zhang (2010)
Hoang et al.
(2009)
Pietraszek and
Tanner (2005)
This Research
(2015)
Performance
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6.10 Conclusions  
The novelty of our research was to detect cyber-attacks on Big Data Cloud 
even when Hadoop was under attack. While other researchers are trying to detect 
these attacks on Big Data Cloud using Hadoop itself, no one actually indicated - 
how these detection will work when some part of Hadoop is under attack and 
become incapable of communication with the rest of its ecosystem. To 
accomplish our goal, we have used real time performance data from Hadoop VM 
and using modern machine learning algorithms we reached significant accuracy 
of 96.3687% for attack detection using filtering in PART algorithm. We consider 
the reason why we achieved this high accuracy in attack detection is because we 
used the complex nature of Big Data Cloud architecture to our advantage. 
      Even though we did not attack on other parts of Hadoop ecosystem, 
from the success of attacking Apache Ambari’s web interface, we believe it is 
possible to run similar kind of attacks on other services and ports as well. There 
is a need to develop multi-layer detection system by future researchers for 
complex Big Data Cloud architecture by proposing layered approaches consisting 
of at least 3 layers. Our suggestion is to use the 3 layer approach with the first 
layer being created with security features already built in with Hadoop. The 
second layer must analyse performance data with data generated in hypervisor 
and the third layer should use traditional log methods which was very successful 
in attack detection for traditional systems. The architecture of this layered 
approach can be in any order, however it need to be smart enough to logically 
start plan B as Ambari or other interfaces stop talking to the core infrastructure. 
Or perhaps let the core run with Plan A and automatically start Plan B on remote 
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interfaces that has lost communication. There is an open future challenge to reach 
higher accuracy level or getting 100 percent accuracy by proposing any novel 
algorithm.  
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Chapter 7 
Integrating Internet-of-Things with 
Cloud Computing and Big Data  
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7.1  Introduction 
Cloud Computing did not take time at all to be in the ICT driving seat. Now 
the success of Cloud consumption by the wider community is showing us new 
dreams to achieve even further. Intelligence of Big Data Technologies, 
Globalization of Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN) together with the new invention 
of Radio-Frequency Identification (RFID) is now trying to merge physical world 
with the digital world. Technologies are transforming the very well-known Internet 
to Internet of Everything. Upward existence of Wi-Fi and Mobile Internet 
technologies making this merging effort quicker and affordable. This chapter is 
written through the vision on integrating Internet-of-Things (IoT) with the power of 
Cloud Computing and the intelligence of Big Data analytics. Putting a sensor on 
everything around us will create opportunities for us to generate more data, power 
of Cloud will provide better storage and management facilities and with the 
integration of Big Data technologies are not only going to make everything 
intelligent but also will bring big economic prospects. But integration of all these 
three cutting edge technologies is complex to understand. This chapter is written 
with a three layered approach understanding the technology, gaps and security. 
The complexity of Big Data Cloud has made traditional way of attack detection 
difficult, we have applied this same difficulty to our advantage by gathering data 
such as Hypervisor’s performance data. With a series of lab experiments on 
different hardware, we have collected performance data from all these three 
layers, then combined these data together and lastly applied modern machine 
learning techniques to distinguish 18 different activities and cyber-attacks. The 
content of this chapter presented at the IEEE International Conference on 2nd 
Asia-Pacific World Congress on Computer Science & Engineering (APWC on 
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CSE 2015), and Submitted in Journal of Network and Computer Applications, 
ELSEVIER. 
 
7.2  IoT Definition 
In our hunt for a suitable definition of Internet of Things, we scanned books 
and articles and provided our own definition below and in Fig. 7.1. we have drawn 
schematic definition of Internet of Things. 
When we put a sensor with some computing techniques to anything, that 
has internet connectivity and layers of intelligence can be considered as Internet 
of Things. 
 
Fig. 7.1. Schematic definition of Internet of Things 
In many definitions, “devices” are mentioned. In our research we found 
‘Anything’ will be a more appropriate word instead of devices. Theoretically we 
can put a sensor to anything and everything. We honestly believe, anything that 
surrounds us will be connected to the internet very soon in one form or another. 
IoT is a major shift in IT world, it is not just going to impact the technology 
industries but the humanity in general. It is also a major shift from consumer’s 
point of view how they will interact with internet.  Though in many definitions, 
researchers put the word “actuator”, we tried to avoid this word in our definition, 
because in our opinion, it’s good to have but not a must have thing. What is a 
thing: “any object that has sensor attached to it and able to transmit the data into 
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the internet/Cloud that could be analysed to make decision”. We can see range 
of possibilities and we started to think possibilities are endless but there are whole 
lot of challenges. These “things” have now changed the concept of IT security 
and internet security, because now we are not talking about computer, tablets or 
perhaps mobile phones. We are talking about very small chips connected to 
everything. 
 
7.3  Literature Review 
The Internet is going to change. People use the internet for communication 
through the use of email and webpages. Data we send comes from client devices 
such as Laptops, Tablets, Smartphones, PC and it goes to some servers and the 
server then transfers that data further. The internet has three major actors these 
include people, client devices and the servers. There are a plenty more actors 
joining the internet and they are called things hence the internet of things. 
Examples of internet of things are temperature sensors, traffic sensors, flow rate 
sensors, energy usage monitors and etc. 
There are a lot of challenges of the IoT including data communication 
challenges about how the physical devices will communicate and interoperate 
with each other. There are also concerns about sensors battery life and 
maintenance period.  
There are security and privacy issues for example, who wants a smart 
home which can be hacked? Nobody does, or a smart hospital, which can be 
breached remotely. Internet of things will have security problems, some reports 
say that, to meet increasing market demand for number of connected devices, 
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manufactures are struggling with deadlines and as a result, devices are released 
with insufficient security measures [157]. 
At CES 2015 the CEO of Samsung said that by 2017 90% of their products 
will be connected to the web [158]. In 2014 ARM announced a new operating 
system for IoT devices called mbed OS [159]. It is a free OS for ARM’s cortex m 
range micro controllers. The main key point of mbed OS is that it allows IoT 
protocols and supports anybody from an application developer to million dollar 
corporations to develop protocol types for IoT devices. IoT device will have a 
processor that runs on 100MHz and not 100GHz or 200GHz like a smart phone. 
It will also have around 4KB – 256KB memory and a storage size of 32KB/64KB. 
There are four types of Operating Systems (OS) made by ARM [159, 160], 
firstly the multitasking OS is like Android and Linux. Second type of OS is the Real 
Time OS (RTOS), these are found in very small devices within cars, planes and 
industrial applications, they are mostly concerned with how a scheduler works or 
how things happen and in what order it happens. But the major downfall is that it 
might be battery hungry or power inefficient. Third OS is known as bare metal 
approach it is not an OS, basically there is a loop that goes round and round to 
infinity and runs code inside that loop checking everything and doing everything 
and its downfall is it can’t be maintained when the project becomes large. The 
forth type of OS is a low power OS, it is designed just to conserve power while 
performing its functions [159]. 
What IoT looks like? At the thing end you have a small device which 
monitors something like a door, a window or a heart rate monitor or also a 
temperature monitor. These devices transmit that data to other more complicated 
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devices, it could be a smart phone, or it can be a control unit of some kind like a 
smart thermostat. The last category of device is known as an IoT gateway they 
are important because the sensor often doesn’t have a direct connection to the 
internet, they probably have Bluetooth or other low power connectivity like Zigbi. 
 
Fig. 7.2. Understanding IoT integration with Cloud Computing and Big Data 
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Fig. 7.2. was drawn by understanding the concepts of IoT Integration with 
Cloud Computing and Big Data. Anything and everything can be an object with 
sensors that can transmit data up into the Cloud that can be analyzed and used 
to make decisions. Anything and everything can also be event driven low power 
OS such as Mbed OS, these OS transmits data through sensors to a smart phone 
or a control unit or even an IoT gateway. These are more complicated devices 
that can send data to Cloud. Middleware software handles the data when sending 
to the Cloud and where data fabrication may occur as well. From Cloud 
Computing data are sent to Hadoop to get intelligent decisions. 
7.3.1 Three Layer Integration Opportunities, Predictions and Crazy 
Figures 
The IoT is the association of data, processes, things and people. This 
modernization has changed the way business, education, healthcare and many 
other aspects of daily life across the world is being done [161]. The number of 
things connected to the internet as of 2008 is far more than the number of people 
on the earth [162].  Stated by Cisco the due to the increased connections of things 
to the internet, through the next decade will show profits up to $19 trillion profits 
for business’s as well as cost savings, improve citizen services and increased 
revenues for governments and other public sector organisations. In Fig. 7.3. we 
have graphically presented integration and opportunity prediction of the three 
layered approach.  
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Fig. 7.3. Integration of IoT with the power of Cloud and Big Data Intelligence 
 
The expected growth of Internet of Things (IoT) at a compound growth rate 
of 31.72% from 2014- 2019 [163].  Estimates from Gartner stated that IoT 
products and service providers will be able to generate an incremental revenue 
that will exceed $300 billion by 2020 [164]. 
7.3.2 Understanding IoT Integration with Predecessor Technologies 
The IoT is one of the most talked about technological trends today, 
providing access to information about anything, anywhere, at any time [165]. 
Today’s devices are designed for accuracy and power which is integrated and 
interconnected to each other through the internet. Technology used a generation 
ago now can be classified as prehistoric and yet there is room for more changes 
to come. Back in 1956, IBM made history by creating the world’s first hard drive. 
It was a 2,000+ lb. behemoth known as the IBM 305 RAMAC. It was designed to 
store and retrieve basic information on fifty 24-inch-diameter disks. It stored less 
than 5 MB in total, roughly enough to hold a single music track in modern mp3 
format and cost the equivalent of $160,000 in today’s money. Today a 1 terabyte 
hard drive can be bought for $160 and can store up to thousands of songs. Moving 
on, in the 70’s, Kodak launched its M22 Instamatic video camera, designed to 
make it simple for consumers to shoot their own high-quality video with point-and-
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shoot ease. Today, there are a dozen high resolution smartphones that has the 
capability to capture a 4k format image and video shooting, which can directly be 
uploaded to the internet via Facebook, Twitter and YouTube. Furthermore, the 
revolution of IoT is now taking a toll and making a mark in this era of technology. 
The integration of IoT in predecessor technologies is important because the world 
will soon be connected with the IoT, which simply means that the technology 
today has to move with it or it will be left behind [166]. 
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7.3.3 Understanding Complexities with Three Layered Approach 
 
Fig. 7.4. Understanding complexities with three layered approach 
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In Fig. 7.4. we have identified the three layers as Things Layer, Cloud 
Computing Layer, and Big Data Layer. This is the basic idea we got by doing 
extensive research in IoT.  In the Things Layer we can connect a sensor with 
anything such as multi-protocol radio, processor, sensor, energy source, memory 
and mixed signals. All these things connects physical world with the digital world 
in the form of zeros and ones. These are than used in the Cloud and we have 
described it as Cloud Computing Layer. Than from there we can use Big Data 
Intelligence also described as Big Data Layer. 
7.3.4  Problem with BYOD 
 
The revolution of IoT has brought about a new system in organisations 
known as Bring Your Own Device (BYOD). BYOD has been introduced in 
organisations for the purpose of reducing hardware costs for organisations and 
provide flexibility to employees [167]. While these benefits provide favourable 
results of some extent to both employees and organisations, there are still 
concerns regarding BYOD that hinder the growth of the system. BYOD problems 
can be partitioned into four broad categories which are: Legal, Security, Corporate 
and Financial.  
The problems that BYOD system faces need to be made explicit. This 
section will discuss the four categories of BYOD issues and attempt to identify 
specific areas of concern. The first category identifies the various legal issues 
BYOD faces. Some of these issues can be the ownership of data and device 
compensations [168]. The data on an employee’s mobile phone about the 
organisation is technically owned by the organisation but on the contrary any data 
on the employee’s personal device could be seen as their own as well and thus 
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could be debatable in legal terms. In addition, if an employee loses their personal 
device which they were using for the organisation, is the organisation obliged to 
provide compensation or not [169].  
Security is another discipline that identifies various potential risks of BYOD. 
Since corporate data is loaded on an employee’s personal device, there is a good 
chance of either deliberate or accidental misuse of data. Security has a twofold 
impact whereby either access to organisations data can be misused or an 
employee’s privacy could be compromised. Some specific risks could be of cyber 
criminals, data loss, lost devices, data integrity and confidentiality [170].  
The third category is based around corporate values and policies. BYOD 
system in organisations is closely managed by various policies and procedures 
[171]. The extent to which these policies can be enforced is unclear as various 
aspects need to take into consideration such as the quality of device, the level of 
access, and so on. The financial category has a very important role in the growth 
of BYOD in organisations. BYOD can incur huge financial costs from 
procurement, labour and maintenance costs of employee’s personal devices, 
from patches and updates, application deployment, and data management in 
personal devices of employees. Fig. 7.5. has been designed examining the 
articles Survey: BYOD, IoT and wearables trends in the enterprise by Scott 
Matteson [167], Bring your own device' creates privacy issues for employees by 
Marilyn Odendahl and Indiana Lawyer Staff  [168], IoT Adds New Wrinkle To 
MDM, BYOD by Pablo Valerio [169], 10 BYOD concerns that go beyond security 
issues by Mary Shacklett [171] and BYOD: data protection and information 
security issues by William Long [170]. 
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Fig. 7.5. BYOD Issues 
 
7.3.5 Wireless Sensor Networks and RFIDs 
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) systems and Wireless Sensor 
Networks (WSNs) are becoming  an important part of the technological era in 
computing due to its advantages and broad applicability. RFID systems main 
purpose is to recognise objects and to identify the location of objects without 
referencing the physical aspects of the object. WSNs are trivial networks using 
low expense devices. These devices collaborate together to collect information 
by detecting factors such as temperature, pressure, light, humidity, vibration and 
sound [172]. The rapid growth of RFID and WSN technology will meet new 
challenges, provide better communication, save time and improve services. The 
embedding of these technology into the environment will provide huge quantity of 
data that need to be saved, accessed, managed and analysed in a harmless, 
simple, effective and interoperable manner [173]. Therefore, the integration of 
technologies such as Cloud Computing and Big Data with IoT will open up new 
paths to the world of technology. Furthermore, the power of virtualization 
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technologies used in complex Cloud Computing architecture can provide “pay as 
you go” infrastructure for IoT. This will integrate monitoring of things, storage 
systems, data analysis techniques and visualization facilities for IoT devices and 
data. The basic idea of this concept is the pervasive presence around us of a 
variety of things or objects – such as Radio-Frequency Identiﬁcation (RFID) tags 
and sensors which through unique addressing schemes, will interact with each 
other and cooperate with their neighbours to reach common goals. Some 
applications range from highway toll collection, supply chain management, public 
transportation, controlling building access, animal tracking, developing smart 
home appliances, and remote keyless entry for automobiles to locating children, 
which is all possible with IoT [172]. 
7.3.6 Human Expectations from IoT 
 
IoT has been highlighted as the evolutionary technology that will reshape 
the human life around the world. The IoT is expected to affect humans from all 
walks of life, from various perspectives. Therefore, as the impact is immense 
there are a number of expectations that have been projected from people’s side. 
The human expectations can be divided into two layers which are the domain that 
will be affected followed by the opportunistic areas. The human expectations can 
be divided into seven broad categories which are: Home and Office, Smart Cities, 
Manufacturing, Transportation, Health Care, Energy and Agriculture [174]. The 
areas of opportunities are divided into five categories which are: Revenue, 
Connection, Application, Embedded and Intelligent Systems and Storage [175]. 
These domains describe the various dimensions of humans as they relate 
to and engage with these domains on a regular basis. This paragraph will 
describe the activities, tasks and technologies in each domain from IoT’s 
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perspective. The domain of Home and Office includes activities that are engaged 
on a routine basis such as switching on the lights of your house from a remote 
location, closing the fridge door in the kitchen from your bedroom and closing the 
window shades and garage doors from your friend’s house [176].  
The Cities domain could include traffic lights being adjusted based on the 
number of cars in each lane, street lights being turned on as soon as someone is 
within a hundred feet range and garbage cans being able to send a message for 
collection as soon as it is filled. The next domain is in the field of manufacturing 
and would probably be very influential in the development of IoT. Manufacturing 
can include equipment’s being able to autonomously adjust its setting to improve 
production quality and automatically shut down equipment’s when not in use 
which will greatly reduce operational costs [176].  
Transportation comes in various mediums such as motor vehicles, trains, 
aeroplanes and so on. These mediums can include features such as driver 
support, automatic air-conditioning adjustments and aeroplanes being able to 
autonomously set and change course. The Health care industry is another domain 
that will reap a lot of benefits from IoT technologies. These could include a new 
generation of sensors that can detect health deterioration of a heart patient with 
pace-maker and monitoring of premature babies [177]. Energy domain could 
include design and implementation of smart grids that supply power on an as-
needed basis, isolation and autonomous maintenance of issues in the smart 
grids. The last domain is agriculture which also has a number of areas which 
could benefit from IoT technologies such as tractors with sensors that are able to 
detect the quality of soil and automated pest detection and control systems [177]. 
IoT will impact each of the domains in numerous ways. 
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Furthermore, the domains of human expectations can be divided into area 
of opportunities that can found in the seven domains. The opportunities have 
been divided into five sections which are: Revenue, Connection, Application, 
Embedded and Intelligent Systems and Storage. Revenue basically refers to 
financial gain that could be offered by IoT technologies. For example, IoT will 
enable better production rate in manufacturing which would mean more profits for 
the organisation as well as salary increments for the employees which in turn will 
improve the standard of living. Connection will improve corporation and 
communication between people, organisations and machines while IoT 
application will be able to provide users with a better and complete experience.  
The embedded and intelligent systems will be able to assist people and 
organisations to improve and better manage their daily activities. Some examples 
of intelligent embedded systems can be automatic fridge door close after a certain 
period of time and switching of car lights based on light exposure [176]. Finally, 
more storage space will be available which can also play a beneficial role Big 
Data challenges. The storage space can be improved with grid computing 
technologies as all machines will be online and IoT technologies could help the 
manufacturing industry produce better storage devices. Fig. 7.6. below illustrates 
the two layers of human expectation. The diagram below has been designed by 
closely studying the The Internet of Things (IoT) in HCM – Expectation? 
Soumyasanto Sen [174], The Internet Of Things And The Principle Of Great 
Expectations by GH Rao [175] and The Future is Smart from a Business Report 
by The Globe and Mail [177]. 
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Fig. 7.6. Human expectations from IoT 
 
7.4  IoT Security and Gap Analysis on Three Layered 
Approach 
The concept of IoT is based on the concept of creating a public internet. 
While this type of network offers numerous benefits to humans, there are still a 
number of security concerns that will be born with IoT.  The internet of things is 
now moving from a centralized network structure to a decentralized network 
structure. While this decentralised network structure will maintain the usage of 
traditional network computers and servers, it will also incorporate smart mobile 
devices in the mix. Security in IoT is an issue because of the new structure of the 
network. IoT utilises smart devices and sensor technology to collect and manage 
data and information and this process adds additional layers to the existing 
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network structure. To better understand IoT security, this research will attempt to 
segregate the various layers of IoT network and explain the security concerns at 
each level. 
 
 
 
Fig. 7.7. Understanding IoT security in a layered approach 
 
The Fig. 7.7 above has been designed after reading the articles Internet of 
things: Poised to be a security headache by Larry Dignan [178], IoT Reference 
Model is the IoT audit Technical Framework from IoT audit [179], Gartner Says 
the Internet of Things Will Transform the Data Center by Gartner [164], IoT 
security (Internet of Things security) by Alan Grau [180] and Security In The 
Internet Of Things by wind River Systems [181]. In Table 7.1. we have presented 
gap analysis on three layered approach based one our understanding from 
articles [3-5, 124, 125, 164, 178-182]. Researchers predict that by 2020 the 
number of connected devices will outweigh the number of people as IoT will be 
everywhere from industrial to home appliances. Security in IoT requires a new 
model altogether to cater for issues at various levels. The addition of the sensors 
layer, IoT device layer and data abstraction increases the attack surface area. 
This will mean that the frequency of attacks in an IoT network could be much 
higher than traditional networks.  
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TABLE 7.1. Gap analysis on three layered approach 
 Trusts and Privacy Concerns Threats Risks Issues and Challenges 
 
 
 
Things 
Layer 
ವ Things has changed the 
Internet so much that we 
can’t trust our “best 
practices anymore” 
ವ One can collect info that 
he/she didn’t intend to 
collect 
ವ How accountability will be 
managed? 
ವ Who should I blame? 
ವ How data will be stored? 
ವ Manufactures are not 
going to put same level of 
effort securing things. 
ವ Anything on the network 
has a link of chain 
ವ Security almost no-
existent in majority of 
things 
ವ Insecure API 
ವ No Threat modelling 
ವ Data encryption not all the 
way 
ವ Vulnerabilities found in 
most common home 
appliances  
ವ Default Passwords can be 
found online  
ವ Too much security on 
wrong places and 
almost no security 
where it should be 
ವ Multi-Party Networks 
ವ Manufacturers are 
trying to be creative 
in areas where they 
should not be 
ವ Older hardware chips 
are not compatible 
with recent standards 
ವ Not enforcing to 
change default 
password 
ವ Can’t really control 
BYOD 
ವ Can’t push policy 
ವ Bringing cost down for 
sensors 
ವ Lack of R&D 
ವ Low commodity prices 
ವ Insufficient 
Infrastructure 
ವ Regulatory pressure 
ವ Low level of exploration 
ವ Battery life 
ವ Interoperability 
 
 
 
 
 
Cloud 
Layer 
ವ Privacy laws are restricting 
Cloud providers from 
instant monitoring 
ವ Interest of different 
stakeholders are not 
necessarily in unison 
ವ Providers are naturally 
inclined to hide their own 
company policies for 
recruiting employees 
ವ Cloud providers’ inability to 
monitor its employees 
ವ Trust issue with the Cloud 
providers that they may 
become too commercial 
and store in low security 
area than agreed 
ವ Lack of knowledge 
ವ Cloud providers’ 
unwillingness to provide 
log and audit data; and 
security practices 
ವ Lack of transparency 
ವ Abuse and Nefarious 
Use of Cloud Computing 
ವ Insecure API  
ವ Malicious Insiders  
ವ Shared Technology 
Vulnerabilities 
ವ Data Loss/Leakage  
ವ Account, Service & 
Traffic Hijacking  
ವ Unknown Risk Profile 
ವ Shared elements were 
never designed for 
strong 
compartmentalization 
 
ವ Untested procedures, 
poor policy and 
inadequate data 
retention practices 
ವ Privileged user 
access 
ವ Regulatory 
compliance 
ವ Data location 
ವ Data segregation 
ವ  Data Recovery 
ವ  Investigative support 
and long-term 
viability 
ವ Service unavailability 
ವ  Performance 
unpredictability 
ವ  Data captivity 
ವ  Social and technical 
impact 
ವ Licensing 
ವ  Sustainability and 
interoperability. 
ವ The inability to audit 
events associated with 
API use 
ವ Incomplete log data to 
enable reconstruction 
of management activity 
ವ Business competitors 
using separate virtual 
machines on the same 
physical hardware 
ವ Coexistence of 
manufacturing sector 
and retail sector 
ವ Rapid development of 
Cloud Computing also 
opens some new 
loopholes 
ವ Present practice of 
digital identity 
management is not 
good enough for hybrid 
Clouds 
 
 
Big 
Data 
Layer 
ವ Govt Monitoring 
ವ Re(Identification) 
ವ Regulations 
ವ Creepy Factor 
ವ Lack of transparency 
ವ Where to find policies? 
ವ What will be future use? 
ವ Too many entities 
collecting large datasets 
ವ So many open ports 
ವ More data in warehouse 
tempt attackers 
ವ Magnified by 3Vs 
ವ Undetectable Malicious 
Activities 
ವ False Positives 
ವ Not Clear 
ವ Unreliability of 
commodity hardware 
ವ Insecure 
Computation 
ವ Input Validation and 
filtering 
ವ Not having granular 
access control 
ವ Security system is 
tied with traditional 
system 
ವ Large logs raises 
security concerns 
ವ Access to data (move, 
merge and manage) 
ವ Overkill 
ವ Skill Shortages 
ವ Cost of Clusters 
ವ Development gap 
ವ Originally developed 
for batch processing 
and not for real time 
streaming 
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Approaching security in IoT will require a different approach altogether. 
Security has to be implemented at various layers and they will have to be 
managed separately as well. For instance, the data abstraction layer may be very 
well secured with firewalls and security protocols but an attacker may attack the 
IoT devices directly and sabotage the data coming in or going out. In addition it is 
important to identify the types of attacks at different layers and implement a 
suitable security plan. IoT has already started revolutionising the Information 
Technology field and it is vital that research is started in IoT security as it will play 
an essential role in IoT’s adoption in the global community. 
 
7.5  Experiment Design 
Cloud Layer: For Cloud layer we used same dataset from our previous 
DDoS attack experiment on Cloud Computing in chapter 4 [5]. 
Big Data Layer: For this experiment we have chosen a HP ProLiant DL380 
G4 Server [82] with Dual network interface cards. The main reason for selecting 
server hardware is not to make hardware limitation a bottleneck, which may 
provide inaccurate data. We also chose VMWare ESXi 3.5[83] Hypervisor as 
VMM and Windows 7 [94] as guest Operating System (OS). Fig. 7.8. shows a 
logical and physical diagram of our experiment design.  
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Fig. 7.8. Physical and logical diagram of experiment design for Cloud 
Computing layer 
Our goal for this experiment was to attack Hadoop’s Web Management 
interface Ambari Web [130]. We also wanted to create a Big Data Cloud in which 
Hadoop ecosystem will be resident in the Cloud.  To achieve this goal we have 
chosen A computer with dual core Intel Pentium CPU G3220 (3M Cache, 3.00 
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GHz) [131] it has 8 GB  RAM. G3220 processor has support for Intel® 
Virtualization Technology (VT-x) . Fig. 7.9. shows our experiment design. 
 
Fig. 7.9. Experiment design for Big Data layer 
 
We have setup Type 1 Hypervisor : VMware ESXi 5.5 [132] directly on the 
hardware . And through vSphere Client [133] we setup 4 other VMs Windows 
2008[134], Windows 7 [135], RHEL 7 [136] and CentOS 7 [137]. All our 
Hypervisor and VMs are 64 bit. After setting VM we have imported Hortonworks 
Data Platform (HDP) VM [129] to our VMware infrastructure. 
Things Layer:  Our views for this layer, "Man in The Middle" (MIM) attack 
can modify things data or someone (or something) can take control of the things 
and try to fabricate data where the data is stored. From this point of view, we have 
run some abnormal activities on storage layer and tried to distinguish those from 
normal activities.    We believe, if MIM or things tries to fabricate data or run 
suspicious activities, it will create similar patterns at storage devices.  
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7.6  Data Collection and Analysis with Three Layered 
Approach 
 
Fig. 7.10. Data collection and analysis with three layered approach 
 
Fig. 7.10. shows the data collection and analysis with a three layered 
approach. The data collection layer collects the data from three separate layers, 
these include things layer, Cloud layer and Big Data layer. The data collection 
layer than sends the three sets of data to the next layer which is the data 
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preparation layer, this is the place where all the three different layers of data are 
merged into one and converted to a .csv format. Once the conversion to .csv is 
done than the .csv file needs to be reconverted to .arff file, the .arff file format is 
for the software called WEKA where we can do the analysis of the data. The last 
layer is the data analysis layer, in this layer the formatted or converted file is 
added to the software called WEKA. In WEKA some operations are carried out 
such as Pre-processing, Classification and filtering is done to get the best 
possible accuracy with a set of algorithm. In the Pre-processing stage the data is 
checked if it is compatible with the software from there the next operation takes 
place which is Classification. In Classification we select the best possible 
algorithm and get try to get the maximum accuracy. The last step is the Data Filter 
Layer, in this layer the accuracy readings are improved, in our experiment we 
applied Discretization and Re-sampling as the filtering options for supervised 
learning. Our accuracy final accuracy rating was 97.6787% after applying the two 
filtering options. 
  
7.6.1  Data Analysis 
The process of classification involves sorting out any dataset based on 
predefined classes of the respective dataset. The classification process is based 
the data mining concept called machine learning techniques. These techniques 
are widely available from the computational intelligence community. Classification 
techniques are executed through various predefined algorithms. This research 
will be using the RandomForest algorithm as research has shown that 
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RandomForest algorithm can classify instances at an accuracy rate of around 
97.6787%.  
RandomForest algorithm is a trademark of Leo Breiman and Adele Culter 
[183]. RandomForest algorithm is one of the most popular methods of frameworks 
used by data scientists. RandomForest is able to classify large amounts of data 
with accuracy. RandomForest are an ensemble learning method of classification 
and regression that constructs a number of decision trees at training time and 
outputting the class that is the mode of the classes output by individual trees. The 
tree construction process is essentially based on entropy calculation which used 
to determine the node location of the decision tree. The RandomForest algorithm 
will be executed through WEKA data mining tool developed by The University of 
Waikato. 
      The analysis in Fig. 7.11. and Fig. 7.12. illustrates how RandomForest 
algorithm has assayed the dataset that is with and without filtering. The dataset 
was classified with 97.6787% accuracy which means that it can be taken as a 
very reliable outcome. The algorithm was able to classify the dataset into 18 
classes. We also used C4.5 algorithm to see if we could get a better accuracy, 
but the maximum correctly classified instances was 91.1243%. The best option 
was to use RandomForest algorithm as it gave the best results compared to other 
algorithms.  
7.6.2  Algorithm Descriptions 
In this research we have used supervised learning algorithms to identify 
the best performing algorithm when an attack happens. A supervised learning 
algorithm considers the training data to produce an inferred function, which can 
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be used for mapping new examples. An optimal scenario is basically allow for the 
algorithm to correctly determine the class labels for unseen instances which is 
also called test data. Several state-of-the-art   supervised learning algorithms are 
experimentally evaluated in the context of to stop real time cyber attack. The 
predictive power of several Decision Tree C4.5 [74], Naive Bayes [71] and 
Support Vector Machine (SVM) [73] is contrasted in our experiment. Among this 
group of algorithms we found decision tree group algorithm RandomForest [183] 
shown excellent overall predictive capabilities. RandomForest algorithm is a 
trademark of Leo Breiman and Adele Culter. RandomForest algorithm is one of 
the most popular methods of frameworks used by data scientists. It is able to 
classify large amounts of data with accuracy. RandomForest are an ensemble 
learning method for classification and regression that constructs a number of 
decision trees at training time and outputting the class that is the mode of the 
classes output by individual trees. The tree construction process is essentially 
based on entropy calculation which used to determine the node location of the 
decision tree. The RandomForest algorithm will be executed through WEKA data 
mining tool developed by The University of Waikato [183].  
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________________________________________________ 
RandomForest Algorithm [105] 
________________________________________________ 
1. For b = 1 to B: 
a. Draw a bootstrap sample Z* of size N from the 
training data. 
b. Grow a RandomForest tree Tb to the bootstrapped 
data, by recursively repeating the followings steps 
for each terminal node of the tree, until the minimum 
node size nmin is reached. 
i. Select m variables at random from the p variables. 
ii. Pick the best variable/split-point among the m. 
iii. Split the node into two daughter nodes. 
2. Output the ensemble of tress {Tb}1B. 
To make a prediction at a new point x: 
Regression:  መ݂୰୤஻(ݔ) =  
ଵ
஻  ∑ ௕ܶ
஻
௕ୀଵ (ݔ) 
Classification: Let ܥመ௕(ݔ) be the class prediction of the 
bth RandomForest tree.  
Then ܥመ୰୤஻(ݔ) = ݆݉ܽ݋ݎ݅ݐݕ ݒ݋ݐ݁ {ܥመ௕(ݔ)}1B. 
_______________________________________ 
7.6.3 Data Preparation 
We have generated attacks on dataset for experimental demonstration by 
gathering performance data. To start with, we consider eighteen types of attacks 
including no attack to differentiate the difference between a attack and a non-
attack. These are following: (A) Normal Activities of things, (B) Reboot physical 
machine, (C) Malicious insider cloning VM, (D) Malicious insider copying 
everything from a VM, (E) Malicious insiders taking snapshot of the VM, (F) 
Installing new guest VM on the same physical hardware. (G) Turn on any guest 
VM on the same physical hardware, (H) Normal Activities on Cloud Layer, (I) DoS 
attack On Cloud Layer using attack tool RDOS.exe, (J) SYN flood attack on 
Cloud, (K) HTTP-DoS attack on Cloud using attack tool LOIC, (L) Ping Flood 
attack on Cloud, (M) Normal Activities running on Hadoop ecosystem, (N) RDOS 
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Attack on Ambari port 8080, (O) LOIC Attack on Ambari port 8080, (P) XOIC 
Attack on Ambari port 8080, (Q) LOIC java Attack on Ambari port 8080, and (R) 
LOIC Attack on Hadoop's port 80. The results shown in Fig. 7.11. And Fig. 7.12. 
illustrations the amount of correctly classified instance and the incorrectly 
classified instances using WEKA. 
Classification of Results before Applying Filtering 
=== Run information === 
Time taken to build model: 1.39 seconds 
=== Stratified cross-validation === 
=== Summary === 
Correctly Classified Instances          2063               93.9008 % 
Incorrectly Classified Instances         134                 6.0992 % 
Kappa statistic                            0.9264 
Mean absolute error                        0.0137 
Root mean squared error                    0.0763 
Relative absolute error                   14.7715 % 
Root relative squared error               35.4691 % 
Coverage of cases (0.95 level)            99.1352 % 
Mean rel. region size (0.95 level)         8.8479 % 
Total Number of Instances               2197      
=== Detailed Accuracy by Class === 
TP 
Rate 
FP 
Rate 
Precision Recall F – 
Measure 
MCC ROC 
Area 
PRC 
Area 
Class 
0.990 0.009 0.960 0.990 0.975 0.969 0.999 0.992 7 
0.889 0.001 0.923 0.889 0.906 0.905 0.999 0.952 8 
1.000 0.000 0.985 1.000 0.992 0.992 1.000 1.000 9 
0.438 0.000 0.875 0.438 0.583 0.617 0.998 0.803 10 
0.750 0.000 1.000 0.750 0.857 0.865 0.970 0.846 11 
0.985 0.019 0.918 0.985 0.950 0.940 0.996 0.979 0 
0.484 0.001 0.882 0.484 0.625 0.650 0.927 0.608 1 
0.438 0.001 0.778 0.438 0.560 0.581 0.997 0.722 4 
0.800 0.001 0.923 0.800 0.857 0.858 0.997 0.918 2 
0.980 0.001 0.962 0.980 0.971 0.970 1.000 0.997 3 
0.945 0.001 0.963 0.945 0.954 0.953 0.999 0.975 5 
0.737 0.001 0.875 0.737 0.800 0.801 0.999 0.858 6 
0.953 0.023 0.947 0.953 0.950 0.928 0.994 0.987 12 
0.535 0.002 0.821 0.535 0.648 0.658 0.991 0.691 13 
0.745 0.002 0.897 0.745 0.814 0.814 0.998 0.916 14 
0.958 0.002 0.852 0.958 0.902 0.902 1.000 0.975 15 
0.987 0.005 0.937 0.987 0.961 0.958 0.999 0.971 16 
0.993 0.004 0.944 0.993 0.968 0.966 1.000 0.993 17 
0.939 0.013 0.937 0.939 0.935 0.926 0.996 0.996  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Weighted 
Avg. 
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=== Confusion Matrix === 
 
a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r Å 
Classified as 
403 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 |      a = 7 
3 24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 |      b = 8 
0 0 66 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 |      c = 9 
9 0 0 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 |      d = 10 
5 0 0 0 15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 |      e = 11 
0 0 0 0 0 383 2 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 |      f = 0 
0 0 0 0 0 16 15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 |      g = 1 
0 0 0 0 0 8 0 7 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 |      h = 4 
0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 24 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 |      i = 2 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 50 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 |      j = 3 
0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 52 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 |      k = 5 
0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 1 14 0 0 0 0 0 0 |      l = 6 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 623 5 4 4 10 8 |      m = 12 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 20 23 0 0 0 0 |      n = 13 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 0 35 0 0 1 |      o = 14 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 23 0 0 |      p = 15 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 148 0 |      q = 16 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 151 |      r = 17 
 
Fig. 7.11.  Analysis output of RandomForest algoritm in WEKA before filtering 
 
 
Classification Results after Applying Filtering 
=== Run information === 
Time taken to build model: 0.36 seconds 
=== Stratified cross-validation === 
=== Summary === 
Correctly Classified Instances          2146               97.6787 % 
Incorrectly Classified Instances         51                 2.3213 % 
Kappa statistic                            0.9721 
Mean absolute error                        0.0087 
Root mean squared error                    0.0519 
Relative absolute error                   9.4414 % 
Root relative squared error               24.136 % 
Coverage of cases (0.95 level)            99.5904 % 
Mean rel. region size (0.95 level)         8.6911 % 
Total Number of Instances               2197      
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=== Detailed Accuracy by Class === 
TP 
Rate 
FP 
Rate 
Precision Recall F – 
Measure 
MCC ROC 
Area 
PRC 
Area 
Class 
0.990 0.004 0.981 0.990 0.985 0.982 0.999 0.992 7 
0.963 0.000 1.000 0.963 0.981 0.981 1.000 0.996 8 
0.970 0.000 1.000 0.970 0.985 0.984 1.000 1.000 9 
0.938 0.000 1.000 0.938 0.968 0.968 1.000 1.000 10 
0.900 0.000 1.000 0.900 0.947 0.948 0.970 0.912 11 
0.995 0.006 0.972 0.995 0.983 0.980 1.000 0.998 0 
0.839 0.001 0.897 0.839 0.867 0.865 0.994 0.884 1 
0.813 0.000 0.929 0.813 0.867 0.868 0.999 0.956 4 
1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 2 
1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 3 
1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 5 
0.789 0.000 0.938 0.789 0.857 0.859 0.995 0.875 6 
0.982 0.009 0.979 0.982 0.980 0.972 0.999 0.997 12 
0.791 0.002 0.895 0.791 0.840 0.838 0.993 0.900 13 
0.872 0.000 0.976 0.872 0.921 0.921 1.000 0.986 14 
1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 15 
1.000 0.003 0.955 1.000 0.977 0.976 1.000 0.994 16 
1.000 0.000 0.993 1.000 0.997 0.996 1.000 1.000 17 
0.977 0.005                                                                                                                                                       0.977 0.977 0.976 0.972 0.999 0.991  
 
 
= Confusion Matrix === 
a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r Å Classified 
as 
403 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 |      a = 7 
1 26 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 |      b = 8 
2 0 64 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 |      c = 9 
1 0 0 15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 |      d = 10 
2 0 0 0 18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 |      e = 11 
1 0 0 0 0 387 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 |      f = 0 
1 0 0 0 0 4 26 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 |      g = 1 
0 0 0 0 0 3 0 13 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 |      h = 4 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 30 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 |      i = 2 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 51 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 |      j = 3 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 55 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 |      k = 5 
0 0 0 0 0 3 0 1 0 0 0 15 0 0 0 0 0 0 |      l = 6 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 642 4 1 0 6 1 |      m = 12 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 34 0 0 0 0 |      n = 13 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 41 0 0 0 |      o = 14 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 24 0 0 |      p = 15 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 150 0 |      q = 16 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 152 |      r = 17 
 
Fig. 7.12. Analysis output of RandomForest algoritm in WEKA after filtering 
 
Weighted 
Avg. 
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7.7 Experimental Results 
After carrying out the experiment with five algorithms which includes, J48, 
LMT, Heoffding, REPTree and RandomForest we noted the results down to 
compare which was the best. The graph representation shown in Fig. 7.13. Shows 
the difference of correctly classified from incorrectly classified using these 5 
algorithms. The 5 algorithms are RandomForest, J48/C4.5, LMT, HeoffdingTree 
and REPTree, out of these algorithms we found out that RandomForest was the 
best as it had 97.68 % correctly classified instances and only 2.32 % incorrectly 
classified instances were reached. The details of each algorithms performance is 
shown in Table 7.2. The table basically compares the correctly classified 
instances from the incorrectly classified instances and other comparisons include 
Kappa Statistics [184], Mean Absolute Error, Root Mean Square Error, Relative 
Absolute Error, Root Relative Squared Error, Coverage of Cases, and Mean 
Relation Region Size. After reviewing the data which was achieved for each of 
those algorithms, we can say by looking at Table 7.2, that RandomForest 
algorithm is the best option. 
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Fig. 7.13. Comparison chart between the algorithms 
 
After getting the performance results we took a closer look at the Confusion 
Matrix [78] analysis to study the details of the performance measures. The 
confusion matrix offers a clearer picture on the actual predicted classification task 
done by any classification technique class wise. The confusion matrix based 
performances are provided in Table 7.3. In the experiment, we used 10 Folds 
Cross Validation as our Test Option to give us the classification accuracy. Cross-
validation is a technique to evaluate predictive models by partitioning the original 
sample into a training set to train the model, and a test set to evaluate it. Due to 
the data size we preferred 10 fold cross validation in this research. 
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Table 7.2. Algorithms performance for cyber-attack and activities 
classification 
Comparison RandomForest Algorithm 
J48 / C4.5 
Algorithm LMT Algorithm 
HeoffdingTree 
Algorithm 
REPTree 
Algorithm 
Correctly 
Classified 
Instances 
2146 97.68 % 2002 91.124 % 1930 87.847 % 1424 64.816 % 1986 90.396 % 
Incorrectly 
Classified 
Instances 
51 2.321 % 195 8.8757 % 267 12.153 % 773 35.184 % 211 9.604 % 
Kappa Statistic 0.9721 0.893 0.8534 0.6063 0.8842 
Mean Absolute 
Error 0.0087 0.0118 0.0182 0.0401 0.0159 
Root Mean 
Square Error 0.0519 0.0978 0.1072 0.1946 0.0966 
Relative 
Absolute Error 9.4414 % 12.724 % 19.6069 % 43.2991 % 17.1304 % 
Root Relative 
Squared Error 24.136 % 45.4894 % 49.8469 % 90.483 % 44.9165 % 
Coverage of 
Cases (0.95 
Level) 
99.5904 % 92.3077 % 94.0373 % 68.1384 % 95.767 % 
Mean Rel. 
Region Size (0.95 
Level) 
8.6911 % 6.6606 % 8.2259 % 6.2611 % 8.6709 % 
Total Number of 
Instances 2197 2197 2197 2197 2197 
 
In 10-fold cross-validation, the original sample is randomly partitioned into 10 
equal size subsamples. Of the 10 subsamples, a single subsample is retained as 
the validation data for testing the model, and the remaining (10-1) subsamples 
are used as training data. The cross-validation process is then repeated 10 times 
(the folds), with each of the 10 subsamples used exactly once as the validation 
data. The 10 results from the folds can then be averaged (or otherwise combined) 
to produce a single estimation. The advantage of this method is that all 
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observations are used for both training and validation, and each observation is 
used for validation exactly once 
Table 7.3. RandomForest inside performance analysis 
 
a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r 
10FCV Attack 
Classification 
Performance 
a 403 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
93.9008% 
b 3 24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
c 0 0 66 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
d 9 0 0 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
e 5 0 0 0 15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
f 0 0 0 0 0 383 2 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
g 0 0 0 0 0 16 15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
h 0 0 0 0 0 8 0 7 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
i 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 24 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
j 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 50 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
k 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 52 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
l 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 1 14 0 0 0 0 0 0 
m 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 623 5 4 4 10 8 
n 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 20 23 0 0 0 0 
o 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 0 35 0 0 1 
p 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 23 0 0 
q 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 148 0 
r 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 151 
 
Looking at the confusion matrix in Table 7.3, we take into account the first 
row of attack that is normal activities on Cloud layer. There are a total of 407 
instances for normal activities on Cloud layer out of which 403 instances are 
correctly classified, 2 are incorrectly classified as DoS attack on Cloud layer using 
attack tool RDOS.exe, 1 is incorrectly classified as SYN flood attack on Cloud, 
and 1 is incorrectly classified as HTTP-DoS attack on Cloud using attack tool 
LOIC. Looking at the second attack using DoS attack on Cloud layer using attack 
tool RDOS.exe there were a total of 27 instances out of which 24 are correctly 
classified and 3 is incorrectly classified as normal activities on Cloud layer. In the 
Third attack using SYN flood attack on Cloud there were a total of 66 instances 
and all of them were correctly classified. Looking at the fourth attack called HTTP-
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DoS attack on Cloud using attack tool LOIC, there were a total of 16 instances 
out of which 7 were correctly classified and 9 were incorrectly classified as normal 
activities on Cloud layer. The fifth attack was based on ping flood attack on Cloud, 
where the total numbers of instances were 20 out of which 15 were correctly 
classified and 5 were incorrectly classified as normal activities on Cloud layer. 
The sixth attack was done using normal activities of things, where there were a 
total of 389 instances and out of that 383 were correctly classified, 2 were 
incorrectly classified as rebooting physical machine, 2 were incorrectly classified 
as malicious insiders taking snapshot of the VM, and another 2 were classified as 
turning on any guest VM on the same physical hardware. The seventh attack 
involved rebooting physical machine and there were a total of 31 instances 
involved out of that 15 were correctly classified and 16 were incorrectly classified 
as normal activities of things. The eighth attack were based on malicious insiders 
taking snapshot of the VM where the total number of instances were 16 out of 
which only 7 were correctly classified, 8 were incorrectly classified as normal 
activities of things, and another 1 was incorrectly classified as malicious insiders 
cloning the VM. The ninth attack was based on malicious insider cloning VM, 
there were a total of 30 instances in that and out of that 24 were correctly 
classified, 3 were incorrectly classified as normal activities of things, 2 were 
classified as malicious insider copying everything from a VM, and 1 was 
incorrectly classified as installing new guest VM on the same physical hardware. 
The tenth attack was involved with malicious insiders copying everything from a 
VM and it had a total of 51 instances out of that, 50 were correctly classified and 
1 was incorrectly classified as malicious insider cloning VM.  The eleventh attack 
involved installing new guest VM on the same physical hardware, which had a 
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total of 55 instances out of which 52 were correctly classified and 3 were 
incorrectly classified as normal activities of things. The twelfth attack was done 
by turning on any guest VM on the same physical hardware which had a total of 
19 instances and out of that 14 were correctly classified, 4 were incorrectly 
classified as normal activities of things and another 1 was incorrectly classified as 
installing new guest VM on the same physical hardware. The thirteenth attack 
was normal activities running on Hadoop ecosystem, it had a total of 654 
instances out of that 623 were correctly classified whereas 5 were incorrectly 
classified as RDOS attack on Ambari’s port 8080, 4 were incorrectly classified as 
LOIC attack on Ambari’s port 8080, 4 were incorrectly classified as XOIC attack 
on Ambari’s port 8080, 10 were incorrectly classified as LOIC Java attack on 
Ambari’s port 8080, and another 8 instances were incorrectly classified as LOIC 
Java attack on Ambari’s port 8080. The fourteenth attack was RDOS attack on 
Ambari’s port 8080, where there were a total of 43 instances out of that 23 were 
correctly classified and other 20 were incorrectly classified as normal activities 
running on Hadoop ecosystem. The fifteenth attack was LOIC attack on Ambari’s 
port 8080, there were a total of 46 instances and out of that 35 were correctly 
classified, 11 were incorrectly classified as normal activities running on Hadoop 
ecosystem, another 1 was incorrectly classified as LOIC attack on Hadoop’s port 
80. The sixteenth attack was XOIC attack on Ambari’s port 8080, there were 24 
instances in total out of that 24, 23 were correctly classified and 1 was incorrectly 
classified as normal activities running on Hadoop ecosystem. The seventeenth 
attack was LOIC Java attack on Ambari’s port 8080 and it had a total of 150 
instances, out of that 148 were correctly classified and 2 were incorrectly 
classified as normal activities running on Hadoop ecosystem. The last attack was 
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based on LOIC Attack on Hadoop's port 80, it had a total of 152 instances and 
151 instances were correctly classified and 1 was incorrectly classified as normal 
activities running on Hadoop ecosystem. Table 7.4 shows the list of attacks and 
activities used for our experiment. This basically distinguishes and differentiates 
between each attack and activity. 
Table 7.4. Classification attacks lists 
a Normal Activities on Cloud Layer 
b DoS attack On Cloud Layer using attack tool 
RDOS.exe 
c SYN flood attack on Cloud 
d HTTP-DoS attack on Cloud using attack tool 
LOIC 
e Ping Flood attack on Cloud 
f Normal Activities of things 
g Reboot physical machine 
h Malicious insiders taking snapshot of the VM 
i Malicious insider Cloning VM 
j Malicious insider copying everything from a VM 
k Installing new guest VM on the same physical 
hardware 
l Turn on any guest VM on the same physical 
hardware 
m Normal Activities running on Hadoop 
ecosystem 
n RDOS Attack on Ambari port 8080 
o LOIC Attack on Ambari port 8080 
p XOIC Attack on Ambari port 8080 
q LOIC Java Attack on Ambari port 8080 
r LOIC Attack on Hadoop's port 80 
 
However, in the current setup which we analyzed there were no sort of 
filtering done to those data in classification algorithms. According to Gavin et al. 
[144] there is always some noisy data present in the analyzed data. In an example 
regarding proteins Gavin et al. [144] suggests that there are significant amounts 
of false-positive protein interactions present in that experiment data. Gavin et al. 
[144] also estimates that 30% or more of protein interactions detected in that 
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example may be spurious, as inferred from duplicate analyses of 13 refined 
protein complexes [145]. Taking this is account filtering was applied to our data 
set. We used Discretization filtering algorithm to improve the classification 
problem, this is done to remove noisy data. 
A researcher named Fisher [146] reveals that discretization is a small part 
Statistics and that it has an exceptional case of one-dimensional clustering. 
During the nineties the research in the field of discretization grew and supervised 
methods were developed [147, 148]. There are other fields that discretization has 
affected drastically, in areas such as where discretization can actually enhance 
the performance of discrete methods such as Associate Rule Construction [149] 
or the Machine Learning of a Bayesian Network [150]. In our experiment we have 
used the method called “Global Discretization” [151]. 
After filtering task was carried out, the most irrelevant instances have been 
removed from data. The second stage is to feed the same test data with more 
rigorously data mining processes by using earlier model. Fig. 7.14. shows how 
the algorithm works and how the selected test option works in this experiment. 
The improved results of the filtering performances have illustrated in Table 7.5. 
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Fig. 7.14. Graphical Representation of the Machine Learning Work Flow for this 
experiment 
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Table 7.5. RandonForest performance after adopting filtering approach 
 
 
a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r 
10FCV Attack 
Classification 
Performance 
a 403 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
97.6787 % 
b 1 26 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
c 2 0 64 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
d 1 0 0 15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
e 2 0 0 0 18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
f 1 0 0 0 0 387 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
g 1 0 0 0 0 4 26 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
h 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
i 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 30 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
j 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 51 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
k 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 55 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
l 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 1 0 0 0 15 0 0 0 0 0 0 
m 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 642 4 1 0 6 1 
n 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 34 0 0 0 0 
o 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 41 0 0 0 
p 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 24 0 0 
q 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 150 0 
r 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 152 
 
Looking at the confusion matrix in Table 7.5, we could compare and see 
that there are a lot of differences when using filtering.  We look into the first row 
of attack that is Normal Activities on Cloud Layer. There are a total of 407 
instances for normal activities on Cloud layer out of which 403 instances are 
correctly classified, 1 is incorrectly classified as rebooting physical machine, and 
3 are incorrectly classified as malicious insiders taking snapshot of the virtual 
machine.  
Looking at the second attack using DoS attack on Cloud layer using attack 
tool RDOS.exe there were a total of 27 instances out of which 26 are correctly 
classified and only 1 is incorrectly classified as normal activities on Cloud layer. 
In the Third attack using SYN flood attack on Cloud there were a total of 66 
instances, out of that 64 were correctly classified and 2 were incorrectly classified 
as normal activities on Cloud layer. Looking at the forth attack called HTTP-DoS 
attack on Cloud using attack tool LOIC, there were a total of 16 instances out of 
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which 15 were correctly classified and only 1 was incorrectly classified as normal 
activities on Cloud layer.  
The fifth attack was based on ping flood attack on Cloud, where the total 
number of instances were 20 out of which 18 were correctly classified and 2 were 
incorrectly classified as normal activities on Cloud layer. The sixth attack was 
done using normal activities of things, where there were a total of 389 instances 
and out of that 387 were correctly classified, 1 was incorrectly classified as normal 
activities on Cloud layer and another 1 was incorrectly classified as normal 
activities running on Hadoop ecosystem.  
The seventh attack involved rebooting physical machine and there were a 
total of 31 instances involved out of that 26 were correctly classified, 4 were 
incorrectly classified as normal activities of things and 1 was incorrectly classified 
as normal activities on Cloud layer. The eighth attack were based on malicious 
insiders taking snapshot of the virtual machine where the total number of 
instances were 16 out of which only 13 were correctly classified and 3 were 
incorrectly classified as normal activities of things. The ninth attack was based on 
malicious insider cloning virtual machine, there were a total of 30 instances and 
all 30 instances were correctly classified. The tenth attack was involved with 
malicious insiders copying everything from a VM and it had a total of 51 instances 
and all 51 instances were correctly classified. The eleventh attack involved 
installing new guest virtual machine on the same physical hardware, which had a 
total of 55 instances and all 55 instances were correctly classified. The twelfth 
attack was done by turning on any guest virtual machine on the same physical 
hardware which had a total of 19 instances and out of that 15 were correctly 
classified, 3 were incorrectly classified as normal activities of things and another 
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1 was incorrectly classified as malicious insiders taking snapshot of the virtual 
machine. The thirteenth attack was normal activities running on Hadoop 
ecosystem, it had a total of 654 instances out of that 642 were correctly classified 
whereas 4 were incorrectly classified as RDOS attack on Ambari’s port 8080, 1 
was incorrectly classified as LOIC attack on Ambari’s port 8080, 6 were incorrectly 
classified as LOIC Java attack on Ambari’s port 8080, and another 1 instance was 
incorrectly classified as LOIC Java attack on Hadoop’s port 80. The fourteenth 
attack was RDOS attack on Ambari’s port 8080, where there were a total of 43 
instances out of that 34 were correctly classified and other 9 were incorrectly 
classified as normal activities running on Hadoop ecosystem. The fifteenth attack 
was LOIC attack on Ambari’s port 8080, there were a total of 46 instances and 
out of that 41 were correctly classified and 5 were incorrectly classified as normal 
activities running on Hadoop ecosystem. The sixteenth attack was XOIC attack 
on Ambari’s port 8080, there were 24 instances in total out of that 24, all were 
correctly classified. The seventeenth attack was LOIC Java attack on Ambari’s 
port 8080 and it had a total of 150 instances and all were correctly classified as 
LOIC java attack on Ambari port 8080. The last attack was based on LOIC Attack 
on Hadoop's port 80, it had a total of 152 instances and all 152 instances were 
correctly classified. Table 7.4 shows the list of attacks and activities used for our 
experiment. By comparing the two confusion matrix in Table 7.3 and Table 7.5 it 
can be seen that the filtering gave a better accuracy than previously.  
The performance data in Table 7.5 confirmed that the proposed 
RandomForest machine learning method that combines filtering and data mining 
processes is able to filter out most irrelevant instances and reduce the chance of 
generating noisy patterns hence improve the computational accuracy and 
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efficiency which basically safe the system more likely from the above types of 
cyber-attacks. For filtering we took the data and classified it as it was and got a 
accuracy of 93.9008%. Once we got that accuracy our team tried to improve this 
result than the filtering option we used was Discretization from which we got 
93.9918% just slightly improved from the previous classification. Next our team 
tried the Resampling filtering option and finally we got our best result which was 
97.6787%. 
7.8  Related Works 
After doing the comparative benchmarks from past year papers and 
comparing the accuracy it can be said that our results are more accurate. As 
shown in Fig. 7.15 and Table 7.6, our performance accuracy is 97.6787% that is 
the highest accuracy achieved while doing machine learning. The results were 
also filtered and the algorithm RandomForest was used to achieve this 
percentage. We compared data from five different papers and there scores are 
as follows: Tjhai et al (2010) attained an accuracy of 51% which is just above the 
50% threshold. Spathoulas & Katsikas (2010) also used machine learning to get 
the accuracy rating, and they got an accuracy of 75%. Al-Mamory & Zhang (2010) 
got accuracy of 82%, which was the highest accuracy so far before our 
experiment. Hoang et al (2009) got an accuracy of just over 45% mark, which is 
the lowest in the comparison between six performance statistics. Pietraszek & 
Tanner (2005) achieved an accuracy of 52% just above the 50% mark. So as 
stated and also shown in Fig. 7.15 and Table 7.6, it proves that our results are 
11.9008% more accurate than the previously suggested performance accuracy 
of 82%. 
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Fig. 7.15. Comparative benchmarks 
Table 7.6. Detailed comparison 
Reference Year 
Does Cloud 
Customers 
has easy 
access to the 
data Set? 
Method 
Will it 
work in 
Cloud 
Systems? 
Will it work in 
Pre Cloud 
System 
Systems? 
Used 
Architectural 
Complexities to 
Experimental 
advantage? 
Can it 
identify 
attacks and 
activities? 
Tjhai et al 
[152] 
2010 No 
SOM Neural 
Network and K-
means 
Algorithm 
Yes Yes No Not Tested 
Spathoulas 
and Katsikas 
[153] 
2010 No 
Filtering 
Algorithms 
Yes Yes No Not Tested 
Al-Mamory 
and Zhang 
[154] 
2010 No 
Filtering 
Algorithms 
Yes Yes No Not Tested 
Hoang et al. 
[155] 
2009 No 
Hidden Markov 
Model (HMM) 
Yes Yes No Not Tested 
Pietrazek 
and Tanner 
[156] 
2005 No 
Data Mining 
Clustering & 
Machine 
Learning 
Yes Yes No Not Tested 
This 
Research 
2015 Yes 
RandomForest 
Algorithm with 
Filtering 
Yes No Yes Yes 
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97.6787%
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7.9 Conclusions 
The novelty of this research was firstly to present IoT integration with Cloud 
Computing and Big Data using a three layered approach. Secondly, collecting 
and merging performance data from all three layers regardless of what hardware, 
software and platform used. Finally, to accomplish our goal we have used real 
time performance data and modern machine learning algorithms were applied to 
distinguish 18 different attacks and activities with a noteworthy precision of 
97.6787 % for attack detection using filtering in RandomForest algorithm. We 
consider the reason why we achieved this high accuracy in attack detection is 
because we used the complex nature of Cloud architecture to our advantage. 
There is a need to develop multi-layer cyber-attack detection system by 
future researchers for complex IoT architecture by proposing layered approaches 
as shown in this research. Our suggestion is to have well documented models 
consisting of how the data is collected, prepared, analysed and filtered in layered 
approaches. There is an open challenge for future research to reach higher 
accuracy level or getting 100 percent accuracy by proposing any novel algorithm. 
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Chapter 8 
Conclusions 
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8.1  Summary 
Despite the great potential that Cloud Computing holds, we are witnessing 
a lack of enthusiasm among the consumers; a phenomenon we believe is largely 
attributable to data security concerns. Organizations desire assurances that their 
valuable data are not compromised. Because of many benefits that Cloud 
Computing can offer, it is of critical importance that the gaps in security measures 
be identified and addressed. Unfortunately, Cloud services do pose as an 
attractive target to any cyber-criminal because it is a one-stop shop to do all kinds 
of cyber-criminal activities as these services contain many user and 
organizational data.  
From a security point of view, Cloud Computing actually inherits all the 
security issues from existing systems plus the security issues that has been 
created due to its unique architecture and features.  While the complexity of Cloud 
architecture makes traditional way of cyber-attack detection challenging,   a cloud 
provider’s unwillingness to share security related data with its clients adds to the 
difficulty of detection by a Cloud customer. Hence this is a great need to develop 
cyber-attack detection system for Cloud Computing where a Cloud customer can 
identify malicious activities and cyber-attacks with the limited resources and 
access they have. It will be even better if customers can use the complexity of 
Cloud Computing to their advantage on the way discovering attacks as it will be 
more efficient. The system also need to be good enough to minimize false 
positives. 
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The foremost focus of this thesis was to propose a suitable solution 
for Cloud customers that answers all three research questions and provide 
satisfactory resolution backed by experimental analysis. 
x How Cloud customers can proactively detect cyber-attacks 
on Cloud Computing without any help from Cloud service 
providers?  
x In cyber-attack detection process, what is the way for Cloud 
customers to use the complexity of Cloud architecture to their 
advantage? 
x In cyber-attack detection model in Cloud Computing, what 
can be done to reduce false alarm?  
The study has proposed Cloud customers to use performance data of their 
virtual machines for insider’s activities and cyber-attack detection as it is available 
to all Cloud users and does not require any help from Cloud providers to generate 
this data. For shared on demand nature of Cloud systems, these performance 
data is actually attached to the fundamental core of Cloud systems, the study has 
also achieved significant high accuracy in attack detection as it used complex 
nature Cloud architecture to an advantage. To reduce false alarms the study has 
successfully distinguished attacks and activities using modern machine learning 
algorithms and comparative benchmark has been drawn to compare attack 
detection with others that too has used machine learning for attack detection. 
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8.2  Outcomes of the Thesis 
The study followed step by step procedure to achieve its goal. Starting from 
extensive review, initial thought to combat cyber-attacks, detection of insiders 
activities were first few milestones. The research then worked with identifying DoS 
attacks and later on it focused on more complex environments of Big Data Cloud 
and IoT Cloud.  This part of the thesis summarises the outcome of the study and 
focuses how the objective as well as the design goals of the study were met. 
Chapter 2 presented an extensive literature review on Cloud Computing 
with the main focus on gaps that is hindering Cloud adoption has been undertaken 
and, at the same time, a review on threat remediation challenges has been 
performed.   
Chapter 3 constructed some thoughts with the help of initial data.  
Experimenting through a constructed set up, we presented the performances of 
several of the most popular machine learning techniques on attack identification 
in a Cloud environment and, a comparison on performances has been made. We 
used a statistical ranking approach for the final selection of a learning technique 
for the task. We found that rule based technique C4.5 and PART are equally 
efficient techniques to solve our problem at hand. However, based on the 
computational performance we suggest C4.5 as the better technique for real time 
attack protection in a Cloud environment. 
We evaluated each technique’s performance through different 
performance evaluation matrices that included the rigorous testing of 10-fold 
cross validation, True Positive Rate (TP), False Positive Rate (FP), Precision, 
Recall, F-measure and the area of Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC). In 
another phase, we also counted computational complexity for our final selection. 
191 
 
Our experimental outcome corroborated the fact that C4.5 provided not only a 
better performance than other techniques, but also the level of performance is of 
acceptable standard.  
Chapter 4 presented the performances of several of the most popular 
machine learning techniques on our activity modelling in a Cloud Computing 
environment and a comparison on performances has been made in identifying a 
particular malicious activity. We found rule based technique C4.5 is an efficient 
technique to solve our problem at hand.  
We evaluated a technique’s performance through different performance 
evaluation matrices with the rigorous testing of 10-fold cross validation. Our 
experimental outcome demonstrated that C4.5 provided not only a better 
performance than other techniques, but also the level of performance is of 
acceptable standard. The other algorithms tested were Naive Bayes, Multilayer 
Perceptron, SVM and PART techniques, which as a future task, would be 
subjected to further tests by adopting their best parameters for more real-world 
activity classification problems. 
Chapter 5 attempted a resolution of one of the major trust issues between 
Cloud providers and their customers: “Cloud providers are not transparent and try 
to hide security related data from their customers”. We endeavoured to empower 
the customers with a novel approach on how Cloud customers can detect cyber-
attack happening in their VM by collecting performance data and using machine 
learning techniques. The reason for using performance data here instead of 
traditional security logs and data is that, Cloud customers can easily generate 
performance data of their VM using built-in or third party software without 
assistance from the Cloud providers. We demonstrated through performance 
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charts from hypervisor and performance plots from our data collection 
spreadsheet to show how accurately these kinds of data can be collected during 
an attack. We also presented the performances of several of the most popular 
machine learning techniques on attack identification in a Cloud environment and, 
a comparison on performances has been made. We used accuracy measure for 
the final selection of a learning technique for the task. In this chapter we 
suggested the use of AdaBoost method with base classifier J48 to protect the 
Cloud Computing environment from the cyber-attacks. The major advantage of 
AdaBoost is that it considers a weighted sample to focus learning on the most 
difficult attack rather than a random sample of the training data. Moreover, this 
method incorporates weighted vote instead of combining classifiers with equal 
vote, the latter is very common in the traditional learning theory. 
Chapter 6 showed a novel approach in cyber-attacks detection on Big Data 
Cloud even when Hadoop is under attack. While other researchers are trying to 
detect these attacks on Big Data Cloud using Hadoop itself, no one actually 
indicated - how these detection will work when some part of Hadoop is under 
attack and become incapable of communication with the rest of its ecosystem. To 
accomplish our goal, we have used real time performance data from Hadoop VM 
and using modern machine learning algorithms we reached significant accuracy 
of 96.3687% for attack detection using filtering in PART algorithm.  
Chapter 7 presented a vision of IoT integration with the power of Cloud 
Computing and the intelligence of Big Data analytics using a three layered 
approach. It also carried an experiment collecting and merging performance data 
from all three layers regardless of what hardware, software and platform used. 
193 
 
Finally, to accomplish our goal we have used real time performance data and 
modern machine learning algorithms were applied to distinguish 18 different 
attacks and activities with a noteworthy precision of 97.6787 % for attack 
detection using filtering in RandomForest algorithm. We consider the reason why 
we achieved this high accuracy in attack detection is because we used the 
complex nature of Cloud architecture to our advantage. 
Therefore, key contributions of this thesis are: 
x An extensive investigative survey on Cloud Computing with the main focus 
on gaps that is slowing down Cloud adoption as well as reviewing the threat 
remediation challenges. 
x Some experimentally supported thoughts on novel approaches to address 
some of the widely discussed cyber-attack types using machine learning 
techniques. The thoughts have been constructed in such a way so that 
Cloud customers can detect the cyber-attacks in their VM without much 
help from Cloud service provider. 
x Classifying real life insiders’ activities from the performance data in a 
hypervisor and its guest operating systems, this experimental result not 
only successfully detect insiders’ activities but can also be used in complex 
Cloud environments such as Big Data Cloud or IoT Cloud to reduce false 
alarms in cyber-attack detection systems.  
x Experimentally validate model for classifying different Denial of Service 
attacks in Cloud Computing using rule-based learning. 
x An alternative view of “Big Data Cloud” with the main aim to make this 
complex technology easy to understand for new researchers and identify 
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gaps efficiently and showed a novel approach in cyber-attacks detection 
on Big Data Cloud even when Hadoop is under attack. 
x A vision on integrating Internet-of-Things (IoT) with the power of Cloud 
Computing and the intelligence of Big Data analytics. Used layered 
approach in cyber-attack detection and collected performance data from 
all these layers, then combined these data together and applied modern 
machine learning techniques to distinguish 18 different activities and 
cyber-attacks. 
 
8.3 Benefits 
Several novel and significant contributions were proposed in this thesis 
which are expected to be of benefit to the organizations, Cloud customers, Cloud 
service providers, researchers and finally the community. The key benefits of this 
study are:  
x Guideline on top security threats and their existing solutions. 
x Guideline on challenges/obstacles in implementing threat remediation. 
x An experimentally validated model for cyber-attack detection where a 
cloud customer can detect cyber-attacks and malicious activities 
happening on their VM without considerable help from Cloud service 
providers. 
x An effective model for cyber-attack detection in Cloud systems that use 
complexity of Cloud architecture to its advantage. 
x An alternative view of “Big Data Cloud” to make this complex technology 
easy to understand for new researchers and identify gaps efficiently 
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x An experimentally validate model to detect cyber-attack on Big Data Cloud 
even when its central management interface become paralysed by 
attackers. 
x A vision on integrating Internet-of-Things (IoT) with the power of Cloud 
Computing and the intelligence of Big Data analytics. 
x An experimentally validate model in cyber-attack detection in a very 
complex environment when Internet of Things integrates with the power of 
Cloud Computing and with the intelligence of Big Data analytics. 
 
8.4 Future Works 
Notwithstanding the fact that Cloud Computing is still emerging in the 
information technology landscape, it is still in merging process with some other 
new technologies such as Big Data and IoT and so many of the future threats 
may still be unknown, we can always train a machine with the range of attack 
patterns learned in the past and slot that in the new architecture. 
This study is still inchoate which requires development in different areas. 
Therefore, we envisage further investigations and growth into the following areas 
and issues would be useful: 
x Develop a real-time monitoring system with a large volume of data that will 
help in proactive attack detection model using modern machine learning 
techniques and learning tools such as R. Conduct experimental analysis 
to investigate the real world documented attack scenarios that usually 
occur as a combination of various cyber-attacks types. 
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x Investigate and analyse the potential challenges of real life implementation 
of proactive attack detection model, how Cloud providers can co-operate 
with their customers in this regard? Propose suitable solutions to mitigate 
these problems with the help of a series of experiments. For instance, 
identifying combination of attacks in Cloud Computing using supervised 
learning and develop new novelty detection model for cyber-attacks in 
Cloud Computing using unsupervised learning, therefore identify the 
attacks in an intelligent way. 
x There is a need to develop multi-layer detection system by future 
researchers for complex Big Data Cloud architecture by proposing layered 
approaches consisting of at least 3 layers. Our suggestion is to use the 3 
layer approach with the first layer being created with security features 
already built in with Hadoop. The second layer must analyse performance 
data with data generated in hypervisor and the third layer should use 
traditional log methods which was very successful in attack detection for 
traditional systems. The architecture of this layered approach can be in 
any order, however it need to be smart enough to logically start plan B as 
Ambari or other interfaces stop talking to the core infrastructure. Or 
perhaps let the core run with Plan A and automatically start Plan B on 
remote interfaces that has lost communication. 
Similarly, there is also a need to develop multi-layer cyber-attack detection 
system by future researchers for complex IoT Cloud architecture by 
proposing layered approaches as shown in this research. Our suggestion 
is to have well documented models consisting of how the data is collected, 
prepared, analysed and filtered in layered approaches.  
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x There is an open challenge for future research to reach higher accuracy 
level or getting 100 percent accuracy by proposing any novel algorithm and 
develop pattern analysis graph using database where machine learning 
will be able to detect any novel attacks. 
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